Mitchell Library, State Library of New South Wales

Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett diary and papers, 1915-1917
A 1583

[Note: this transcription has been automatically generated from a typed document and may contain typographical errors. The volume contains:
- Correspondence related to the purchase of the papers by the Library of New South Wales.
- Ashmead Bartlett’s Gallipoli diary from 25 March 1915 to 31 December 1915. Page 8.
- Review of the Situation in Gallipoli. Page 217.
- Memorandum on the Situation in Gallipoli. Page 237.
- Letter to Mr Herbert Asquith, British Prime Minister. Page 245.]

[Page 4]
[Previous pages are cover and inside front cover]
Correspondence and records of the negotiations for the purchase of these papers are in records in the Principal Librarian’s Office, indexed as No. 16/360
The Public Library Of New South Wales,
Sydney, 3rd July 1917.
(To be attached to the Bartlett Papers)
Besides the papers in this bundle there are due from Bartlett the originals of his cables from the Dardanelles, between March and October, 1915. These originals have been paid for in the general account, and Angus & Robertson's agent, in London - Mr. George - has an order from Bartlett addressed to the Manager of the Eastern Telegraph Company, asking him to hand over to Mr. George these documents on the termination of the War.
The papers in our Records also show copies of letters from Bartlett to the Postmaster General and a reply thereon that the documents will be kept by the Manager of the Eastern Telegraph Company and handed over at the proper time. I wrote to Angus and Robertson to-day, reminding them that 'these documents are still due and asking them to remind their agent in London so that he would not overlook it.

[Page 5]
Ashmead Bartlett Papers - Conditions of purchase and arrangements re deposit in Mitchell Library.
Public Library Of New South Wales.
5th April, 1916.

Messrs. Angus & Robertson, Ltd.,
Castlereagh Street,
Dear Sirs,
Referring to my conversation with Mr. George Robertson yesterday concerning the proposed purchase of originals of despatches from Mr. Ashmead Bartlett, I have to say, with the approval of the President of Trustees, that I shall be glad if you will endeavour to purchase for the Trustees the documents mentioned on the rough list submitted to Mr. Robertson by Mr Bartlett, comprising the original typewritten despatches before alteration by the censor, and the same as altered, Mr. Bartlett’s memorandum to the British Cabinet concerning the state of affairs at the Dardanelles, and his briefer memorandum submitted at Mr. Asquith’s request on the ' same subject, together with any other similar documents which May have been offered by Mr. Bartlett; the whole at a price not exceeding £300. We expect that you May be able to secure these documents at no greater sum than £200, but as the papers mentioned are typewritten and presumably contain no manuscript other than Mr.Bartlett’s signature, it is desirable that if possible the author should add manuscript annotations where such would serve to explain or elucidate any part of the despatches or other papers, or would add value by connecting them with circumstances which May have arisen since the papers were written; such, for instance, as a note attached to the letter to Mr. Asquith, stating that this was forwarded at Mr. Asquith’s request as more suitable for submission to Cabinet than the longer memorandum dated June 6th, 1915, also that Mr. Bartlett considered that this shorter memorandum to Mr. Asquith led to his, Mr. Bartlett’s, withdrawal and probably the evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsular; and any similar particulars which might increase the value of such documents.
In order that Mr. Bartlett should be encouraged to make such manuscript addenda, we are willing to pay him an extra sum on receipt of the documents, such sum to be estimated by us after considering the increased value which such documents would possess through the addition of such manuscript memoranda.
Whatever else should be added in the way of manuscript, it is necessary of course that each document should bear the autograph signature of Mr. Bartlett.
We desire that you and your agents in London should take such precautions as you May consider necessary to ensure that these originals of the despatches and memoranda should be the only copies sold or distributed in any way by Mr. Bartlett, except that he May have the permission which he demands to utilize any part of these papers for the preparation of the book-which he mentions he will at some future time publish concerning the whole matter.

[Page 6]
It is desirable also that Mr. Bartlett should make a statutory declaration guaranteeing that these documents are really what we purchase them for, that is, originals of despatches and memoranda as he has offered to sell to Mr. Robertson according to the rough memoramdum in Mr. Robertsons possession.
Your commission on the transaction will of course be at the rates customary between us, that is 10 per cent, on the maximum limit price of the Trustees, viz., £300; and the Trustees will recoup you any expenses which you May consider it necessary to undertake in arranging and completing the transaction.
We understand and agree to the condition of purchase mentioned by Mr. Bartlett, namely that the documents after purchase by the Trustees will be regarded as confidential, and locked away in the Mitchell Library safe during the continuance of the war and for a period of two years after the declaration of peace. We desire you to exercise your own excellent judgment in making the arrangements which you consider necessary to safeguard the Trustees in your dealings with Mr. Bartlett.
I am, dear Sirs,
Yours faithfully,
W. H. Ifould,
Principal Librarian.

[Page 7]
Bartlett, E. Ashmead
1. Diary of Gallipoli Campaign
2. Review of the situation in Gallipoli
3. Memorandum on the situation in Gallipoli [Resume of no. 2 for Cabinet]
4. Letter to Mr Asquith

[Page 8]
[Editor’s note: This diary begins with Ashmead Bartlett’s appointment in March 1915, as representative of the British press to report on the Dardenelles Expedition. It covers the campaign from the initial landings, both Anzac and British. His visit to London in June with conversations with Winston Churchill, and senior Ministers and a detailed account of the disastrous British action in August at Suvla Bay. His letter to the Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith, and his forced return to England in early October. His lecture tour and his departure for Australia at end of December 1915. His many spelling and typing errors have not been corrected]

Diary of Gallipoli Campaign EAB. E Ashmead Bartlett

Thursday March 25th 1915
This morning I left London accompanied by Lester Lawrence,
who was to represent Reuters at the Dardanelles Expedition. The Admirality and War Office having consented to allow two, representatives of the Press to go to the Front. The Newspaper Proprietor’s Association then met to elect a representative, and Harry Lawson is the President of it. Several names were proposed by the "Daily Mail" and "The Times", but these were immediately turned down, or else violently opposed "by the "Daily Chronicle", "The Daily News" or the "Morning Post". The discussion went on without any conclusion being arrived at, until Harry Lawson said "Well I am willing to let Ashmead-Bartlett go.

"The Times" and the "Daily Mail" at once jumped up and said that I was perfectly acceptable to them, and wanted to have me elected on the spot. Lawson, however, said he thought it better that the meeting should adjourn for three days, and that meanwhile they, the representatives should consult their owners, as to my election. Lawson sent for me the same evening and told me what he had done, so that for the next three days, I remained in a expectancy wondering whether my appointment would meet with violent opposition at the last minute. The Friday before the date on which I am writing, the meeting was held, and I was unanimously elected without opposition. That is how I came to represent the entire London Press at the Dardanelles. I then got in touch with the Admiralty, and received my instructions to make my own way to Malta, and then to report myself to Admiral Limpus, who would arrange for me to continue my journey, to wheresoever the Fleet was to be found. I delayed my departure for one

[Page 9]
day, in order to wait for Lawrence, who could not get his kit ready in time. We left Victoria at 8.30 a.m. intending to cross by Boulogne, but at arriving at the boat, we were not allowed on board, because of some absurd new regulation about passports, which we had not complied with. We rushed up to the French Consulate, had the necessary changes made, but on our return the boat had already left, and we had to wait for the 12 o’clock boat to cross via Dieppe. On the boat I met Will Irwin. Fortunately we reached Paris in time to catch the 9 o’clock train to Milan.

Friday March 26th
We spent all day in the train arriving in Milan at 3 p.m. and as we did not leave until 9.30 p.m. we had time to visit the Cathedral and other sights.

Saturday March 27th
We arrived in Rome at 10 a.m. and went to the Grand Hotel. I then found that it would be impossible to cross from Syracuse to Malta until Wednesday evening, so that I might just as well have stayed in London another two days. At this time, we knew nothing of what was happening at the Dardanelles, except from unofficial reports written from the Island or from Athens, and the short official statements occasionally appeared. All I knew was that there was to be a landing on the Gallipoli Peninsular, on a large scale, and that I understood the Expedition was almost ready to start and this made me extremely keen to reach my destination without delay. I took Lawrence for a long drive around Rome, and we visited all the usual historic spots with the inevitable guide. My heart being at the Dardanelles

[Page 10]
I was somewhat bored with having to revisit Rome. In the evening at the Grand Hotel I met my old Constantinople friend Prince Djmil Tossoun, who is married to a sister of the Khedive or else his sister is married to that Prince. He told me he had been living in Paris for some time, but had been obliged to leave when England and France declared war on Turkey. He asked me to dine with him that evening, to meet the Military Attache of the Turkish Embassy in Rome, and the First Secretary.

Thinking I might be able to obtain some valuable information from these two gentlemen, I consented, to break the strict etiquette of war and to meet my enemies at dinner. We dined at
a little restaruant, the name of which I forget, and I found the Military attache a man I had previously known, and extremely agreeable. He was out of sympathy with the Committee of Union in progress, and deplored the fact that England and Turkey were at war. He told me many interesting facts about the attack of our Fleet on March 18th. He said the Turks had been greatly frightened by the volume and intensity of the fire of the ships’ guns, but that the actual damage was almost nil. Two guns had been actually put out of action and about 35 men killed. He said that if I would come around to the Embassy on the following morning he would show me their official report, and I said I would do so. We ended up the evening at a Cafe Chantange.

Sunday March 28th
This morning I went to the Embassy a gaudy building, with a typical Turkish scheme of decoration, and there read through the official account of the operations, from the Turkish standpoint. It was an extremely interesting document, very soberly

[Page 11]
written, and as it was only intended for their own representatives and not for the consumption of the world at large, it could be considered perfectly accurate. It only served to confirm my opinions that we were hopelessly underestimating out task, and that the attack on March 18th had never stood any chance of succeeding.
In the afternoon I went out to the Races, and there found a mixed crowd, composed of all the warring nations. The majority of those present were far too busy discussing politics, the European situation generally, and the probable attitude of Italy. I found the Italian opinion much divided. The upper classes were largely intermarried with Austrians and Germans, and seemed to be pro-German, but the Middle classes and the lower are heart and soul with the Allies, and are howling for intervention.

There is terrible distress in Italy, and the people feel that their lot will be improved rather than rendered worse by taking part in the War. The useless occupation of Tripoli has exhausted the resources of the country, and the Italians wont be able even to mobilise, unless the Allies finance them. This is the first time I have been in Rome, or in Italy since 1911, and my name is still hated by the Italians, because I showed up the awful massacre in the oasis which took place in the early occupation. I met a good many people I knew, at the Races, including my old friend the Austrian Attache, Count Palliaichwitch, whom I had last seen at Bucharest in the summer of 1913. I had a long discussion on the situation with him, and we agreed that it was a great pity that England and Austria should be at war with one another. The next person I ran across

[Page 12]
was Princess San Faustina, whom I had not seen for a long time. I found her just the same as ever, but she seems to have definitely separated from her husband. After the races I went to her house and played Bridge where I met a number of the elite of Rome.

Monday March 29th
All day in Rome, spent most of the time sightseeing.

Tuesday March 30th
Left Rome with Lawrence at 8 p.m. on the Syracuse Express, which runs direct through and is a great improvement on the old system, where you had to change at Naples, and at Messina. Uneventful journey and uncomfortably hot.

Wednesday March 31st
We arrived at Syracuse at 6 p.m. and dined in the town, catching the boat at 9 o’clock for Malta. There is only a service on Wednesdays now as the Austrian boat, Corola has disappeared since war broke out, to escape our cruisers. It was a pleasing sight in Syracuse to see the number of German ships interned there. I suppose that in the event of Italy declaring war, they will fall into the hands of the Italians.

Thursday April 1st
We arrived at Malta at 10.30 a.m. and immediately went ashore, taking ourselves and our belongings to the Osborne Hotel. I then went across the Harbour to the old port, to call on Admiral Limpus. He saw me at once, and I had an interesting talk with him, on the whole situation. Admiral Limpus has been for several years the head of our naval mission in Turkey, and he naturally knows the Turks and the defences of the Dardanelles

[Page 13]
better than anyone else. One would have thought that as he is a senior naval officer in the Mediterranean that he would have been given command of the Fleet, operating against the Straits. But for a ridiculous sentimental reason he is relegated to the charge of the dockyards at Malta, because we with our absurd kid glove manner of conducting warfare, do not feel it would be fair to employ a man against the Turks, who at their own especial invitation and request has learned Something about them by endeavouring to trade their Navy.

I found Admiral Limpus an extremely sceptical about the whole Expedition. He said that the attack on the 18th of March ought never to have been made as the forts and defences are far too strong. Now we have given the Turks warning that we intended to strike, and they will be already for us on the peninsular itself. He told me that he would send me forward to the fleet by the first boat making the journey, but that no warship was going up at the present time, and that therefore I must not mind if I traveled on a collier, or some other equally uncomfortable craft. I replied that I would go in a rowing boat if necessary, as my one object was to get there. That evening I dined at the Malta Club and much to my surprise who should walk in but J. W. Taylor, late Head of the greatest gambling saloon in London, at whose house I have played many times. He is now a Colonel in His Majesty’s Service, and was on his way to Alexandria in charge of a ship laden with mules. We dined together, sat up very late playing billiards.

Friday April 2nd
I received a telephone message early this morning from Admiral Limpus saying that an oil tank steamer "Sunik" was

[Page 14]
sailing at 3 o’clock that afternoon to join the fleet, at a certain destination, and that if I liked we could sail on her. I accepted joyfully, and having left all superfluous belongings at the hotel, Lawrence and I repaired on board, presented oufc- belves to the Captain, a very agreeable man. The "Sunik" is a brand new oil tank steamer, but is now being used for carrying fresh water, of which she has 6,000 tons on board, which she has brought from Liverpool. It appears that water is scarce in the Islands of the Eastern Mediterranean. Our quarters if not luxurious, were at least extremely comfortable, and at 4 o’clock, we had the satisfaction of steaming out of the harbour and the feeling that at last we were defintely launched on the great adventure.

Saturday April 3rd.
At sea on the "Sunik". There is nothing to record, and the weather is beautifully fine. The only thing I can’t get accustomed to is having dinner at 5 o’clock every afternoon. It makes the evenings so uncomfortably long.

Sunday April 4th
At sea on the "Sunik". The weather has changed, the sea has beoome very rough, but our boat is extremely steady.

Monday April 5th.
We steamed into Mudros Harbour early this afternoon, and there found the magnificent spectacle of an enormous fleet of warships and transports assembled in this huge bay, of the island Lemnos. It was a wonderful sight and the first thing we saw was the mighty "Queen Elizabeth" our latest and greatest

[Page 15]
dreadnaught, carrying the new 15-inch gun. However I do not intend to write descriptive accounts here, and those can he obtained later on on the pages of any of the newspapers. On entering the bay, an officer came on and conducted us to our anchorage. Lawrence and I then ceased the opportunity of going off in his launch, to present ourselves to Admiral Vemyss, who is the local Admiral in charge. His brother Randolph Wemyss used to be quite a friend of mine, but he is now dead. The Admiral received us in a fairly friendly manner, but his manners are not agreeable at any time. He said that we would have to report to Admiral de Roebuck, who is on the "Queen Elizabeth" and who was in supreme command.

Admiral Wemyss had charge of all the cables and we could not send a word off without it going through his hands. Having said good-bye, we borrowed a launch, and repaired on board the "Queen Elizabeth". On the Quarterdeck we were met by Commodore Keyes, who is the Chief of Staff to the Admiral. He received us in the most agreeable manner and said that if we would wait a few minutes, the Admiral himself would see us. A little later we were taken down to the Admiral’s quarters. These are very fine in these big ships. Admiral de Roebeck is a most delightful man, courteous type of old English gentleman, and he received us in the most friendly manner. He said that he had merely received their intimation that we were on our way out and that he was to find accomodation for us on one of the ships He explained that as the fleet was divided into divisions, which might be employed on different services, that it would be best for us to separate. With this I had no objection, as I much prefer to work alone, and not to

[Page 16]
give anybody else the benefit of my experiences. The Admiral said that we had better stay on the "Sunik" for a day or two until accomodation could be found for us on warships. We then left the "Queen Elizabeth", the Admiral inviting us both to lunch on board the next day, and promising to send a launch, to fetch us.

Tuesday April 6th
I spent the morning on board the "Sunik", and a little before 1 o’clock, the launch came and took us to the "Queen Elizabeth", where we found quite a large party assembled, and
I was introduced to Captain Burke, Colonel Doughty Wyley. Admiral de Roebeck then reminded me that the last time we had met was at the great supper party, given by Princess Hatzfeldt in honour of Elsie Janis’s first appearance at the Palace. After luncheon, I had a long talk with Commodore Keyes, who gave me very many interesting details of the great fight on March 18th. and the reasons for its failure.

Wednesday April 7 th.
Remained on board the "Sunik" but managed to get a boat ashore in the afternoon. Lawrence and I took a walk and climbed some of the hills to have a look at the island. When we got down to the shore again, we had no means of getting back to the "Sunik" which lay a long way off. However, we found a number of officers of the "Triumph" going back to their ship, and we asked them where they could send us off to ours.
We went as far as the "Triumph " with them and they invited us down to the Wardroom to have a drink, an offer we were very glad to accept. Later on they sent us back to the "Sunik".

[Page 17]
Thursday April 8th
We had an Australian transport come alongside this morning and I seized the opportunity of going on board and having a talk with some of the officers and men. It is the first time that I had met them, and they struck me as being a very fine lot. The physique of the men is remarkable. We had nothing like it in our Army, except perhaps some of the picked Guards Battalions. They invited me to lunch, but suddenly a signal was made to the "Sunik", and both Lawrence and I were to repair on board the "Triumph" at 3 o’clock that afternoon, and that she would sail to a certain destination immediately. This news filled our hearts with joy, and we saw visions of naval engagements and terrific fights with the forts. We hastily packed our belongings and then the launch came to fetch us. On arriving on board the "Triumph" we were introduced to her Captain, Fitzmaurice, who welcomed us in a friendly manner.

We then went to the Wardroom and had lunch, and the "Triumph" sailed for Tenedos. The Captain told me that there one of us would be transferred to another ship. On arriving off Tenedos orders came for one of us to go to the battleship "London", but it did not specify which of us. A signal was then made to Admiral Bailey, and he replied that I was to go to the "London". So having bid farewell I transferred myself and my belongings to my new home, where I was destined to remain for three very pleasant and historic weeks. Her Captain is called Armstrong and is a most charming man, and I found the Wardroom very agreeable. I little knew how much this transferrence to the "London" would mean to me, because as it turned out afterwards she was one of the vessels which covered the landing of the

[Page 18]
the Australian Troops.

Friday April 9th
I had very comfortable quarters assigned to me on the "London", being given the Captain’s spare cabin, which was large and airy, and a good room for me to work in. At this time the greater number of the French and English battleships were lined in Mudros Bay, whilst the cruisers, the destroyers were engaged in covering the passage of the numerous transports from Alexandria to Mudros. The Expedition had to be taken to Alexandria to enable all the units to be resorted and reorganised before the disembarkation could be attempted on the Gallipoli Coast. Two divisions of the Fleet took it in turns to cruise off the mouth of the Dardanelles and up and down the Coast watching the enemy’s movements. No one knew exactly what troops the Turks had on the Peninsular, and what preparations they were making to resist an attempted landing. In the afternoon Captain Armstrong took me on board the "Queen" to call on Admiral Bailey, who commanded the second Division.

I had a short talk with him, and found him an extremely agreeable man, and fully alive to the difficulties of our task ahead. The Captain and myself then rowed ashore to Tenedos, to visit the Aviation Grounds, which had been established on the island, under the charge of the well known naval airman Commander Samson. The ground might have been specially made for the use of our aviators, as it is absolutely flat, and any small rises had been removed by the Greek labourers. Samson was away on a flight, so we passed some of the time looking around, and examining the various types of naval bombs. He came in shortly afterwards, and the Captain arranged about some

[Page 19]
spotting he was to do for him on the following day. We then returned to the ship.
Saturday April 10th
We remained off Tenedos until 4 o’clock and then steamed towards the Dardanelles, accompanied by the battleship "Prince of Wales", to relieve the "Triumph" and another battleship. Two battleships take it in turns to cruise off the Straits for 48 hours at a stretch. It is already growing dark when we reached the entrance, so that I could see little or nothing that evening. All our port holes are shut, and we did not show a light, and we were of course, covered by three destroyers, to check any sudden attack of a Turkish destroyer or torpedo boats. Nevertheless it was thrilling work for a novice, like myself, to be really on a battleship and within such close proximity to the enemy. It was wierd cruising about in the darkness without a light showing; and standing on the bridge you could see in the dim distance the grim outline of the shore, the hidden secrets of which were so soon to discover to our cost. It was very hot down below, with all the port holes closed, and I found it difficult to sleep, not yet having become accustomed to the life of a sailor, which consists of having a great deal of fresh air during the day and none at all at night.

Sunday April 11th
The day broke beautifully fine and clear. There was not a ripple on the water, and the panorama of the Gallipoli and Asiatic Coasts lay exposed before my eyes for the first time. I went aloft to the fore-top to obtain a better view. This was my first visit to such a height, and it scared me very much, climbing the steel ladder, and then having to climb out

[Page 20]
on the shrouds, and up through the man-hole into the little steel chamber. I made my first attempt, when nobody was looking on, and I got nearly up to the top when I was seized with a sudden panic on looking down below me, and seeing the deck such an immense distance beneath. I hung on for a moment and then climbed down again, without ever reaching my destination. I then had a rest, but felt very unhappy at having been beaten so I made up my mind to try once again, and on this occasion, I was successful. I practised it several times during the day, until I became quite expert, and could go up almost as quick as a sailor, and hang on with one hand if necessary. Up aloft I examined carefully the enemy’s positions.

The village and castle of Seddul Bahr, Cape Helles, Kum Kale, and other points of local interest. I could not either through my own or through the powerful ship’s glasses, discover a single Turk moving anywhere. Both the Asiatic Coast and the Gallipoli Coast seemed to be absolutely deserted. We cruised up as far North as the little promintory of Gaba Tepe. Throughout the whole distance, although we kept a sharp look out, we only saw one Turk. Gaba Tepe looks strongly fortiffed, and we could see the enemy’s trenches on it, and also the field of barb-wire covering the front. We then turned and steamed slowly down the coast again. It being Sunday morning, a service was held on the Quarterdeck, and this was a moving spectacle to hear hundreds of bluejackets and marines shouting out at the top of their voices the old Christian airs, so that they were wafted across the waters to the waiting Infidel, only a mile away.
Two interesting incidents alone marked the day. The "Queen Elizabeth" came out from Mudros and did a full speed trial

[Page 21]
up the Gulf of Saros. In the distance I also saw another dreadnaught-cruiser. On asking which one she was, I was told she was the "dummy" "Inflexible". She is a captured German liner got up to resemble a dreadnaught, so that it is extremely difficult to tell the difference on seeing her silhouetted a long way off. I believe we have a number of these dummy ships, which are an invention of the ingenious brain of either Lord Fisher or Mr Churchill, I am not sure which. They are supposed to attract the enemy’s torpedo craft and submarines, or else to lure on a squadron of his battleships to attack them.

I fancy they have been quite useless, and a very costly experiment. This dummy "Inflexible" was useless at the Dardanelles and subsequently she was sent back to Malta, but was sunk on the way by a German submarine. There is a rumour that the officer in charge, subsequently went mad when he saw her wooden turrets and 12 inch guns calmly floating out to sea, when the vessel herself disappeared beneath the waves. We continued to cruise off the Straits all that afternoon, bitterly disappointed that no enemy would show himself, and longing for the chance of letting off a gun at something or somebody. Binney, the gunnery-Lieutenant was continually seeing fortifications and masses of Turks, but these invariably turned out to exist only in his imagination, and the Captain resolutely refused to let him fire a shot. Our only occupation was therefore to play bull-ball, for half a crown a comer, which is a favorite pastime on all battleships. We were all very bored, when at about 5 o’clock a signal was received on board that on the following day we were to enter the Straits, and cover a destroyer which was to go as far up as possible, on a scouting expedition.

[Page 22]
This news was received with the wildest joy by every officer and man, for now we saw the chance of having a scrap with the forts at the Narrows, the first engagement since the battle of 18th of March and of thus avenging the comrades who had fallen in that battle. The good news made everyone in the Wardroom very gay, and cocktails flowed freely, before dinner, which was also a lively repast. Our Captain, being the senior Naval Officer on the two battleships was in charge of the operation, and the "Prince of Wales" was placed under his orders. We all turned in in a good humour with ourselves, and life in general.
Monday April 12 th.
We got up at the usual time, and after breakfast the ship was cleared for action, and we made for the entrance to the Straits, with the destroyer in front, and the "Prince of Wales" astern. (For an account of what happened see elsewhere) For the remainder of the day and that night, we lay off the Straits.
Tuesday April 13th
We were relieved at noon by two other battleships, and returned to Tenedos, and received orders to sail the same afternoon for Mudros Bay, where we arrived just before dark, and took up an anchorage, in which we remained for the next two weeks.
Wednesday April 14th to
Tuesday April 20th
As these days were spent in Mudros I shall write a collective account of various incidents that occured in connection with the start of the expedition. By this time I had written several articles, and my first step was to get them on board the

[Page 23]
"Queen Elizabeth" for Commodore Keyes to censor. Amongst other things I sent through an account pointing out the extreme difficulties of the task ahead, and also showing that it was impossible for the attack on the 18th March to have succeeded. Strangely enough, not only was this passed by Commodore Keyes, but also by the Admiralty in London, and was duly published in the papers, and caused the first of the many sensations which the Dardanelles were to produce in the course of the next eight months. At this time Lawrence and myself were under the Admiralty, and had no official connection with the Army at all, so that our position was somewhat anomolous.

In fact I did not know even if I would be allowed to land with the Army, which would of course be essential, once the Expedition was put ashore. I always found Commodore Keyes and his assistants censors, Captain Godfrey of the Marines, most accomodating and agreeable, and as long as the censorship was conducted by the Navy, it was carried out in a broad and benevolent spirit and worked absolutely without friction of any sort.
In fact Admiral de Roebeck’s staff were all charming and delightful people to deal with. Up to this time I had seen nothing of Sir Ian Hamilton, and his Staff, and they had not yet arrived from Egypt. An expeditionof this sort naturally entails an enormous amount of preliminary preparations and part of this was carried through in Alexandria, and the final touches put to it in Mudros Harbour. Every day fresh transports would arrive, packed with troops, or stores, or ammunition, or coal. Warships would be continually arriving or departing, and not only with our great Fleet of pre-Dreadnuahgts assembled in the

[Page 24]
bay, but also a great number of French, ships as well. The transports belonged to every line that has ever flown the British Flag in any quarter of the world. I do not see how the Expedition would ever have been handled but for the fortunate existence of this immense sheet of landlocked water, within 40 miles of our eventual destination. Fortunately also neither a German or Austrian submarines had as yet put in an appearance, and had they been in the Eastern Mediterranean at the start, I do not see how the Expedition would ever have been landed. As it has turned out, it would have been better for us had the loss of a few transports, and warships in the early days caused us to abandon the entire enterprise.
But Fate ordained that these things were not to be. The preparations went on vigorously for the next three weeks, but the plans of the Commander in Chief, and the numbers of men at his disposition were kept a profound secret. We spent a lot of our time at guess work, and in fact it was fairly easy to decide on some of the landing points, on account of the peculiar formation of the coast, which would only allow troops to be disembarked at certain points. Commodore Keyes gave me a definite promise that the "London" would be at one of the most interesting and vital spots, and that if by any chance, the plans should be changed, he would shift me to another point. With this I was satisfied, and simply remained quiet to await events. It had been definitely and quite rightly decided that I should send out no cables until after the landing had been made, as it was essential to keep our preparations absolutely quiet, and the wires were fully occupied with Government work. I had therefore little to do, except

[Page 25]
to watch events, and to write a few articles of a picturesque nature which could be allowed through. I forget the exact date on which the "Arcadian" with Sir Ian Hamilton on board arrived in the Bay, but I lost no time in visiting her, and in presenting a letter of introduction which I carried, from Harry Lawson to the Commander in Chief . Sir Ian received me in a most friendly manner, and said that he had no official notice that Lawrence and myself were attached to the Army, and I then asked him whether he would let me land, and join with the troops. He said he had no objection at all, and that he thoroughly disapproved of the manner in which the public had been kept in the dark throughout the campaign, and that he was entirely in favor of having reputable war correspondents with the Army. He said that of course, this passage would have to be censored, but that he would see that nothing was taken out except that which came within the category of military secrets.

He then made the announcement to me, that William Maxwell, the ex Daily Mail correspondent was on his staff, and had been appointed censor. This news fairly staggered me, because I happened to know that Maxwell was no particular friend of mine, and that also he would hardly be acceptable to the Newspaper Proprieters’ Assoc, on account of his quarrel with the "Daily Mail" In the early part of this campaign, Maxwell had been employed by the "Daily Telegraph" in France and Belgium, but his opportunities had been so few, and his work so indifferent that at Christmas, a contract was terminated by mutual consent, and Maxwell was presented with a commission as a Captain of the Staff. I pointed out these objections to Sir

[Page 26]
lan, but at the same time I said that I had no personal feeling in the matter, and that I was quite willing to give the scheme a trial. I also met General Braithwaite, Sir Ian’s Chief of Staff, who also received me in a very affable manner. In fact I thought the reception I met with a little too marked and seemed rather to show a desire to utilise my services, as an advertising agent rather than as an independent eyewitness. I looked up several other members of his Staff, and amongst them was Dawney, young Broderick, Jack Churchill, Winston’s brother. He has come out as Camp Commandant, a nice soft job, with no danger in it, I suppose obtained for him through the influence of his brother.
During my stay in Mudros Bay, I took the opportunity wherever possible of going on shore, and getting exercise. On one of these trips who should fall down at my feet, and kiss my hands but that old blackguard, Couppa, who had been my dragoman throughout the various Balkan Wars. He expressed the greatest pleasure at seeing me again, and wanted to come back into my service, but I told him I did not see much chance of being able to employ him. He had set up a store on the island, doing a vigorous trade selling articles at an enormous profit, to British, French, Australian and Senegalese soldiers and sailors. At this time the majority of the troops were kept on the transports, but there was a camp of some of the Australians Battalions on shore. I could not pick up more than a general idea of the composition and numbers of our forces, which were kept a profound secret, but from the number of ships and from other available data, I put them at about 70,000 men.

[Page 27]
Our crews were kept very busy rehearsing the landing with the 11th Australian Infantry under Colonel Johnstone, who it was understood were to be disembarked from our ship. Every day parties of men fully equipped were brought on board, and practiced leaving the boats and climbing the ladders. To facilitate the rapid embarkation of a great number at one time wide wooden ladders were made on board the ship up which two fully equipped men could climb at one time, and also wide rope ladders were made, up which several could climb, but these turned out unsatisfactory and were abandoned in favor of the wooden ones. Thus these with the ships ladders enabled five or six hundred men to embark from, or disembark into the boats and steam pinnaces in a very few minutes with a minimum of delay. The crews of the boats would sometimes be away for the whole day landing troops on the shores of the bay, and taking them off again. The most careful preparation was made to insure success and every item was constantly rehearsed until the crews and the landing party had obtained highest possible state of efficiency.
This was the first time I had seen anything of the Australian troops, and I was at once instantly impressed with their physique and general bearing. I had never seen before such a magnificent body of men, but of course their idea of discipline was very different to what you expect to find in an English Regular Battalion. The men seemed rather to discipline themselves and the officers seemed to have but little authority over them, except that which came from the personality and not from the rank of a Captain or Lieutenant of a Company. This position was easy to understand because many of the officers had had but

[Page 28]
little more training than the men, and that therefore they had not got the experience and authority that comes from years of service,behind them. Nevertheless, they struck me as being of a particularly well trained and efficient body of men, who could be relied on in any emergency, and whatever they lacked in discipline and experience, would be more than compensated by their natural intelligence and initiative. They got on splendidly with the crews of the battleships, and a warm personal friendship soon sprung up between our bluejackets and these men from the South. I had a very interesting talk with Col. Johnstone, who told me that his great difficulty was the lack of experience amongst his officers, and N.C.Os, but otherwise he felt perfectly confident that his men would give a splendid account of themselves in the field. Thus the days passed and these preparations and rehearsals until a point was reached when everything seemed ready and we were on the qui vive of expectancy as to when the expedition would sail.

Wednesday April 21st.
Meanwhile I had seen nothing of Lawrence, whose battleship the "Triumph" had not appeared in Mudros since we sailed on her. But, this day she came into port, and I hastened on board to have a talk with Lawrence, and to compare experiences. I had been on board the "Queen Elizabeth" in the morning, and had had a talk with Commodore Keyes, and he told me that Lawrence had been making a fool of himself and had got one of the Lieutenants on the "Triumph" into serious trouble, because he had got him write an account of the engagement of March 18th, and he had then attempted to send it through to Reuters. Thus of course causing the unfortunate Lieutenant to commit a serious breach

[Page 29]
of the regulations. Lawrence, it appears, had been given a severe talking to, at Keyes request by the Captain of the "Triumph", Fitzmaurice. I found Lawrence on board and had a talk with him, and tried to give him some general instructions as to how he should behave, and on what subjects he should wiite. I then returned to the "London" and he, himself on the following day was transferred to the battleship "Cornwallis", commanded by Capt. Davidson, the son of old General Davidson, whom I knew so well at Eastbourne.
Thursday April 22nd.
It was now obvious that the start of the Expedition could not be much longer delayed. In three days time, the moon would have waned, and we could rely on pitch dark night. The weather, which for some days had been very fine, now suddenly came overcast and squally, raising a short choppy sea, which gets up very quickly in the Mediterranean, and which would render a landing in boats extremely difficult, and precarious. This afternoon I went on shore for the last time, and had a farewell walk through the little village, and out into the country, accompanied by the parson of the "London", and an R.N.R. Lieutenant who had been on some Australian line. On returning to my boat I found Sir Ian Hamilton waiting on the quay and had a final talk with him. He seemed to be extremely confident and in excellent spirits, and even told me a funny story. I asked him at what he reckoned the chances, he seemed to think they were very good. He told me that he thought the Turks had about 35,000 men actually on the Gallipoli Peninsular. Personally I was far from sharing the confidence of the General, and my

[Page 30]
sole remark on saying good bye was this: "General, the task ahead is one of the most difficult that has ever been undertaken, and the Expedition can only succeed if you have sufficient troops to push right inland at the start, and if the Government keep you well supplied with reinforcements. By this time I had become convinced that the Expedition was almost certainly doomed to failure. The military authorities took the standpoint that the most critical period would be the first 24 hours, mainly during the landing. Personally I thought otherwise. I did not think that the Turks would concentrate the mass of their men to actually oppose the landing, as they would come under the fire of such a mass of warships that after a time they would almost certainly be crushed by it, or else demoralised.
I felt rather that the critical period would be when having established ourselves on shore, we attempted to push inland to attack their main positions, wherever they might be situated, because the guns of the fleet would no longer then, be able to render the same assistance, and the Army would have to depend on itself to storm entrenched positions with the very limited number of field guns, and howitzers to support them. I knew what an excellent fighter the Turk is behind entrenchments, and how difficult he would be to turn out at the point of the bayonet. I also saw that once the troops were ashore at a number of different points, that the command would be an extremely difficult one, to exercise and that so much would depend on the skill and initiative of the Brigadier Commanders. I felt certain that we must expect to encounter just the same high level of skill in the land defences as the Fleet had met with when it attacked the Straits.

[Page 31]
The Turks had had ample warning that we were coming, and they were certain to have made their preparations accordingly. What I mistrusted most was the higher commands of the Expedition. It did not appear to me from my intercourse with them that either the General or his Staff realised the terrible gravity of the enterprise on which they were now embarking, and how much failure might mean to the Empire. It seemed to me they rather regarded the Expedition as a kind of glorified picnic, and that the main considerations was the fact that they had an independent command to exercise which was extremely pleasing to their amour propre.
I could tell at once that their Intelligence Department was extremely bad, and that little or no reliance could be placed on their estimate of the Turks having 35,000 men to resist a landing. And that even then, it seemed to me that if this estimate was correct, that our force of 70,000 is far too few with which to attack troops on prepared grounds, of which we knew little or nothing. This was shown by our maps, the best obtainable, but which were found to be absolutely inaccurate, and which tells heavily against accurate fire from either the ships’ guns or our own field artillery. Again considering the small effect of the fire of the ships’ guns against the forts of the Narrows, I saw no reason to expect any better results when they were employed against earthworks, and entrenchments. It was therefore with the greatest misgivings that I watched the start of this enterprise. I did my best to get the truth known in England and the gravity of the situation realised, and thanks to the fact that my letters were being censored, up to this time, by the Navy and not by the Army, I succeeded in a limited sense

[Page 32]
in doing so, but of course not in the manner in which I wished. It is obvious to me that unless we succeed in getting the Peninsular in the first two or three weeks, that our chance has gone forever, because it would be impossible to spare sufficient reinforcements from the Western Front to turn what was meant to be a secondary operation, into a great major operation of war. However, the spirit of all ranks seemed excellent, the Australians and New Zealanders were especially keen, on seeing active service for the first time, after their long months of preparation. This of course is the greatest enterprise of its nature ever undertaken in the history of any nation, and in spite of those careful preparations, I mistrusted our Staff work as I knew that the best brains of the Army were in France, and that even there, it had broken down time and time again. The cooperation between our Army and our Navy has seldom been happy in the past, and I felt that here we might see another example of jealousies and conflicting interests fraught with momentous consequences.
Other factors which it seemed to me would tell against us, would be the peculiarly heterogenuous character of the Expedition, involving as it did troops drawn from almost every nation fighting on the side of the Allies, and from almost every climate, from the North to the South Poles. I knew that there was likely to be friction between the French and ourselves as the former had always regarded the landing in the nature of a forlorn hope and it did not auger well for our success that they had appointed a General D’Amade, who had already been twice stellenboshed on the Western Front. He was supposed, however, to be a great friend of the English, having been the French Military Attache witn our

[Page 33]
Army in the South African War. On the other hand, he is known to be an extremely conceited man, and although Sir Ian Hamilton was nominally supposed to be the Commander in Chief of the joint Army, I did not feel that he would be strong enough to exercise his authority in any emergency, that might call implicit obedience to a command, on the part of our Ally.
Friday April 23rd
The weather showed signs of clearing today, and we learned definitely that all being well, that our portion of the Expedition would sail the following day. We had a full dress rehearsal once again of taking the 11th Infantry on board, and the rest of the day, we spent watching numbers of battleships, cruisers, and transports sailing from the Bay, to a then unknown destination. This force consisted of the 29th Division and covering ships, which was to rendezvous over Tenedos, which we understood was to land somewhere at the Southern extremity of the Peninsular.
The destination of the Colonial troops was however, unknown. I paid a farewell visit to the "Queen Elizabeth" and saw Commodore Keyes, who promised me he would get the despatches off as soon as possible, and that they would probably have to go by boat from [to?] Malta, or Alexandria, and be despatched by cable from there. There was an air or suppressed excitement about everyone. All seemed to shake off the lethagy of too much waiting about, and to brace themselves for the coming struggle. The last and greatest of the Crusades which would decide whether the Turk would be driven out of Europe forever or else leave the Crescent more

[Page 34]
triumphant than it had ever been since the capture of Constantinople by Mahomed the Second, in 1482. That evening we sat up late in the Wardroom discussing the prospects, and even betting on what would happen. Every officer present seemed to be absolutely confident of success, except myself, and I was accused of being a pessimist, because I ventured to point out a few of the real difficulties that had to be encountered before we could call the Narrows our own.
Saturday April 24th.
Throughout the morning there was scenes of the greatest activity in Mudros Bay. The warships changed their positions and took up their new stations, and many transports slowly made their way to the entrance of the Harbour. At 3 o’clock our boats brought 500 men of the 11th Australian Infantry on board for the last time. Numbered Squares had been painted on the Quarterdeck in white paint, and on these the companies fell in, each according to its number as they came on board.
The men were then dismissed and made their way forward to the mess deck and bows, for the crew of the battleship had handed over almost their entire accomodation to them so as to make them as comfortable as possible for their last night. At 5 o’clock we, the Second Division of the Fleet consisting of the "Queen", "Prince of Wales", "London", "Majestic", the four landing ships, and the covering ships "Triumph", Bannchante and I believe "Price George" slowly steamed out of the Bay. As we passed the long lines of waiting transports, our bands played various tunes, and the National Anthem of the Allies and deafening cheers greeted our departure. It was a most

[Page 35]
majestic and inspiring spectacle I had ever seen, "but withal there was an atmosphere of tragedy, because we knew that there were so many on this battleship who would never see another sun sink to rest in the West. The weather was beautifully fine, and no sooner had we cleared the entrance to the bay than instead of making direct for the Gallipoli coast which would have caused us to arrive there too soon, we steamed due West so as to pass around the far side of the Island of Lemnos, and made to a secret rendezvous, which only the Admiral in Charge knew of. It was obvious that at the best we could only effect a purely local surprise, because the Turks, according to Sir Ian Hamilton’s own words, knew of the exact composition of his force, before he ever left Egypt, and they must have known from their aviators, and the numerous spies scattered amongst the islands, the exact point which our preparations had reached and when we were likely to strike. They also could guess that it would be between the waning of the old moon, and the rising of the new.
About 6 o’clock the Australian Contingent fell in on the Quarter-deck and the crew of the battleship on the other side of it, and Captain Armstrong then read Admiral de Hoebeck’s proclamation wishing success for all ranks. His place was then taken by the ship’s chaplain, and prayers were uttered for victory, the crew and the contingent standing with bare heads. The Australians were then taken to the mess deck, where a hot meal was served out to them by the crew, and then they turned in to obtain as much rest as possible before dawn. It was the last sleep for many‘a brave warrior

[Page 36]
from ’’down under". At 7 o’clock dinner was served in the Wardroom, and the officers of the "London" did the Australian officers extremely well. Whatever happened to them on the following day, at least their last night was made as comfortable and as lively as possible, and many a man, who had not tasted any drink for a long time past, was invigorated by cocktails, champagne, and whiskies and sodas. We all gave up our cabins to the officers in order that they might obtain as much rest as possible, and personally when I turned in at about half past ten, I snatched a few hours of sleep on the floor. At sunset of course all lights on board had been extinguished, and we steamed slowly through the night to our nnknown destination, and to an unknown fate.
Sunday April 25th
At 1 a.m. the Fleet stopped, and all on board were roused. I hastily got into my clothes, and went around the mess deck, where I found the Australian troops having a final hot meal before falling in. Likewise one was served to the officers in the Wardroom. At 2 o’clock the men fell in by companies on the numbered squares of which I have already spoken. Our boats had meanwhile been lowered, and the steam pinnaces which were to tow them in shore. Each battleship towed three of these pinnaces behind her from Mudros. There was only a faint light from the moon, and the scene on the decks was dramatic in the extreme. The magnificent contingent from Australia stood there in absolute silence, the men receiving their last instructions from their officers. Around them stood the beach parties from the ship, who were to put them ashore. Lieutenants in khaki, midshipmen not yet

[Page 37]
out of their teens, in old white duck suits dyed khaki, and carrying revolvers and water bottles almost as big as themselves. It was a stirring and inspiring moment when at 2 a.m. or 2.30 a.m. the pinnaces towed the boats alongside and the men immediately embarked in them. Thanks to the constant rehearsals, there was no confusion, and no overcrowding, and everyone was embarked without a mishap. The tows then went astern, each battleship towing four behind her. At 3 a.m. steam was again raised and we moved slowly in towards the shore until a little after four, the dim outlines of the coast became visible for the first time. At 4.30 a.m. the four battleships were in line, at about 3,000 for yards from the shore. The signal was given for the tows to be cast off, and to make their own way to the beaches.

It was still very dark, and the pinnaces each towing three or four boats looked like great snakes as they slowly made their way inland. As soon as they had departed I went forward to the bridge to join the Captain, and his Staff. I think it was the most exciting moment I have ever known watching the boats which hardly seemed to move, make their way towards the land.
(For full account of the landing and events during the day, see elsewhere).
Throughout the afternoon the fighting continued, and we continually received orders to fire on various positions, where the Turks were vigorously pressing the Australians back, to the first line of hills they had seized on landing. It was obvious they were extremely hard pressed. The wounded never ceased to come off the shore in an endless - stream, and the accomodation on the hospital ship speedily gave out.

[Page 38]
As usual, the medical arrangements were awful, and terribly mismanaged. There seemed to be no one in charge, in supreme authority, to direct the stream of wounded for whom no accomodation could be found, to any particular ship. Numbers were taken on board the warships, and there tendered by the ship’s surgeon, but of course the accomodation here again was limited. Finally orders came that they were to be sent on board empty transports which had discharged their men, and that Doctors it was said, would be sent on board to look after them until they reached Egypt. But of course many unfortunate wounded perished, who would have otherwsie been saved.
Our pinnaces were kept so busy that I could not get a boat to take me to the shore until after dinner. Any boats that did come off reported that things were going badly, and that we had enormous casualties, that the beaches were piled up with wounded who could not be moved, and that the fire on the beaches from the enemy’s shells and snipers was extremely heavy. Finally about half past nine p.m. one of our pinnaces came back for fuel and water, and I was able to return on her to the beach. We steamed in close to the shore under a perfect hailstorm of bullets, coming from the hills, which seemed to come from all directions. Fortunately most of this fire was high, and you were safer when you got in under the shelter of the hills on the narrow beach at their foot, about 30 yards wide. I climbed ashore over some barges and found myself in the semi-darkness amidst a scene of indescribable confusion. The beach was piled up will ammunition, stores, among which lay dead and wounded, and men so absolutely exhausted that they had fallen asleep in spite of the noise

[Page 39]
and excitement around them. Other parties were wandering about in the darkness and being directed up the hills by their officers. In fact there seemed to be a continuous stream of men going and returning. On the hills above there was a perfect inferno of rifle fire, and shells bursting.
In fact the air was buzzing with bullets, like a drone in a bee on a hot summer’s day. Once I had got ashore I did not know where to go or what to do, but I saw a little group of men standing apart, which from their caps I could make out to be officers. One of them, a short man in the centre, seemed to be giving directions to the others, and on going up close to them, I recognised him as General Birdwood, from his photograph, although I had not yet met him. Now I was wearing a khaki suit, but had unfortunately come ashore in my old green hat, and on approaching close to this group a big man, whom I discovered afterwards was a very jumpy and nervous Australian Colonel attached to the Staff, on seeing me, shouted out "Who are you. What are you doing here?" and before I could answer he said "Seize that man, he’s a spy."
Of course allowance must be made for the terrible day, they had all been through, and for the fatigue and dangers they had faced, and were still facing, but it struck me as being rather queer that a spy should be dressed differently to everybody else instead of being in exactly the same uniform. Before I had time to explain, the soldiers rushed up and I found myself a prisoner, and I then went up to the Staff, and said "l am Ashmead-Bartlett, the official War Correspondent attached to the Expedition". The trouble was this, that having no official connection with theArmy at this period, I

[Page 40]
had been presented with no pass, but fortunately, realising before I left the ship that something of this sort might happen, I got Captain Armstrong to give me a pass permitting me to go ashore and state in it who I was. But even this did not seem to satisfy the nervous Colonel, who was convinced that I was a spy, and he shouted out "How do I know you are what you say you are. Does anyone here know this man?". Then from somewhere out of the darkness a gruff voice replied "Yes I do".
I had no idea who my benefactor was and did not in fact discover until six months later, when on taking a trip on a stray pinnace, the boatswain referred to the incident, and said that he was the man who had saved me from what he described as being "Hexecuted on the spot". He said I had made a trip with him to the "Queen Elizabeth" at Mudros and he had recognised me by my hat. In any case I was immediately released, and the chief of Birdwood’s staff, Street, came up and spoke to me and I was presented to the General. He asked me how I had come ashore and I replied "In a pinnace". They then said "You must keep her here for the time being. There is an urgent dispatch to be sent off, and we have no other boat ashore." Of course I consented, and remained with the staff while General Birdwood sat down and wrote a letter. There was a very excitable beach officer Commander --- who came up to me and said "Do not send your boat away, whatever you do. We have got to go around all the transports and get them to send in their boats, as it is impossible for the Australians to hold on during the night. They are being too hard pressed."

[Page 41]
It was a dramatic scene in the semi darkness, while General Birdwood was writing his dispatch to the Commander in Chief. He was surrounded by his small group of Staff Officers and by heaps of dead and wounded, and stores and ammuntion. In the distance small groups of men could be dimly discerned climbing the hills to the fighting line, or else coming away from them, whilst overhead thousands of bullets kept up their incessant droning. The dispatch finished, it was handed to the naval commander, who immediately rushed down to where I had left the pinnace, and jumped on board her, followed by me, shouting out "Go the the battleship "Queen".
We picked up the "Queen" in the darkness, after a short run, the Commander went on board to see the Admiral. He remained some little time, and then came on to the pinnace. The "Queen" immediately weighed anchor and stood off towards Cape Helles. I then said to the Commander "What are we going to do now" and he replied "Wev’e got to go to every transport in turn, and order them to send their boats in immediately, to bring off the Australian troops. I pointed out to him that such an operation was utterly impossible in the darkness and confusion
then prevailing, and that the only chance of saving the force was to hold on until daybreak. He agreed with me, but correctly replied that he was obliged to obey his instructions. We went to the nearest transport and the Commander shouted out through a megaphone that she was to hold her boats in readiness to send them ashore at a moment’s notice. We went to each one in turn, and gave a similar message. In many of these transports the discipline amongst the civilian crews was

[Page 42]
disgraceful, for instead of being ready to meet any emergency that might occur, in many of them there was not a soul even on watch, and it took us ages to get someone in a responsible authority to take our message. It was obvious to me that if an effort was really made to take the Australians off that it could only lead to an appalling disaster and that it would be much better to risk the destruction of leaving the force ashore. It took us at least two hours to go around to all the transports, and then we returned once more to the beach. There was still a good deal of firing going on, but it had lost a great deal of its intensity, and it seemed to me the conditions had materially improved, especially as the Turkish shell fire had ceased for the time being.

On stepping ashore we went at once to the staff, and informed them what we had done, and I was again immediately arrested as a spy by the very same Colonel, whose nerves seemed to have completed deserted him. However on this occasion I had no difficulty in obtaining my release. I had now to return to the "London" as the steam pinnace would stay no longer, and I felt pretty confident that the troops would be able to hold their own during the night. Just as I was leaving I ran across the P.M.O of the "London" McMillan, who had been working incessantly amongst the wounded all through the afternoon, and night. I offered to take him off to the ship but he declined to leave, saying there was plenty more work for him to do. I got back to the "London" about 3 o’clock in the morning. It was not until later that I heard what had happened about General Birdwood’s letter from the lips

Monday April 26th
We were all up at dawn to take fresh stock of the situation. A Turkish warship sent over several salvos of big shells from the Straits, but fortunately these missed everything, although one apparently struck the "Majestic", but as a matter of fact it burst in the water just alongside her throwing up a tremendous column of water. Throughout the morning the Turks delivered a tremendous counter -

Nevertheless it was gratifying to receive signals from the shore such as "Your shooting is splendid, you assisted us most materially". Meanwhile fresh troops stores, ammuntion and guns were being disembarked without cessation, and every hour thus gained materially improved our position. (For full account of these operations see elsewhere). I think at this stage the Turks committed a great error in tactics. Their idea seemed to be to render the beaches untenable, and to prevent the landing of reinforcements and supplies. To achieve this end, they concentrated their fire of the majority of the guns on the beaches and tried to create a zone of fire, through which it would be impossible for boats and pinnaces to pass. It is a most remarkable sight to see huindreds of shrapnel shells bursting on the water within about a 100 yards of the shore, and although it was extremely unpleasant to pass

Tuesday April 27th
The Turkish attacks died down to a considerable extent to day and were more or less spasmodic, and it seemed that the Colonials were now safely established ashore. During the whole of this time we had not received one scrap of authentic information as to how things were going at Cape Helles. One would have thought that some news would have reached the Captains of the battleships. The rumours in the extreme from optimism to pessimism. At one moment we heard that the landing had been completely successful that Achi Baba had been seized, and that the Cape Helles force would shortly appear over the hills to join up with the Australians at Anzac. This would be followed by adverse rumours to the effect that we had got ashore, but only after enormous losses, and were holding our own with the utmost difficulty in the face of enormous odds. All we could see from observations were naval shells bursting over the reverse slopes of Achi Baba, which seemed to be

Wednesday April 28th
I remained on the London off Anzac, and visited the shore to find out various details of the fighting, and I found that the Australians and New Zealanders were now firmly entrenched on a semi circle of hills around the beaches, and I could see no likelihood of their being driven off by counter attacks. This more than ever confirmed me in my opinion that I should lose no time in getting down to Helles without one minute’s delay. There were plenty of exciting incidents during these days, but I have recorded most of them elsewhere, so it would merely be repetition to repeat them here.

Thursday April 29th
This morning I received a signal from Commodore Keyes telling

Our destroyer was ordered to report to the Q.E. which we found lying just off the Point. On going on board I saw Commodore Keys, who told me he had sent for me as he wished me to write and account of the various landings at Cape Helles. I found to my disMay that up to this time none of my cables had been despatched, although they had been censored. Commodore Keyes stated the reason that Sir Ian Hamilton objected to any account going through until he had got off his official despatches. This was of course reasonable, and I could raise no objection, although a little disappointed. He gave me the reassuring news that Lawrence had not even sent any cables in to be censored, so that whatever happened I was certain to be ahead of him. Keyes then gave me the envelope containing my censored despatches, and told me to take them on board the "Euryalus" which was the ship from which all destroyers or transports, going to Malta or Alexandria took their instructions. He said that if I took them on board, that they would then put them on board the first destroyer of transport, as it was utterly impossible to send

He had promised to make a signal to say I was coming, but on my arrival on board, the signal had not been received. It was now a little past eight and I was taken down to the Wardroom, where I found a very convivial gathering. An old grey-haired man with clean shaven face, rather short and stout was sitting at the head of the table surrounded by a group of younger officers, and all were drinking port; the officer of the watch took me in to introduce me to the Captain, whom I discovered to be the short jovial man of whom I have already spoken. On hearing my name he said "Are you a bloody Lord?" I said "No my names is Ashmead-Bartlett". So he said "Oh I thought he said you were a lord". I then explained that I had been sent by Commodore Keyes to take up a temporary abode on his ship, and that he had promised to signal to say I was coming. He replied "Well sit down make your self at home, Have you dined?" to which I replied "No". He then ordered dinner and a whiskey and soda, and then made me drink three or four glasses of port with him.

Friday April 30th
I woke up with an extremely bad head this morning, but decided to go ashore in the first available boat, and to make a complete tour of all the beaches. I landed at X Beach and worked my way along to W and V. While I have already written a full description of these beaches, and so therefore will not repeat it here. Everywhere were evidences of a desperate struggle that had taken place for that position. The desperate nature of the whole undertaking was clearly shown by an examination of the enemy’s works and only the magnificent courage of the 29th Division enabled us to get ashore at all. Our line was now about two miles inland streching from the gully ravine in front of Chrythia to Cox Battery on the Dardanelles. The right of the line was now held by the

Saturday May 1st.
I stayed on board most of the day until I got my account finished, and I then took it on the "Queen Elizabeth" where I saw Commodore Keyes, who promised to have it censored and sent off as soon as possible. I then went on board "The Arcadian" and had a talk with Sir Ian Hamilton and his Chief of Staff, Braithwaite, who had his arm in a sling as the result of being inoculated against small pox. Sir Ian Hamilton spoke very freely of the campaign and of the difficulties he was up against and he declared that the Turks were in far stronger force than had been anticipated. He spoke very highly of the troops, and of the splendid manner in which they had fought. It was then told me that in future all despatches relating to the movements of the Army would have to be censored on board the "Arcadian" and not on "Queen Elizabeth". At the same time a pass was given to me signed by the Provost Marshal, which would enable me to go anywhere I liked. I then went and saw Maxwell and had a talk with him, and he promised me to censor my stuff in the same manner

[Page 52]
I wondered therefore, what course would be adopted and whether the Expedition would be withdrawn or abandoned before we committed ourselves still deeper into what might turn out to be a grand fiasco. I also wondered whether Sir Ian Hamilton would really face the true facts and let the Government know the real state of affairs. At this time we were barely holding on to the Peninsular and to enable us to do so, we had to keep all the battleships off the Coast, constantly bombarding the enemy’s trenches, or resisiting his counter attacks. In addition an immense fleet of transports lay off the shore, and I could not help thinking what a magnificent chance was being missed by the enemy’s submarines, and also what would happen to the Army if the submarines did appear, and thus force the Fleet and the transports to retire to Mudros. I learned that another Division the Lancashire Territorials, were due to arrive and might be expected any day. So it did not seem likely that any fresh advance would be attempted until they put in an appearance. In fact at this point the prospects of the Expedition looked particularly bad.

Monday May 3rd
This day I went on board the "Cornwallis" and called on Lawrence, whom I had not seen since we left Mudros. He told me of his experiences and of his many troubles with the censor, half of which are due to his lack of experience. He showed me several cables from Reuters in which it would appear that they are not altogether satisfied with his work, so I said that he could read through my despatches, if they would assist him in any way. I then returned to the "Implacable" after a short visit to the shore.

of the Gully Ravine and we were being constantly called up at all hours of the night and day to bombard the enemy. I am afraid that so far it did not have much effect, materially, although no doubt we exercised a kind of moral influence on the enemy and on our own men, who of course love to hear the sound of the guns. It was very hard work for the crews because they were constantly being employed as beach parties, having to convey the stores and ammunition and troops ashore. Everything seemed to be hung up, and it became more and more doubtful as to what the next move would be.

Tuesday May 4th
I examined the left of the position and also spent a good deal of time writing. I went over afterwards to visit Reginald Kamm at the French Headquarters, as he is a member of D’Amade’s staff. I found him suffering from the effects of his old wound, and also from the heat and complained bitterly of the conduct of the Expedition. He spoke to me a lot about the friction between the two commands, and it appears that the French are very disatisfied with things in general. Kamm told me that he thought D’Amade was a little off his head, and that he had never recovered from having being stellenboshed twice on the Western Front, and also that the death of his son who had been recently killed, had greatly upset him. The French, it appears, were greatly dissatisfied with having to withdraw from the Asiatic Coast after their successful landing at Kum Kale, where they succeeded in taking some 500

We then made our way towards the Lancashire landing, and were making good progress when out of the darkness there came a stern challenge "Alt, who goes there?" Again Ramsay replied "I am Lieut- Commander Ramsay", but the magic had lost its spell, and we were met by another curt rejoinder in a broad Lancashire accent "Well, ‘ands oop, anyway" There we had to stand with our hands above our heads feeling like two blithering idiots, while the guard closed around us to examine our credentials. However his uniform and my own innocent appearance quickly reassured them and we were allowed to continue our way, to the beach. Personally I was very glad to get back on board the "Implacable" safe and sound.

Wednesday May 5th
This morning I was summoned by signal to go on board the "Arcadian", where I again saw Sir Ian Hamilton. He told me that the operations had recommence the following day and that I ought

[Page 57]
Baba as well, but that if it was too late he would take Achi Baba on the following day. This shows how hopelessly he misread the whole situation, because far from taking Crythia or Achi Baba on that day or the day after, these two places were never occupied by our troops up to the very end of this disastrous campaign. General Hunter Weston was in a constant habit of misreading situations, for it was he who aanounced to his division before the Expedition ever landed that it was absolutely essential that Achi Baba should be occupied the same afternoon. A little after 10 o’clock I left him and took up my position to watch the fight. (For full account see elsewhere). I spent a greater part of the day in the company of Jack Churchill, who had come ashore with the Staff. Sir Ian himself and Braithwaite also came ashore, to direct operations, and spent part of their time with Hunter Weston who was acting as a local commander of all the troops present, and partly at another observation station belonging to Headquarters Staff.

In the afternoon Lawrence also turned up, but being very blind he could only see a few hundred yards away from him and therefore the magnificent panorama of war were somewhat wasted on him. When the fighting was over I returned to the "Implacable". As I left Lancashire Landing one of the Brigades of the Lancashire Division was just arriving. These unfortunate raw troops were no sooner got ashore in the darkness than they were pushed right up into the firing line and many of them were killed before they even got a chance of getting a view of the enemy’s position. It was a terrible mistake to employ troops in this manner, before they have ever had the chance of settling down and becoming accustomed to the sound of bullets.

Saturday May 8th
I again went to the shore to watch the final stages of the attack on Achi Baba, which culminated in a final charge of both armies simultaneously that is the French and English at 5. 30 p.m. Of course this ridiculous of conducting warfare except a further slaughter, and by 6 o’clock we knew that the first stage of the campaign had definately failed, and that it would be impossible to make another move of any sort until the arrival of large reinforcements from home. This means that we are now settled to a great campaign in France and another of huge dimensions in the near East. We have voluntarily brought this on ourselves by attacking the Turks, when we would have done far better to have let them stew in their own juice until the grand settlement which must follow the termination of the War. I saw that for the time being there would be little or nothing for me to do except to write up the events of the last few days.

Monday May 10th
I was again kept very busy writing despatches, and could not get a chance to go on shore.
Tuesday May 11th
I went on shore today, and had a look around, and also a talk with Hunter-Weston. Everybody seemed weary and depressed, as the general opinion was that nothing could possibly happen until the arrival of large reinforcements. Today the Turks started shelling Lancashire Landing, and V. Beach very vigorously, from Achi Baba and also from the Asiatic Coast. They have a six-inch gun that fires a high explosive shell, and which bursts with a terrific detonation. I had just gone ashore and was standing talking to Bettleheim in his tent when the first of these arrived.It burst in the centre of the little valley running up from the landing, and knocked out about eleven or twelve horses, and killing one man. Some of the horses were killed outright others had broken legs or their insides ripped out, without being killed. Naturally, this new menace caused considerable excitement, especially when it was followed by a series

Wednesday May 12th
The day passed with continuous bombardment between the Turkish guns shelling the beaches and our own guns trying to keep down their fire. I went my usual walk on shore and found everyone much disturbed by the menace

Thursday May 13th
I have nothing to record this day until the evening. At 2 a.m. I was roused up by the Gunnery-Lieutenant who told me that we were to send our boats, and endeavour to piok up the crew of the battleship

She was sighted by an old Quarter-Master as she crossed the bows of the battleship, but instead of giving the order to fire at her at once, he hesitated, thinking it might be one of our own vessels, and challenged her instead. A reply was made in English and immediately afterwards a torpedo struck the "Goliath" in the bows, and she listed to port. This was followed by two others all of which got home. The unfortunate battleship turned over and sank in under three minutes. The majority of the crew were caught like rats in a trap, and were drowned below, and only about 20 officers and 130 men were saved. These were picked up by the boats of the other ships further down the Straits, or else by destroyers. Although the "Goliath" was lying within about 100 yards the shore, so strong is the current that not a single survivor succeeded in swimming across. The Turkish torpedo boat then made her way back up the Straits still unobserved, and her signals were picked up by one of our ships as she sent a wireless to the Goeben announcing the successful result of her attack.

It was really a most extraordinary sight to us on the "Implacable", as we were lying quite close. The shrapnel hit them with a fearful whack, which could be heard a long distance away or else threw up great columns of water alongside. Both ships had their anchors down, and almost the first shell burst one of the steam pipes conveying steam to the anchor winch, and she could not get her anchor up . The position of both vessels began to look very precarious, and a destroyer hastened in to their assistance, whilst we and the neighbouring ships tried to locate and knock out the Turkish battery, but met with no success. One of the crew in his panic jumped overboard, and the destroyer had to lower a small boat to pick him up. He was rescued in the most gallant manner but the little boat had some very narrow shaves, as the shells fell all around her. Captain Lockyer now ordered his anchor to be raised for the purpose

May 16th
At one thirty the Implacable received orders to sail for Mudros to take in coal and ammunition. On arriving there I found the London in harbour and on going on board to visit my old friends I found many letters for myself and also the newspapers containing the my accounts of the landing of the Australians. I spent most of the day reading them. They have in fact received a very good show in all the papers.

Monday May I7th
we spent all day at Mudros. I was very idle and so weary that I could not write. The weather is getting very hot and I am not suitably clad. I am anxious to find an excuse to get away to Malta or Alexandria for a few days to get a complete outfit for ths summer and for the land campaign

Tuesday May 18th
We returned to our old anchorage off Cape Helles at dawn. On arriving there the Implacable received orders to proceed immediately to Malta where the London Queen and Prince of Wales are to join her. This squadron under Admiral Thursby is being detached from the Dardanelles and is not to retutn. There are rumours they are to join up with the Italian Fleet which looks as if Italy were on the verge of declaring war. I went on board the Swiftsure and saw Admiral Stewart Nicholson who told me to join the Cornwallis pending further instructions from Admiral de Roebeck. Therefore I went on board and saw Caotain Davidson,, who is and old friend and I also saw Lawrence. These continual changes are a great nuisance so I wrote off to Commodore Keyes to ask if I might hire a yacht for my own use. With the Fleet so dispersed it is extremly

[Page 65]
difficult to get about especially up to Gaba Tepe. There are many rumours of Cabinet changes. To-day I heard we are to have a Coalition Government with Balfour at the Admiralty and that Winston is to be outed which I do not think would upset the Navy much. Everyone is alamed about the future of this expedition which has been one long muddle from start to finish.

Wednesday May I9th
I decided this morning to draw up a memorandum of the whole situation and to send it in in the form of a letter just to see if the Military Authorities will let it through, but I do not think they will. In any case I intend to leave a record of what I think ought to be done if we are ever going to get through to Constantinople. I feel certain the Military Authorities out here are concealing the truth from the Authorities at home and that they will not tell them the real facts about the situation because they are afraid they will be withdrawn altogther and then good bye to K.C.Bs K.C.MG and all the other damned Gs and Peerages they have in mind. But this is only plaing with a great question when the whole safety of your country is at stake. But our leaders in the field are very little men. That is the trouble

Thursday May 20th

At six am the Cornwallis went up the Dardanelles to act as Flank bombarding ship. We were at battiestations and soon commenced a vigorous attack on both Europe and Asia aiming I believe at a 5-9 gun on the Asiatic side European side and at some batteries the Turks are supposed to be constructing on the Asiatic side. There was the usual fearful waste of ammunition and the general discomfort caused to every -

[Page 66]
one on board by letting off of 12 inch and 6inch guns. The enemy replied vigorously and we had a lively time on board but his aim was as usual bad and we continually shifted our position so as to put him off. The Majestic also came under fire as she lay at anchor. Finally we were struck by one 5-9 Armstrong Whitworth Shell which came in on the starboard side amidships and damaged two cutters and finally bursting in the battery. We left the Dardanelles at 1 pm and at four ofclock I sailed on a trawler for Cape Kefalo Imnros to visit Commodore Keyes and William Maxwell. To-day a signal came round the Fleet of the decisive success gained by the Australians at Gaba Tepe on the I8th and I9th when they repulsed the great attacks of the Turks under Von Sanders in person. On arriving at Kephalo I went on board the Triad and saw Keyes who told me I could not have a yacht but that I might hire a motor boat if I could get hold of one.

I then went on board the Arcadian and dined with William Maxwell and got Jack Churchill to give me a cabin for the night. After dinner I went to Sir Ian Hamilton's cabin and had a long talk with him. He wished to impress me with the idea that things were going very well. I pointed out that very large reinforcements would be necessary to carry the expedition through whereupon he replied ‘They have promised me two more Divisions and then turning to Braithwaite the Chief of the Staff he said ‘We must not worry the old man too much. He is very pleased with us now and in time we shall get all we want out of him' He then discussed the plan of campaign and seemed to think all his troubles would be over once he had taken Achi Baba which he regaded as the key to the Narrows. He seemed confident he would be able to take it at the next attempt with

[Page 67]
the new reinforcements. He seemed quite cheerful and confidant but I could not help thinking it was a very strange way to regard your duty towards your country as secondary to worrying Kitchener for the right number of men to carry the expedition through. I had handed in my memorandum on the situation to Maxwell on coming on board and of course neither Hamilton or Braithwaite had seen it up to this time. It subsequently became the mainspring of all my troubles in the Staff in the future because after reading it they realised three things which they can never forgive. Firstly that I had a perfectly clear conception of the extent of our so called success up todate. Secondly that I knew too much and disapproved of the strategy of the cmpaign and thirdly they saw for the first time that I was not prepared to be an offical eyewitness but was determined to remain and independent critic who could not be got at in any one’s interests.

Whilst I was with Sir Ian and the Chief of Staff a message ame in to say that several wagon loads of copper a had been reported at Dedegatch on their way through to Turkey. Sir Ian turned round to Braithwaite and said ‘We must try and stop them at all costs. Could not our military attache in Sofia do something. But Braithwaite said 'He is no use and an idiot’. Sir Ian then said it must be a job for some of our independent bright boys' out there will you send a cable and see vwhat can be done. Braithwaite then left the room a but I stayed some time longer and talked om many subjects. They asked me to cable that same evening to London for some Turkish maps I had bought from the General Staff when in Constantiniple. This I said I would do. Sir Ian complained bitterly that the Government had not published his dispatches. He loves writing and would

[Page 68]
make a much better War Correspondent than General. I stayed up talking until lam.

Friday May 21st
At ten am I sailed on a torpedo boat from the Arcadian to Anzac with several officers of the General Staff as I wished to collect information on the repulse of the Turks. I landing I saw General Birdwood who took me all round the positions with him. I had a very interesting time and counted houndersd of Turkish dead lying in front of the trenches. The Colonials seemed very pleased with themselves and were laying about the front lines having a good rest after their labours of the three previous days. As General Birdwood past one of them looked up and saw his rows of ribbons exclaiming. ‘The bloody army is’nt going to know me long, enough to get a row like that’ I lunched with the General on my return and he gave me a new map of the position they have prepared.

At four pm I went on board the Canopus and had a very interesting talk with Captain Grant, who gave me many very interesting details of the Falklands Islands battle and of the part played by the Canopus. Bu he was most interesting on the subject of the feint made at Bulair by a portion of the Naval Division on the day of the landing April 25th He was the senior naval officer in charge. He declares the lines were absolutely unoccupied that day and might have been taken probably without a shot. He used every device to get the Turks to show their hands but no a man was visible and not a gun was fired. He made several feints of landing and men were sent close in shore but the Turks never fired a shot. At night he even landed some marines who penetrated some distance but were not molested. He was

[Page 69]
going to make a report on the state of affairs and to ask permission to land when at midnight he received orders to come south at once with his whole force to assist in taking off the Australians at Anzac who were then in a very bad way and it was thought they would not be able to hold on during the night. Thank Goodness this crowing disaster did not occur.

[Page 70]
Saturday May 22nd
This morning I went on board the "Swiftsure" and saw Admiral Nicholson. I pointed out to him how extremely difficult it was for me to get my work done and sent off living on board the "Cornwallis" which was continually engaged in duties up the Striats. I asked him therefore if I could be transferred to another ship, and he very kindly told me I could come and live with him on the "Swiftsure" hersfelf. I therefore returned to the "Cornwallis", collected my baggage, said " Good -bye" to my friends and took up my quarters on the flagship. The Admiral invited me to lunch, and was extremely agreeable. I also met General Fuller for the first time, who is the head of all the Artillery of the Army, and who lives on board the Flagship.

Sunday May 23rd.
To-day was the day fixed for the armistice at Anzac for the burial of the 3000 Turkish dead lying in front of our trenches, who fell in the abhortive attack of May 18-19. To my bitter disappointment I was unable to get up to Anzac to witness this most interesting event I tried by every means in my power, but there was no boat of any sort, and I found myself a prisoner on board the "Swiftsure" as the ship moved further north for the purpose of shelling the extreme right wing of the Turks, as the armistice did not apply to the Cape Helles end. However we only fired a very few rounds and then returned to our old anchorage. The armistice at Anzac lasted from dawn until about 4 o’clock in the afternoon, and was scrupulously observed by both sides, not a shot being fired. A zone was established between the two lines, and it was arranged that the Australians should bury all the dead on their side of it, and the Turks all on their side, and that the rifles should belong to those in each zone. As a matter of fact the Australians and New Zealanders crept out dur-

[Page 71]
ing the night and collected as many of the Turkish rifles they could find, so that when the latter came out on the following day they were bitterly disappointed at recovering so few. During the day not a shot was fired, and the armistice was prolonged until about 5 o’clock as the work had not been completed. Of course both the Staffs seized the opportunity to have a good look at the others lines, with a view to the future operations.

Monday May 24th
I was aroused up early this morning by sounds of excitement from the deck, and on going up above found that the battleship "Albian" had run ashore in the night in a fog off Gaba Tepe and was being furiously bombarded by the Turkish guns. She remained in this position from 4 o’clock in the morning until 10 a.m. fully exposed to the Turkish fire, and was hit over a hundred times, but fortunately the Turks could not bring to bear any gun of large calibre, and the shells from the field guns did very little damage to her thick armour. The "Canopus'. went to her assistance, got a cable aboard and tried to tow her off, but it immediately snapped. However later, two fresh cables were got in position ,and the whole of the crew were made to come aft, and stamp on the decks, so as to lighten her bows, which were stuck on this sand bank, At the same time the "Albian" opened up terrific bombardment of the Turkish positions, with her forward 12-inch guns and 6-inch, not for the purpose of doing the enemy any particular harm, but to lighten her by getting rid of some of her ammunition and also in the hope that the concussion would shake her bows off. This plan in the end proved successful, and both vessels got clear with a loss I think of 4 killed and several wounded. Poor Admiral de Roebeck is having a worrying time. He has

[Page 72]
now left the "Lord Nelson" to which he had temporarily transferred his flag and has taken up his quarters on the yacht "Triad", as the "Lord Nelson" has been sent back to Mudros on account of the submarine scare. On hearing that the "Albion was ashore the "Triad came over to Anzac to render any assistance in her power, and got a shell through her for her trouble. (Add May 22nd) I should have said that on May 22nd the day on which I moved on board the "Swiftsure we had the first submarine scare. It was just after lunch, when suddenly a torpedo signalled she had sighted a submarine. The news was reported the same time from the battleship ’’Prince George", which fired two guns at the periscope.

The news caused terrible consternation, and the "Swiftsure" and the other battleships, and most of the transports immediately got up anchor, and steamed a zig zag course all over the place. It was a remarkable sight and looked as if the entire Fleet had suddenly gone mad, or that the helmsmen were all drunk, or else that the Admiral was practising some new kind of dance. The destroyers followed by all the trawlers, spread out in a great fan, and tried to round up and ram our elusive enemy, but without success. In any case, she disappeared and we returned to our old anchorage at half past four. Naturally there is a great feeling of insecurity in everyone’s mind. The "Swiftsure" has no nets, as these were left behind at Malta not being considered of any practiaal use. Therefore we have no protection at all against a torpedo. It was the result of this scare that caused the ships off Anzac to steam about during the night, and the first fruits of the enemy's arrival in our midst was the stranding of the battleship "Albion"

Tuesday May 2 5th
I was dressing down below about 7.30 having slept on deck, when

[Page 73]
there came tremendous shouting from the deck, followed by the rapid firing of guns. Together with everyone else, I rushed on the Quarter deck to discover the cause of the alarm. I then learned that the periscope of a submarine had appeared within three hundred yards of us. Our crew on the "Swiftsure" were all men of first rating, and the men were lying around the 14 pounders, they immediately fired on tfre enemy, who seemed to have been thoroughly scared and promptly disappeared beneath the surface. He certainly lost a great opportunity, for in addition to the "Swiftsure" the "Agememnon" was lying within a few hundred yards and the old "Majestic" a short distance further off. Presumably the submarine came up blind, and was fired on before it had the chance to lay on a target. This evidence of the enemy’s presence caused still further consternation, and no one seemed to know what ought to be done. The "Agememnon" immediately weighed anchor and steamed off to Mudros, as she was too valuable a ship to take any chances with, thus leaving only the "Swiftsure" and the "Majestic" off the Cape Helles end. It is a most uncomfortable feeling lying there at anchor knowing that at any moment we might be blown to eternity by our unseen foe.

I went ashore at 10 o’clock as I wished to see Hunter Weston, with whom I had a long talk. He told me that there would be another attack in a few days time, and that once again he was quite confident Achi Baba would be taken. I returned to the "Swiftsure" at 12 o’clock, and then learned that the submarine which had disappeared for a couple of hours, had fired a torpedo at the battleship "Vengeance" which was cruising up and down between Helles and Anzac. The torpedo passed across her bows, fortunately missing. The "Vengeance" then went off to Kepholos and we heard nothing more of the submarine. We all went down to lunch, and were nearly through the meal, when a young signalman

[Page 74]
came to the Commander and said "Beg pardon, Sir, the "Triumph" is listing". I rushed on deck, where all the officers bad assembled including the Admiral, and there sure enough, off Gaba Tepe lay the unfortunate battleship with a heavy list,.Destroyers were rushing to her assistance almost covering the horizon with the dense columns of black smoke thrown out by their funnels. Fortunately there was a trawler very near the "Triumph" which steamed in close to take off her crew. The battleship hung at an angle for eight minutes, and then turned bottom up, floating in this position for 20 minutes. The sea being calm and most of the crew being provided with patent waistcoats the loss of life was small. She was struck by two torpedos, which either passed underneath or went right through her net. It was a dramatic moment on the "Swiftsure" watching her go down.

The Admiral and all the officers stood at the salute or with their hats in their hands as she made her final plunge, diappearing beneath the waves in a cloud ol smoke and steam. Admiral Nicholson then turned on his heel, closed his telescope with a snap and turning to the officers present said "Gentlemen, the "Triumph has gone." We all realised how it might have been our turn that very morning, when the same submarine rose within 300 yards of us. What was going to happen now, everybody asked. Were we to lie off the coast, exposed to the enemy attack until we were torpedoed one after the other, or were we to take shelter and leave the Army to look after itself? At 3. 30 Admiral Nicholson suddenly announced that he was going to transfer his flag to the "Majestic" which had nets and was the oldest battleship at the Dardanelles, and that the "Swiftsure" would return that afternoon to Mudros. I went to him and asked him if he would take me along with him to his new flagship, as naturally I was obliged to

[Page 75]
remain off the Coast. He said that he would. I hurried to pack my things and they were thrown into a trawler, together with a miscelaneous selection, trunks and sofas, tin foods, stores and general kit belonging to the Admiral and his Staff. At 4.30 we were on the old "Majestic", which became densely crowded with the new arrivals. I, in fact was given a cabin belonging to one of the warrant officers, right amidships. For the last time in her career, an Admiral’s flag was hoisted on her mainmast, and thus the old "Majestic" which commenced her career some twentythree years before as a flagship was destined to end it as one, also.

The "Swiftsure" immediately steamed away towards Mudros and was not seen again. A little later the "Triad" appeared from Kepholos and anchored close to the "Majestic". Admiral de Roebeck summoned Admiral Nicholson on board, and a conference took place, between the two Commanders. I could not help noticing the irony of the position in which they found themselves. For here was the Admiral in Chief installed on a little yacht, and the Admiral in local command on old "Majestic". The remainer of the fleet had disappeared altogether. Gone was the mighty "Queen Elizabeth", the "Agemamon" the "Lord Nelson", and the great Fleet of pre-dreadnaught battleships that had sailed so proudly out of Mudros Bay three short weeks before. The great danger which all feared, had in fact come to pass. The submarines had chased us from the face of the waters. The "Triad" returned to Kepholos, and the "Majestic" remained at anchor off Kepholos until 8 p.m. being eagerly watched by thousands of men on shore, who expected every minute to see her share the fate of the "Triumph". At 8 o’clock it was suddenly announced that we would return to Kepholos and take shelter for the night. The anchor

[Page 76]
was raised, and the Admiral called several destroyers around him, to cover our flank during this dangerous passage of 10 miles of moonlit ocean. The old "Majestic" did better time than she had done for many years on this almost her last trip. Kepholos is a small open bay in the Island of Imbros about 10 miles from Cape Helles, 9 from Anzac and 12 from Suvla Bay. It offers little or no projection when the wind is in the North or East, but it does keep off the sou-westers. The entrance is as wide as the bay, and is difficult to protect against submarine attack. For some time past units of the Navy had been busy placing a boom in position there, and at this time the work was not yet completed, in fact it said that they were only fishing nets, and were placed there as a bluff. In any case in the excitement and speed at which she was going, the "Majestic" failed to find the entrance, and ran bang into the net, curling it all around her. We therefore had to back out again, and it took us some time to get in. I went to bed about 10 o’clock, and at 12 there was a great scare, for the destroyers on patrol duty outside reported they had sighted a submarine, which was trying to get through the entrance to the bay. I believe the danger only existed in their imagination.

Wednesday May 26th
It was blowing half a gale this morning, which rendered it extremely difficult to get about the harbour in motor boats or steam pinnaces. However I was very anxious to get on board the "Arcadian" and see Maxwell to find out what had happened about the memorandum I had drawn up of the whole situation, at the Front. I succeeded in doing so, and on going on board, I met Sir Ian Hamilton, and did not see particularly friendly, so I gathered he had read the documents I had drawn up. When I saw Maxwell, he

[Page 77]
told me that both Hamilton and Braithwaite had read it, and had written on the margin that it was to be allowed to pass. I cannot say that this altogether surprised me. Meanwhile before I could get back the "Majestic" had sailed for Helles again, and I found myself stranded on the "Arcadian". I then learned that a trawler had sailed for Helles at 2 o’clock, and that I could rejoin the "Majestic" on her. At this time the Navy had just issued an ultimatum to the Headquarters Staff saying they could no longer be responsible for protecting the "Arcadian" against submarine attafek and that therefore the Staff must take up their quarters on shore. The Island of Imbros was selected as being the nearest and most convenient point, and the site had been found overlooking the bay on a sandy waste, where there was said to be good water. I lucnhed on board the "Arcadian" and at 2 o’clock just managed to catch the trawler for Helles, and rejoined the "Majestic" at 4 p.m. That evening we moved closer in to Lancashire Landing until we actually had several large transports between us and the outer sea.

I could not help remarking that in former days it was the duty of the navy to protect British commerce, but that now apparently , it was the duty of commerce to protect the Navy. Nevertheless, in spite of these precautions, no one on board felt any great sense of security, and personally I had a kind of feeling that the end had come. That night we had a kind of farewell dinner in the Wardroom and I drank a bottle of champagne with the P.M.O. The port also went round more times than usual and some of us sat up until about 11 o’clock. There was one of the naval officers, belonging to the "Majestic" with the beach parties on shore, and he was so certain that we were going to be torpedoed that he went around to all his friends and said "Mind you are up early tomorrow morning

[Page 78]
and you will see a sight you have never seen before, namely a battleship sunk by a submarine. Just before turning in, I went to the P.M.O’s Cabin to get a book, and he asked me if I had a life belt.
I told him that I had one of the bicycle tyre Variety, but that I didn’t think it was of any use, because it was leaking. He then gave me another, which I decided I would ask one of the marines on duty to blow out. I then went down below, undressed and wrapped up all my notes and valuable papers in a waterprotff coat, and placed them in my small handbag. I had my mattress carried up to the shelter deck, just above the after turret, intending to sleep up there for greater security, and I almost decided to take my bag up with me, but at the last moment I changed my mind, and left it below. Instead, I took my cigarette case and put £30 in notes in my pyjama pocket, went up an deck, lay down and was soon fast asleep.

Thursday May 27th
I woke up at 6 o’clock, and called out to a sentry to ask the time and he replied "Six o’clock Sir." I then said "All right call me at seven", and went to sleep again. (For full account of sinking of "Majestic" see elsewhere).
Very shortly afterwards a steam pinnace came along side, and took us off our overcrowded boat which was in imminent danger of being swamped. I was wet through, and exremely cold, and we were taken on to a small French transport. The Captain was very kind, and also the crew, for they served us with coffee and brandy, and also with suits of sailor’s clothes. I acquired a pair of blue trousers and a white singlet and a pair of rubber soled shoes. Some of the old veterans were in a state of complete prostration from the cold and shock, but I cannot say that I felt any the worse myself. A little later some officers came off in a motor boat, and took me

[Page 79]
ashore to Lancashire Landing. Here I found a great number of the survivors gathered, including Captain Talbot. I also leartoed that Admiral Nicholson was safe, but that no one seemed to know what had happened to General Puller. The survivors on shore were being served out with army clothing. I went to Bettleheim’s mess had breakfast, and then went up and visited Hunter-Weston, who was very much amused to see me in such a strange costume. I then returned to the beach and learned that all the survivors were to be taken off to Mudros in a fleet sweeper. Having lost everything I possessed in the world I saw that I would have to go down to Malta, and decided to go to Mudros to get the Admiral’s permission.

On arriving there I went on board the "Triad", to the huge joy of the officers at seeing me in such a strange costume. Admiral de Roebeck was most kind and insisted upon his valet fitting me out in a suit of his clothes, while Commodore Keyes presented me with a hat. I then stayed to lunch, and the Admiral said he would send me off as soon as possible to Malta. I spent that night on board a ship called the "Fovette", which is kept at Mudros for stranded officers whose ships have been sunk, as a kind of temporary home. Here I found several survivors of the "Goliath" and there was one young midshipman who had had a miraculous escape.

Friday May 28th
I got a signal that I could sail to day at noon for Malta, on a store ship known as the "Baron Ardrossan". I went on board her, found the Captain a very agreeable man. I felt rather nervous on sailing out of the harbour expecting to be torpedoed again at any minute, and I kept a big lifebelt by me the whole time. The Captain on seeing this, said "Bless you, don’t worry about that belt, I’ve got 1100 round of 12-inch ammunition on board and if anything strikes

[Page 80]
us, we should go up so high that you won’t need any belt.

Saturday May 29th
At sea in the "Ardroasan"
Sunday May 30th
At sea in the "Ardrossan". The voyage was quite uneventful and we sighted no more of the enemy’s boats. I passed the time writing accounts of recent events for the purpose of having them sent off from Malta, but I very much doubt if anything will be allowed to pass, about these disasters to the battleships.

[Page 81]
Diary. May 31st
We arrived at Malta at about nine o’clock. I at once went to see Admiral Limpus but he was not in. However I saw the Flag Captain who gave me a passport to land. I went up to the Club and had a shave and a hair cut and then installed myself at the Osborne Hotel where I had left a suit of clothes and some shirts. Most of the afternoon I was busy looking for clothes and ordering other articles. But I speedily discovered there was little to be had in Malta. I also learnt there was a Massagerie Boat leaving in on the following day for Marseilles and the temptation to return grew on me irresistibably. Congreve advised me to go back as I would miss nothing and I might make myself very useful advising the authorities at home on the true state of affairs at the Dardanelles. That afternoon I received an intimation from the Governor that I was not to send any cables on the situation from Malta withought his express sanction. I knew he had therefore received some word from the General Staff who were above all else anxious that I should not return and speak the truth. This only strengthened my determination to depart. In fact that evening I had already made up my mind. I dined at the Club with Congreve and Falconer the Admiral’s Flag Lieutenant who did his utmost to persuade me to return.

Tuesday June 1st
I awoke in the morning with my mind quite made up to depart as I needed a rest and could get nothing I required in Malta. I telephoned through to Admiral Limpus to ask his permission and he requested me to pay him a visit which I did.

[Page 82]
He received me most affably and seemed most anxious that I should return giving me full permission. I also called on Lord Methuen but he was away in the country and therefore I did not see him. However whilst there I met Mrs Leslie who had come out from England to fetch her son Shawne who she said 'had gone off his head' from the sights he had seen whilst working in the field ambulanoe. The prospect of returning improved my spirits enormously. I cabled to Harry Lawson [Proprietor of the Daily Telegraph] to ask his permission but did not expect to get a reply back in time. I also cabled to Gina and to Elsie Janis and to several shops ordering clothes. I also cabled for theatre tickets for several nights in fact I made the most careful preperations to have everything ready so that I could leave on the following Thursday and catch Friday's boat at Marseilles. I lunched with Mrs Leslie and met Hon Agnes Peel, George Peel's wife who looked as untidy as ever. Then the remainder of the day I spent in making preperations and in reading the papers at the Club.

Wednesday June 2nd
Having acquired a fresh passport and my ticket I went on board the Massagerie boat Calodonien at twelve. Mrs Leslie came and saw me off. She promised to convey my apologies to the governor for not having seen him. On board I met Stanley Wilson who was coming from Athens and Somers Somerset who had just come from the Aecadian. Both are serving their coumtray as King's Messengers. Also Ward Price who had come from Athens. It was pleasant to find oneself again amongst friends. Both Somerset and Wilson were vigorously denouncing the geneeral Staff at the Dardanells for the manner in which they had been treated. It appears that although entrusted with Ambassadors love letters and

[Page 83]
the usual cigarettes the General Staff have evinced a very strong desire not to have them actually up at the front through the fear they will go back and tell the truth about the true state of affairs. Somerset succeeding in getting through by ignoring the instructions. He was received very coldly on the Arcadian but feigning stupidity he was finally allowed to stay until it was time for him to return and learnt a great deal about what was going on. He said 'anyone who looks as stupid as I do has a fair chance’. But Stanley Wilson was held up at Athens and was not allowed to proceed any further. In consecquence he was perfectly furiously and was vigorously denouncing everyone. In fact it does seem a short sighted policy not to trust your own messengers and thus to arouse their antagonism as they have it in their power to do a great deal of harm at home. However as I have often noticed the workings of the military mind are very hard to define. Wilson told me he ad seen Lord Methuen who had cabled to him saying 'do not let Ashmead Bartlett say a word about the expedition as he is a Jeramiah. I do not know what were the pecularities of that prohpet but on enquiry I learn he was a pessimist. I have never been a pessimist provided things are carried out in the right way. But I am more than ever convinced we can never get through working on our present lines. The Calodien is an old boat built thirty years ago but for all that not too uncomfortable. The two Kings Messengers insisted upon my sitting down to put togther a memorandum on the Military situation whieh I proceeded to do but took equal care that neither of them should have a copy.

[Page 84]
June 3rd
At sea in the Calodonien. Nothing to record.

June 4th
Arrived at Marseilles at two pm but we were delayed for some time in getting ashore. On landing I went to see Martin Cecil Gurney our Consul General whom I had not seen for fourteen years when after the South African War I was stationed there as a kind of Assistant Vice Consul by my thoughtful aunt Lady Burdett Coutts. However disliking the work I was not long in making my way to Monte Carlo where I made some mone and finally having met the charming Elsie Phillips I took her back with me to London. Being in the city recalled many old memories of those bygone years. It is strange that I should have also met her too this year again happily married after such a long interval. Gurney arranged my passport which enabled me to depart at six thirty for Paris.

June 5th
Arrived in Paris punctual to the hour at eight am. Drove immediately to the Gare de Nord. Then had breakfast and a shave after which having half an hour to spare I drove in a taxi to visit Madame D' lancey but I found she was out of Paris. Caght the train at 10-5 for London reaching that city to my infinite joy at 0pm. I was met at the station by Audrey who announced that Seabury had been badly wounded in that awful Ypres salient and was now safe home again in London. with two in the head and one in the arm. On arriving at the Carlton Hotel I found Gina who had come to the station to meet me but who had missed me as I got away so quickly. I was delighted to see her again. I took a suit of rooms after a row with the management who said I owed them some money on the last account which was perfectly true.

[Page 85]
I never heard such cheek in my life considering the money I have spent there and I told them so to such good effect that they became most polite and affable. I drove Gina home and then went on to the Palace
Theatre to see Elsie Janis. They were just finishing the play and I saw the last of it from the stage. I then took them and Basil Hallam out to supper to the Carlton Grill where I met Marie Lohr and her
husband. She is about to appear in a new play and is very busy. I heard that Elsie is to only play at the Palace for another two weeks. Business has not been good of late. In fact it has been cut into by
the counter attractions of the Great Empire Review. Got to bed about 1am.

Sunday June 6th
I worked all the morning finishing off my memorandum on the Situation in Gallipoli. I then went up to Holly Lodge to lunch with Uncle Willie and Irene. I found him in great form and much interested in all that I had to say. In the morning I rushed down the city and saw Seabury whom I found installed in the Fishmongers Hall. He seems to be getting on all right and is delighted to be out of the whole horror which I am afraid will effect his nerves worse than the wounds will his body. Lady Glanusk came up to Holly Lodge with two younguns’ and we had some tennis. Then Sir Edward and Lady Carson came up and I was able to give him a sketch of the whole situation at the Dardanelles. He listened most attentatively and told me the Government now had the whole matter under consideration and that it was most important I should see the members. He made an appointment for me to meet Bonar Law on the following morning.

[Page 86]
At six o'clock I motored back to London with Sir Edward and then went on down to the Daily Telegraph Office to see Harry Lawson. I found him arrayed in the unoform of the Bucks Hussars as he has been called back to the colours to command the reserve regiment. He received me most affably and said he thoroughly approved of my return and had cabled to that effect to Malta but I never received his cable before my departure. We discussed a great many interesting matters connected with the war. There seems to be a perfect maze of intrigues at home between the Frenoh and Kitchener Factions. It was Colonel a Court's letter about ammunition in the times which finally caused the Government to give up the struggle and made a coalition inevitable. But in any c case they could not have survived an exposure of the truth about the Dardanelles expedition.

Harry Lawson told me to come to the meeting of the newspapers proprietors on Wednesday as they wished to thank me for my services and to discuss one or two matters. I then went to the Carlton Hotel and dined with Gina after which we went on to Ciro’s of which I found myself a member so I was able to get in. However there were not many people there and a kind of dullness seems to have come over night life in London caused by the heavy demands of the war and the fact that members are no longer allowed to go there in uniform.

Monday June 7th
I soon discovered I was not to be allowed to have a peaceful week in which to get a new outfit and see a few friends. My arrival from the Dardanelles became immediately generally known and I was not let alone
for second. I quickly discovered there were many political factions w who wished to get hold of the truth to use it for their own purposes

[Page 87]
but I made up my mind not to be a party to any such intrigues and to refuse to see anyone about the expedition except members of the Cabinet and officals of the War Office and Admiralty. This morning I went to breakfast with Sir Edward Carson and Bonar Law came in . We had a long discussion on the whole situation and they showed me several important documents dealing with the situation. I presented them with a copy of my Memorandum on the situation and Bonar Law undertook to see Arthur Balfour. There does not seem to be much harmony in the cabinet. In fact they all seem to be at loggerheads. They all seem to dislike K who wishes to do everything himself. Then Carson is animated by a strong dislike of zWinston which further complicates the situation.

However the Cabinet are to meet this week to decide on some settled policy. It seems they are determined to carry the expedition through but apparently have no clear idea how it should be done. At eleven am I was called to the Admiralty where I saw Brade and Sir Graham Green having a long discussion with them on the campaign. They cross examined me on a number of points but I was very guarded in my answers on all technical q questions wishing to avoid any appearance of criticising the chiefs out at the front. However I was enabled to enlighten them on a number of points and tried to make the situation perfectly clear. I lunched at the Carlton with Gina but was called away immediately afterwards to go to the War Office to see Sir Reginald Brade again and also General Callwellb the Director General of Military Operations. I had a very long talk with them again on the situation which I expounded thoroughly. At the end General Callwell said he would be seeing Lord Kitchener that evening and would tell him all I had said and that he would try and

[Page 88]
arrange an interview. I was kept very busy all the rest of the afternoon. In the evening Gina dined with me and we went to the Palace afterwards going round to see Elsie Janis. Afterwards we ended up with supper at the Carlton.

Tuesday June 8th
All this day I was kepy busy at a thousand odd jobs having to arrange matters with the Daily Telegraph and see Hughes Massie. Everybody was attempting to get me to dine or lunch and to get the latest news from the Dardanelles but I resolutely declined to talk except to offical people. Marie Lohr and her husband lunched with me togther with Audrey Frederick Palmer and de Wend Fenton. In the afternoon Gina came to see me. I was kep occupied all the afternoon but at seven dined with de Wend Fenton at Ciro's which was empty but the dinner was quite good.

We then went to His Majesty's to the first night od Knoblaugh’ s new p play entitled Marie O'Deil. It was poor insipid studd at such a crisis in the world's history. In fact I can sum it up in two lines, I do not think I ever saw such poor inspid tosch. For it does'nt show a woman and it does'nt show a boche.
Marie Lohr made the best of a thankless task. It will not run a month that I will guarantee. I met Lady Paget and Lady Cunard at the play. The latter could'nt get in and asked me to tea on the following day. Afterwards I went to supper with the Janiss Basil Hallam and de Wend at Ciro's. But these night clubs are rotten without drink and we could not get one

[Page 89]
Wednesday June 9th
Again I was rushed almost to death all day. I made a desperate effort to collect some kit togther and to order other thins I required for my new departure. In the morning I had to go and see Harry Lawson and then I think lunched at the Carlton with Gina but had to leave immediately afterwards to attend the meeting of the newspapers Proprietors Association to which I had been invited as they wished to thank me for my services. This was held at their offices in Fleet Street . On entering I found about twenty people sittin round a table presided over by Harry Lawson wh made a speech thanking me in kindly terms for the work I had done whilst out at the Dardanelles. I then got up and made a reply in which I intimated that an increase of salary would be an acceptable recognition of my work and the various perils I had undergone on their behalf. This was considered and then referred for future consideration.

We tyen discussed various other points to do with the service and with cabling. This having been accomplished I made them adieu and retired to see Hughes Massie on various questions. At this meeting he first broached the idea of my taking out a Cenemetograph. I was struck with his suggestion but there seemed great difficulties in the way. In the afternoon I did a thousand thins and managed to run down home to pay a short visit. I also saw Edna who discussed her approaching marriage which I do not think will ever come off. In fact I think she will make a great mistake if she does marry this particular man as apparently he has little money and how the Devil she would live on little I cant conceive. I went and had tea with Lady Cunard and there met Mrs Horner and the Duchess of Rutland . They tried to feet me to talk but

[Page 90]
I resolutely declined to be drawn and merely amused them with some unimportant details. Gina doned with me at the Carlton togther with George who had come up from the country to see me. He is better from his wound but I do not think he will be fit to take the front for a long time yet as his arm has not yet healed. We afterwards went on to see the new Review at the Empire which is very good having Ethel Levy George Graves and Joe Coyne as its stars. They gave us a good receptiion on seeing us in the front row. Afterwards Gina and I went on to supper at Ciro’s and stayed out until nearly two am. Thus with days crammed with work and late nights I am nearly dead but I can always go for about ten days at a stretch with little or no sleep.

Thursday June 10th
In the morning I worked at a variety of things and at 11-30 accompanied by Hughes Massie I went to see Sir George Hutchinson the publisher with a view to arrange a deal over a book. Finally after a very long discussion l agreed to write one on the expedition for a preliminary payment of £500 down and a big royalty reserving the American rights. This I consider a good bargain considering the bad state of the book trade on account of the war. In fact I wished to get something definitely settled before I returned to the Dardanelles as immediately the expedition comes to an end the interest in it May collapse. And if the I book has a big sale I shall get well repaid out of the royalty. I then went to lunch at the Duchess of Rutland’s meeting a lot of people including Lady Cunard Diana Harry Cust Lady Elcho and several others wgose names I cannot recall. It was quite like old times. Lady Elcho is

[Page 91]
was very anxious for me to meet Arthur Balfour and said she would try and arrange it if he had a free day. After lunch Gina came to see me but I had to leave her at four to go with de Wend Fenton to see Alfred Butt at the Palace Theatre. We have now arranged that he shall provide a complete cenemetograph outfit for me to take to the Dardanells a d ten thousand feet of film. This will be an immease load to lug round but it will well repay us if only we are able to get some really valuable pictures and at the same time are allowed to use it. The great thing is to get it out there and then to arrange about its use afterwards. I went round that afternoon and had my first lesson. The machine is very neat and compact but the difficult is to load and unload it with film. Otherwise it works automatically with an air engine. However for better or for worse I shall take it. At any rate it costs me nothing.

This evening I dined with Lady Randolph Churchill to meet Winston and his wife. The Lulu Harcourts were also there. I was much surprised in the change that has come over Winston. He looked years older his face was pale his skin flabby and his eyes bloodshot. He seemed etribly upset and depressed. In fact it is obvious to me he has felt his fall keenly . He has come a collossal cropper and will never appear in history as a great statesman but only as an exceedingly clever politican. I. am sorry for him and have always found him a good friend but he only has himself to blame. Had he sat still at the Admiralty and not interfered with the purely naval side of the work he would not have found himself in his present position. But with his domineering nature he liked to interfere in everything and in war matters

[Page 92]

and in military and naval technical and strategical knowledge but chiefly in technical he only has the most elementary knowledge to jud-ge from the conversations I had with him in the course of the week. His errors have been great and consecquently his fall. Time will probably show that his original conception of the Dardanelles expedition was quite sound but the manner in which he went about it is so extraordianry that one might almost believe his mind was slightly disorganised by work worries criticism and fatigues. The poor devil needs a good rest. He started my making errors and has tried ever since to redeem his reputation by brilliant but impossible coups which have landed him deeper and deeper in the mire.

Nevertheless the country owes him a debt of gratitude for having the Fleet mobolised and ready for action at the outbreak of war. But now he cannot understand how it has all happened and this his career which has been one long uninteruppted success has temporarly at any rate suffered a grevious, but by no means fatal check for reasns I was careful to explain to him at a later stage in my narrative, Winston received me in a very friendly manner considering that my exposures of the true state of affairs at the Dardanelles gave the Morning Post and other papers a stick with which to belabour him, I was sorry for this at the time as I owe it to Winston that I was allowed out at all. However the exposure was bound to come from other quarters so it made but little difference in fact it was better it should come from a friendly critic and not from a hostile one. At dinner the conversation was more or less general and I said nothing about the Dardanelles except to Mrs Winston next whom I was sitting and to the Duchess of Marlborough, Winston was fairly quiet for some time but then unable to restrain him

[Page 93]
self he suddenly burst forth on a tremendous discourse on the expedition and what might have been done addressed directly across the table in the form of a lecture to his mother who I must say listened most attentivealy just as does that old Lady I have always found at my own lectures sitting in the front row of the stalls, with immesne rows of empties behind her. Winston seemed unconscious at times of the limited number of his audiense. He seemed determined to get this discourse off his chest at all costs. He talked the most appaling nonscience about what the Fleet might have done on March I8th but I had not the heart to interrupt him at this stage by recalling the actual facts. His great point was that the fight had never been fought through to a finish and that had it been the Fleet could have got through. This is still the great obscession of his mind one which he will never get rid off.

He seemed to feel little or nothing for the brave fellows who had lost their lives in his ill starred enterprise his great regret was like that of some ancient Anahuac God that the sacrifices had been stopped before the full number of victims ready to be laid on the sacrifical altar had reached their destination. They ought to have fought until not a single ship remained not so much to get the Dardanelles as to keep him in office, because if he had to go anywau he preferred to go on account of the loss of the entire Fleet rather than for four or five vessels. But he has no idea of the facts. He never realises that the Fleet never reached the Minefield or the concealed Torpedo Tubes and that the guns of the forts were never permanently silenced. His ideas of geography and fact are very very vague. In fact I do not believe he has ever made a study of the Dardanelles and its fortific-

[Page 94]
ications. His is a mind which believes a thing is done as soon as it is thougt of. Having got his own panegeric of his chest he became calmer under the weight of its removal and frequent applications to his glass which was never empty throughout the evening . When the Ladies had left he suddenly turned on me and began abusing me, because be said I had come home to run down the expedition and to crab it and to talk about it before a lot of stupid Society Gossips. Such is justice when I had carefully refrained from uttering a word. He accused me of turning the whole thing to riducule just for the sake of making a story out of it. I pretended to be angry denied his allegations and procedeed to point out the true facts quietly but firmly. I made it prefectly dear that I realised the absolute necessity for carrying on the expedition but that I would only keep silent if it were carried on in the right way. Having convinced him of this he proceeded to argue more calmly.

When Lulu Harcourt went up to join the Ladies we went aside and discussed every detail. I then discovered that Winston has only one fixed determination in mind namely that the expedition shall be carried through at all costs not only because he feels that strategically it must have a great effect on the war but also because he knows it will mean his complete vindication and restore something of his old prestige because the msitakes will be speedily be forgotten in the final success. He told me the Cabinet were divided and would have to come to a decision this week. He asked me to assist that decision in every way and told me I must meet the Prime Minister on the following day that he would arrange the interview and would himself be present. There was no difficulty in enlisting my services in his interests because I have

[Page 95]
always thought it would be fatal to give up at this stage and that al also the task could be fairly easily accomplished if gone about in the right way. Incidentally if it helped to restore Winston prestige was no affair of mine. I alone was considering the interests of the country. He was now in a more cheerful frame of mind and we talked until midnight when he asked me to walk home with him. Having bid good bey we passed through the deserted streets togther and Winston began again on his own position soilquolising on the past half to himself and half to me. He said he thought it could be done with the Fleet alone and was still convinced that it might have been.

He remarked soundly enough that as long as we tried it with our old reserve ships it mattered little because if they were lost we were none the weaker. But he added 'I told them that once an army was landed it was quite another affair and that they would then be dragged into a great enterprise from which they could not withdrawB’ ‘As for me when I had to leave the Admiralty I had only one desire namely to go and serve with my regiment in France but the Primse Minister and all my colleagues implored me to remain in the Cabinet and at a great personal sacrifice consented to do so’. Really his tone when uttering these words was quite pathetic. We now reached Admiralty House and he let me in through a narrow side door. The great rooms so lately the secene of his glory were now deserted. A single attendant alone was on duty and he got soundly abused for not answereing a bell immediately. Winston wandered through the rooms in which he was now only living on sufferance until his new house is ready his head bent his face flushed

[Page 96]
picking up a book here a letter there glancing at them and then chucking them down as if realising the futility of anything. Finally he resorted to the Brandy bottle and drank in great gulps like some poor wretch who is strengthening his hand for suicide. The huge rooms and offical papers seemed to mock him. The deserted halls so lately full of a crowd of sycophants and admireers and place seekers now only reechoed the sound of his own voice. He was the most perfect picture of a fallen minister I have ever seen . Unfortunately for himself he has little or no sense of humour in regard to his own affairs to comfort his mind and to restore the equlibrium of his judgement.

He was incapable of realising that the world would go on just the same whether he was at the Admiralty or not. He seemed to think that his fall meant the fall of England and was a general calamity to the whole world and modern civilisation. ‘They never fought it out to a finish they never gave my schemes a fair trial’ But I replied they did and lost three ships and two other badly damaged before ever reaching the minefield’. ’That does not matter they ought to have gone on. What did it matter if more ships were lost with their crews. The ships were old and useless and the crews were mostly old reservists they were sent out there to die it was their duty. That is what they were mobolised for’. Finally having calmed down somewhat Winston flung himself in a chair and asked me to go over again all the details of the expedition and of the state of the army and to draw up a scheme showing what should be done to insure success if reinforcements were sent. He got out his maps and I examined all the positions in great detail with him. As we proceeded he grew more and more cheerful realising that his

[Page 97]
dreams of victory were still capable of attainement. We sat three working out a fresh plan of campaign until three am when I finally left him restored to perfect good humour and looking more his old self again. I said to him ‘You need have nothing to fear for your reputation in the futute because all the errors in carrying it out will be forgotten immediately in the immensity of the achievement’ He agreed with me and added 'We must see the expedition is carried through. I will arrange for you to see the Prime Minister to-morrow and will be present myself. The paramount interests of England and her Allies depend on our taking Constantinople with a minimum of delay. It is your duty to assist this in every way in your power. You must hold yourself in readyness to be at my disposition to-morrow. Bidding this strange individual farewell I wended my way back to the Carlton Hotel to snatch a few hours sleep before commencing another even more strenous day.

Friday June 11 th
I was kept very busy all the morning having to see Harry Lawson and do a multitude of other things. At one'clock I received a message from Winston to go down at once to Downing Street to meet him and the Prime Minister. On repairing there I was admitted into the Council Room where I found the Prime Minister Asquith and Mac'Kenna. I was introduced to the latter who then left. Mr Asquith received me in a very friendly manner and having produced his maps we went over the situation in detail with him on the plan we had worked out the previous night. He took in all the points very readily and expressed himself strongly in favour of an effort at Enos or Bulair. He said 'It seems to be the

[Page 98]
only natural thing to do. We talked also about the entry of the Bulgarians in the war whereupon he threw up his hands exclaiming 'Yes if we could only get them to come in all would be well' Hecasked me a great number of questions and when I was about to leave he said ‘I wish you would draw me up a memorandum and let me have it some time t this evening on the whole situation as there is a Cabinet Councl tomorrow and I woild like to have it by me then. I would also like you to be present yourself to answer any questions which May be put to you. I then left rushed off and had lunch with Lady Hamilton wife of Sir Ian Hamilton. Mrs Pollen her sister whose husband is Military Secretary was also present to Sir Ian Hamilton and Lady Cunard.

I found Lady Hamilton very much worried about ten lack of success in Gallipoli but I think I managed to cheer her up a bit by assuring her that the Government intended to see the show through at all costs and would send out the necessary reinforcements. That afternoon I managed to get the memorandum finished although extremely weary and was just in time to dinw with Lady Elcho to meet Mr Balfour. Cynthia her daughter was the only other person present. I found Mr Balfour delightful to talk to as soon as the ice was broken. I discribed in minute detail to him the operations of the Fleet up to date including the loss of the Triumph and Majestic. I also discribed the state of the crews and of the military situation as well. I found that he was equally determined to see the expedition carried through at all costs. He seemed convinced of the necessity. He spoke very freely of the war and of his colleagues.He thoroughly understood when I told him

[Page 99]
how the military authorities suppressed information from their own chiefs at home. He saidv 'Yes I myself find the greatst difficulty in getting all the information I require. I hope you will tell them out there that they need not be afraid of me. Why should any man be afraid of me. But I do not know about my predecessor’ Of Kitchener he said ‘Everyone seems afraid of him. I cannot understand what they are frightened of. You will find him a harmless enough old gentleman somewhat stupid ih grasping points when they are placed before him, but far from inspiring this vague terror. He talked on a great many subjects throughout the evening all with delightful charm and sense. There might have been no war from his attitude of detachment. I handed him a copy of the memorandum I had drawn up for the Prime Minister which he read with great care going through each point in detail with me. Later in the evening Mrs Aubrey Herbert whom I had not seen for a long time came in and asked me if I had met her husband out there. I had done so and she asked me to take some letters back to him. I left at about one o'clock having passed a very pleasant time.

Saturday June 12th
I suddenly remembered I had no passport and just managed to get mine ready and vised at the French Consulate in time. I then went down at twelve o'clock to Downing Street to be present at the meeting. I waited in the Secretary's room. They sat for nigh an hour and a half before breaking up. Then Lord Selborne came out and I was introduced to him. A little later Lord Kitchener whom & had never met before appeared. He greeted me in the most friendly and benevolent manner. In appearance he has grown considerably older than his published

[Page 100]
portraits show. His face is much fuller and extremely read and rough. I suppose this is due to the sun. He asked me a great number of questions which I answered to the best of my ability. The chief were these ' Do you consider the Turks obtain the greater part of their supplies from Asis Minor via Chanak or by sea from Constantinople and via the Bulair lines through Thrace. I told him I considered it impossible for them to keep there army in Gallipoli going feeding it through Asia Minor alone and that if we closed the sea route by submarine s and cut off communication with Thrace by land they would very speedily be starved out. He replied, ‘They made great accumulations of stoes and supplies for the invasion of Egypt and they have been transferring these north by the railroad as far as it goes and from there on camels and in carts. We cannot stop them getting this stuff across fromn Chanak by submarines as they can run it over in sailing boats and in the penny steamer. Personally I do not think they bring much via Bulair except the food for horses and cattle or anything they can collect in Thrace. He went on, ‘we May be able to obtain the same result by sending more submarines up an by entirely closing the sea route’. I pointed out to him the tremendous moral effect which would be created by landing right in the rear of the Turkish lines on the troops facing us at Anzac and before Achi Baba. He agreed with this but still persisted that the army might be fed from Asia. I am quite certain he is wrong there especially if we destroy Chanak by a bombardment. In regard to the Enos landing he remarked . ‘This point has its advantages but it leaves you with such a long line of communications to keep up before you get

[Page 101]
astride the peninsula’ He then asked me a great many questions about our positions before Achi Baba and Anzac saying 'They seem to be absolutely held up at Achi Baba and lost very heavily in this last attack but dont you think they might get on at Anzac and seize that high hill (930). I told him I thought it was utterly impossible and that the position there was a complete stalemate. Then he said ' But could not they move forward across the peninsula south of the Australian position' I explained it was impossible to do this until Gaba Tepe was taken and our left had moved forward. He replied 'Why did they give up Gaba Tepe' He seemed very much surprised when I told him we had never held it and replied 'But surely they could clear out the Turks assisted by the ships which can smothered this exposed position' I replied I am told by General Birdwood the position consists of a number of subterranean passages and bombp oofs which are impeverous to shell fire and underground covered ways lead up to it from the low country behind'

Then he said 'to avoid the diffioukties of the Bulair landing is there no other point between Anzac and Bulair where we might get across' I said I thought not from an examination of the May and that I had never heard one mentioned by the military or naval authorities on the spot. We then had a further discussion on Turkish resources their system of feeding and on the possibilities of the use of gas . He did not consider they had any neither did he think it possible they could make it in Constantinople. He then asked me various questions connected with their ammunition supply which he considered must be getting low. I pointed out to him Fortescue's article in the Daily Telegraph and told him he was a sound a reliable eye witness. He replied ' His information might

[Page 102]
be of great value at the present time. Will you try and get him back to this country’ This really ended the conversation and he said good bye and left. I then hurried off to the Carlton to lunch with de Wend Fenton. The Cenemetograp agreement has now been fixed up. I am to take forty five percent of the profits and Butt is to provide the machine and the film. I was kept very busy the entire afternoon. In the evening Gina came and dines at the Ritz togther with de Wend and we afterwards went on to the Palace to see the Passing Show. I went round and said good bye to the Janises. Elsie is only staying on another two weeks and is returning to America in August. It has been killed by competition and her own foolishness in coming back with the same turns and not playing with others besides Basil Hallam.

This I ascribe to the evil influence of her mother. I then took Gina back to her house and bade her farewell as I shall not see her to-morrow and have such a great deal to do. I shoukd have said that in the afternoon I went back and had a farewell interview with Winston at the Admiralty. He then told me what had passed at the Council that morning, Asquith read out my memorandum which was discussed in detail. He said he hardly heard any reasons advanced against the Bulair landing and that the majority were in favour of it. However he thought they would try first of all to starve out the Turks by sending more submarines. He said that in any case the Cabinet were determined to carry the matter through and would send out the required number of troops. A number of telegrams had been drawn up and sent to our headquarters asking for information on various points.

[Page 103]
It had been suggested that my name should be mentioned but that both he and Mr Balfour pointed out they had promised my name should not be dragged in as it would make my position difficult out at the front. We then had a further discussion. Winston was spending his last day at Admiralty House as that afternoon he was leaving for the country. He looked very ill and weary but more calm. He picked out a few books to read then I accompanied him to the door where he entered his motor saying Good Bye to the office he loved to hold probably forever. A little group of servants alone were there to witness his departure. He said he would send me a letter to Sir Ian Hamilton to put my position right. His last words to me were typical. ‘I consider you have g greatly assisted us. We are all working for a common end. If Constantinople is taken there is enough glory in it for us all’ I then went down to the Fishmongers Hall to say good bye to my brother Seabury who seemed much better.
Sunday June 13th
I worked all the morning completing my preperations for departure and then went up to Hamstead to lunch with Colonel a Court Repington the famous military correspondent of the Times who has just been responsible for the scandal of the shells.I had to be very guarded in my statements to him as I did not wish him to cause another scandal over the Dardanelles in which I might be involved. I told him all I
could and also that the Cabinet were determined to carry the expedition through at all costs and that I hoped he would support the common cause to the best of his ability. He promised me that he would. And I think he will because the Times is doing so badly having lost a great many

[Page 104]
I then returned to the Carlton Hotel and tried to get my papers in some sort of order. At seven thirty I called for de Wend Fenton and we went up to Holly Lodge to dine. Irene Somers Saunderson and his wife and Lady Bagot were there. Afterwards we returned to the Carlton Hotel and de Wend Fenton stayed with me up to a late hour talking over various business matters.

Monday June I4th
This morning I left at 8-30 am for Paris. I met Brook at Boulogne and he introduced me to Lord Esher whom I had never met before. The journey to Paris has again improved and I arrived there on time at 6-30 pm. Madame D'lancey met me at the station and I put up at the Meurice Hotel. We dined out at Armenenville but there was hardly a soul there. How Paris has changed. One would hardly know it now.

Tuesday June I5th
I had to spend the day in Paris and did some shopping in the morning and lunched at the Ritz [with?] the head of our flying Corps in France who was on his way out to the Dardanelles to take over the command of all the Flying Corps there. At the Ritz I met the Chikas who told me Mrs Tevis had really married again. Also Mrs Leeds and John Drexell and a few other acquaitances. Warneford who destroyed the Zeppelin was also there. Alas he was killed while flying that same afternoon.
I left at 8-15 for Marseilles. Madame Dlancey came to see me off. Colonel Sykes was also on the train and several naval officers on their way out to Malta.

Wednesday June I6th
Arrived at Marseilles at 9-30 am. Met our Consul Gurney at the station

[Page 105]
and subsecquently lunched with him. It is nearly fifteen years since I was last in Marseilles. How much water has flowed under the bridge since then. In the afternoon I drove round the town and had tea at I Gurney’s country place. Sailed at 6-30 in a wretched little Massagerie boat the Memphis for Malta. We were overcrowded and badly fed but fortunately the sea was calm.

Thursday June I7th
At Sea in the Memphis

Friday June I8th
At Sea in Memphis. What a wretched way to pass the one hundreth anniversary of Waterloo on a third rate French steamer frightened by submarines. I produced two bottles of Champagne collected all the English on board dragged in the French Captain and made them all drink to the hundreth year of peace between England and France. That is the best we could manage.

Saturday June 19th
Arrived at Malta at 10am. Went and saw Admiral Limpus who asked me a great many questions about affairs at home at what they thought of the Dardanelles Expedition. He said he would send me up to Mudros on the Agememnon on Monday. Sykes and I went to stay at the Osborne Hotel and I proceeded to collect stores and more kit.

Sunday June 20th
All day in Malta writing and working. Heat is great. What a desolate hole it is. Shall be glad when the war is really over.

Monday June 21st
Sailed at 4pm in the Agememnon Captain Fyler for Mudros. She is a fine

[Page 105]
ship and the captain a charming man who made us very comfortable on board. Of course there was the usual scare of submarines but we took every precaution travelling at fifteen knots ziz zagging the whole way and were escorted by two destroyers. I had the Captain's spare cabin and was very comfortable

Tuesday June 2nd
At sea in the Agememnon. No sign of any submarines. Heard to-day that a German submarine torpedoed and sank the dummy Tiger. To the amazement and horror of the crew they saw her wooden turrets and guns calmly floating about in the sea, They dived at once fearing D.Ts.

Wednesday June 23rd
Arrived at Malta at five pm. Found most of the Fleet assembled there. Sykes and I went and saw Admiral Wemyss who mistaking him for Mark Sykes M.P rushed into his arms and then recoilced onfinding his mistake. A real snob if there ever was one. Stayed on board Agememnon that night and found a whole bag of mail and letters had accumulated for me during my absence. Most of the news was old but still interesting. Found a charming letter from May Ladenburg.

Thursday June 24th
Went on board Cornwallis and saw Captain Davidson who told me many interesting things which had occured during my absence. Sailed in Trawler for Kephalo (Imbros) at I2pm. Found a few officers on board. Colonel Sykes also came. Arrived in Kephalo at 7-30. Went on board Triad and saw Admiral de Roebeck and Commodore Keyes. They invited us both to stay on board for dinner. Afterwards I had a very

[Page 107]
long talk with them both until 1 am and then stayed on board for the night. I told the Admiral almost everything that had occured in England. They were much interested

Friday June 25th
Went on shore and reported myself at Headquarters. These are now established on a bare sandy slope exposed to the sun and swept by storms of winds and sand. A horrible spot in fact. I saw the Chief of the Staff who explained to me that all correspondents were now to make their headquarters at Imbros on K Beach about a mile from Headquarters. That we were now under the exclusive control of the Army and had nothing further to do with the Navy. I found at once rather a hostile attitude towards me. I knew this would be so on account of my visit home. They are a lot of sensitive children and fear any form of criticism. As a matter of fact I have criticised no one neither by word or in print. But they know I have seen the heads of the Government and that is what they dislike. I then saw Maxwell who explained there had been a series of intrigues against me to prevent my return at all costs but these unfortunately from there standpoint failed to materalise owing to the safeguards I took at home and the intense desire on the part of the Government who knew I was aware of all their plans to get me out of the country as soon as possible. I played my cards very I carefully and had calculated on all this before hand. All the Junior members of the Staff Pollen Churchill George Lloyd etc were very friedly and anxious to know the latest news. It is amongst the Seniors that I forsee trouble. I saw Sir Ian Hamilton for a moment but he told me to

[Page 108]
return again at five O'clock. I then went on board the Exmouth and called on Admiral Nicholson whom I had not seen since the Majestic went down. I also saw Brooks the Offical Photographer and spoke to him on the subject of the cenemetograph. He is a queer fellow but seems willing to undertake it on liberal terms which it is worth while offering. I then went ashore and the Camp Commandant a Captain Wilson an old highland volunteer belonging to the 5th Royal Scots gave me a tent for the night and said I could use his mess. I then made my way across country once again to Headquarters and saw Sir Ian Hamilton. He struck me as looking much older and very worried. He said that at the start in his opinion and in that of his advisers it was the best course to attack the Turkish positions all along the line but that now he was convinced this was a mistake and that therefore in a few days there would be a fresh advance against a section supported by a heavy artillery fire.

He gave it as his opinion that the Turks were weakening and showed signs of being short of ammunition. He went into full details of the action fought on June 4th and decalred it was within an ace of being a big victory if only the French had moved but their infantry refused to budge and in consecquence the Collingwood Battalion of the Naval Division which had only just landed found itself outflanked and obliged to retire losing over six hundred officers and men. Our left was also held up and in consecquence the centre which had captured four successive lines of Turkish trenches was obliged to retire losing heavily in the process. But we made a net gain of some five hundred y yards but the losses were very heavy amounting to over five thousand.

[Page 109]
On June 24th the French atoned for their previous failure by advancing most gallantly and their 2nd Division captured three lines of trenches and took the famous Haricot Redoubt which has held them up some often. The 1st Division on the sae however failed to make good . General Girouard then told them they must capture th position assigend to them as there were still four hours of daylight. He lent this Division practically all his artillery and finally after several failures the attack succeeded. Their losses amounted to 2500 killed and wounded.

I told Sit Ian some of the things I had heard at home and of some of my interviews. He said he was expecting large reinforcements and when they came he intended to make a dash as he was all for thrusing forward . He seemed fairly confident of achieving some decisive success in the future. After this interview I managed to collect most of my baggage and settled in my tent for the night. He told me there would be some operations of great importance in a few days time and that I should hold myself in readyness to go to Cape Helles.

Saturday June 26th
I remained at Imbros all day trying to get more or less settled in. This island in addition to being the Headquarters of the Army is now I used as a rest camp to which battalions are brought when off duty for a rest. God Knows they need it poor devils after all they have gone through. I find Colonel Hawker whom I formerly knew has been appointed Camp Commandant. The climate is trying. The weather is very hot and almost everyone suffers from stomach trouble.

Sunday June 27th
I got up at 5am this morning to catch the boat which leaves at 6-30 am

[Page 110]
for Cape Helles. As usual there were great delays in starting but we finally reached our destination at 9-30. On going ashore the first person I met was old Bettleheim who looked more sunburnt and ferocious than ever.We had a long talk and he told me many things that had happened since my absence. Everyone is now living in Bombproofs on W and V beaches as since the withdrawl of the warships the Asiatic batteries have been very active. In one day theu dropped 180 shells on W beach but with very poor results as everyo man and animal seemed to be protected by a Divine Providence that day.

I then went and saw General Hunter Weston with whom I had a long talk. He also looks older and worried but is still full of fight and confidence. He is still determined to take Achi Baba which he announced was to be taken the day of the landing. Three months have passed since then and Achi Baba still frowns defiantly down on us. He told me there would be a big attack on the following day to try and push forward the left wing along the coast. He explained in his usual friendly manner all his dispositions. I met several old friends on W beach including Major Howell Jones Captain Carter and others. I lunched there and returned to Imbros by the four o1clock Trawler and went on board the Exmouth to instruct Brooks in the use of the Cenemetograph.

Monday June 28th
The boats were delayed this morning but finally Colonel Sykes and myself got across to Cape Helles at 10 o‘clock. There I found Bettleheim fuming at my late arrival. We mounted our horses and rode to Gully Beach and from there made our way up the famous Gully to try and

[Page 111]
reach a point ealled Gourka Bluff from which we had intended to watch the advance. But we arrived too late. The action was in full progress and shells and bullets were falling everywhere. We therefore made our way close to Generl de Lisle the Commander of the 29th Division's Headquarters and entered the Observation Post of the 10th Battery R.F.A. From this vantage point we obtained a splendid view of the fighting. (For full account see elsewhere) This battery was commanded by Major Wynter an excellent gunner and very agteable fellow who was thanked after the engagement by General de Lisle for his splendid shooting. The bullets and shells fell very thick around us all day. and one battery the 0 97th R.F.A. got knocked out by a Jack Johnson. I returned to camp about fourpm thoroughly exhausted from the heat and noise and general discomfort. I went and had a bathe which did me very little good. That night I stayed with Bettleheim and had an excellent dinner at their Mess which is known as the Hotel Ritz

Tuesday June 29th
At ten am I called on the 10th Battery R.F.A and saw Major Wynter. Together we made & tour of all the captured Turkish trenches dangerous and hot work but all the same extremely interesting. (For full account see elsewhere). I lunched at the 10th Battery and on my way home called on General de Lisle who received me in a very friendly manner. He was very satisfied with the result of the day's work and declared this was the only way to succeed in war namely by attacking segments of the enemy's line. He said no general attack ever would succeed these days. He is quite right. Passed the night at Bettleheims.

[Full account of action reported in Ashmead Bartletts’ despatches]

[Page 112]
In the course of the day when going round the enemy's trenches I came upon Sir Thomas Cunningham formerly our Military Attache in Vienna and who is now at Athens. He was also with L. S. Amery the former Times w writer and Tariff Reform M.P. I had not seen either of them for a long time.

Wednesday June 30th
I remained in camp this morning. We were shelled from Asia all through the night by a high explosive six inch shell which burst almost before you coukd hear it coming. In the morning I found a large piece lying at the foot of my bed. esterday afternoon one of the French warships escorted by several destroyers opened up a furious bombardment of the Asiatic Coast firing salvoes of I2 inch. In the morning I received a cable from Headquarters ordering me to return to Imbros at once and see the Chief of the Staff. I left by the four o'clock boat arriving about six. On board I met Letre Laurence to my great surprise whom 8 I had not seen since my return. He has been living for some time on the River Clyde. He seems to have seen very little of the operations and to have written very little during my absence.

Before lunch I met Compton Mackenzie who is attached to G.H.Q. He is the well known novelist and I was appointed by Sir Ian Hamilton to write for the papers while I was away. The idea was that I should be prevented from returning and that he should take my place as a kind of offical Eye Witness writing to order. But this little plot failed for reasons I have already explained. He himself was most agreable and said he had no desire to take on the work and had refused to do so even although Sir Ian expressed a wish

[Page 113]
that he should even after my return. This a is a good example of Army methods. As if the Newspapers ould be content to pay for two cabled discriptions of the same story. For his cables were to be sent at their expense. It was an extremely dirty trick to try and play on me but the Authorities think I know too much and would do everying in their power to get rid of me.But they wont unless the unforseen occurs. I also met Commander Weyley who has a section of machine guns attached to the RN.R also Commander Coleman and young Loughborough who was wounded early in the campaign came to see me.

On arriving at G.H.Q I was seen by the Chief of the Staff who at once began to absue me because he said it had been brought to his notice that I had openly criticised the conduct of the campiagn about the camp. He said that as a private individual I m might hold what views I liked but that as a War Correspondent I had no right to any except those which were officially givem me. This is a new aspect of the case. He said it was a grave offensive to criticise the conduct of the campaign as it destroyed the morale of the army. I denied ever having done so in public which is perfectly true although in the course of private conversations I might have said something.Certainly I have never said a word to any officer in the front line having returned a stock answere to all requests for information namely 'That the Government were absolutely united and were sending out large reinforcements'. What really amusec me is the fact that the people who really criticise the campaign are the members of the Headquarters Staff itself. They are always coming to me with some fresh complaint. The Chief of the Staff said anyone who criticised them would be sent straight

[Page 114]
home and empty threat which was quite lost on me because it is their not in their interests to let anyone home at present. However personally I like General Braithwaite and pointed out to him that a person who repeated private conversations was neither a gentleman or to be trusted in anyway. I requested his name but he refused to give it to me and said if I would refrain from doing so that the incident was at an end. So I let it stand at that. I had a further talk with Amery and Cunningham on the baot coming over. They did not see, at all confident that the Balkan Staes woud come in. Greece seems the most likely but they will not be in a position to move until after July 20th when Parliament meets.

Thursday June 30th
I remained at Imnros all day. Maxwell came to see me in the morning. He was very disgruntled because all our correspondence has to go direct to the Chief of the Staff and not to him. I suppose he has let things through of which they do not approve. He then went in some details of the intrigues against me whilst I was in England. He assured me he had protested vigorously against the appointment of Compton Mackenzie as he was very Gealous of the honour and prestige of the Press and saw it was merely a move to get an offical tame EyeWEitness in myplace. How much of all this is fact and how much fiction I am not at the present in a position to judge. But Maxwell is very angry with most of the Staff and the way he is treated. He says the intrigues which go on all round are a revelation to him and that never in his life has he had such an interesting time of the inner life of an army in the field. He said it was General Braithwaite plan to never let anyone have access

[Page 115]
to Sir Ian Hamilton and that he tried to run him and to control the campaign. Maxwell told me he intended to write a book on what he has seen of the Staff after the war is over. He guarantees it will make very interesting reading. I think it will toe especially if they annoy him much more and he gets thoroughly angry. He said 'They all have minds like children and must be treated as such and humoured. Let me warn you not to say a word to anyone about the campaign as the whole camp is one
vast whispeting gallery and everything reaches Headquarters. They hate been criticised moer than anything. 'Well it is a funny world and most people innit are very small and cannot see beyond the end of their m noses. Laurence has decided to go back to Malta for a few days to buy stores for our new mess.I made him out a long list gave him my blessing and off he went. I have undertaken to do his work whilst he is away.

Friday July 2nd
I remained at Imbros all day working and then rode over to G.H.Q. where I saw Colonel Ward who received me in the most friendly manner. I passed my private letters without even looking at them and also undertook to get my photographs home. Later in the afternoon I shifted my camp to a very pleasant sight I have selected which is well shaded. I dined with Colonel Robinson who has just come out to take over the command of one of the Manchester Territorial Battalions.

[Page 116]
Saturday July 3rd.
I remained at Imbros all day working. The only news of importance is that General Girouard the New French Commander in Chief, who has been a pronounced success up to date has been wounded. He was visiting the hospital and had just left when he was blown back into it over a ten foot wall by a high explosive shell. Without actually been touched he has had his leg and arm shattered and is I understand finished for the remainder of the campaign. The shelling of Lancashire Landing goes on incessantly. We now have batteries at Totts Point which try and keep it under. The affair is very serious because if we are stuck here for the winter we shall be obliged to land in Asia to obtain a position in Morto Bay which is the only kind of harbour at which we shall be able to land stores in bad weather

Sunday July 4th
Spent all the morning writing an article on the famous Gully Ravine. In the afternoon I went up to G. H.Q and heard a French transport had been torpedoed and sunk in two minutes off Helles. Perhaps this a is a blessing in disguise as our Fleet was showing signs of getting active again. Saw Maxwell Gen Fuller and the French Captain Berthier.

Monday July 5th
At Imbros. Worked all the morning. Continous heavy firing from Helles Maxwell came over and lunched with me. He seems very disgruntled with evrything. There are rumours we have sunk two of the enemy's submarines. In the afternoon I went off and visited Carter on the Balloon Ship and promised to try and get him a better job.

Tuesday July 6th

[Page 117]
Tuesday July 6th
went over to Helles on the 8-30 boat and saw Bettleheim on arrival, No sooner did we land than the enemy started shelling both from Asia and from Achi Baba. Life on the beach is hell. You never know when you May be hit. I rode out round the beach road to the Headquarters of the 29th Division. Wsa nearly hit going round the point. Then on up the Gully Ravine I came in for a further doing and the enemy nearly scored a direct hit on myself and my horse. War is hell. I returned to Bettleheim for lunch. Afterwards I went up and visited Hunter Weston. He and his staff are now completely dug in as they live continously under fire He gace me many details of the recent fighting and of the heavy losses of the Turks.

This last engagement has got back a lot of his old confidence and he is long ing to have another go at them. He told me the next move would be by the French and on our right where the trenches of the Naval Division are situated. He said it would take place in a few days time but I am inclined to think there will be no big move until large reinforcements arrive from England as these continous attacks on Achi Baba cost us enormous casualties. In the last engagement and subsecquent days fighting they amounted to over five thousand wounded not to mention killed. The General begged me to do everythingin my power to encourage the troops by talking to them and by looking cheerful when I went round the front lines. I said I would do by best but it is not very easy to look cheerful with houndreds of shells and bullets jepordising your existance morning noon and night. I heard whilst on the beach that the Triad had been hit by a shell from Asia two days before which wrecked

[Page 118]
eight of her forward cabins just as Admiral de Roebeck and General Braithwaite and several other officers were going on board. I returned to Imbros in the evening

Wednesday July 7th
At Imbros. Went to G.H.Q. Bettleheim came over to stop with me for a couple of days. He reports further shelling of Lancashire Landing and it seems to be getting on his nerves as well as on everyone else’s.

Thursday July 8th
At Imbros. Worked all day on an article on Lancashire Landing.I have not been well ever since I landed. The heat is very great and everyone suffers from stomach trouble. The flies are a pest for they swarm round one in thousands. I shall be very very glad when it is all over. So will everyone else. It is just sheer slaughter for the infantry who have a rotten time. The casua ties everywhere grow by leaps and bounds. When and how will it all end.

Friday July 9th
Bettleheim and myself went over to visit Anzac this morning. On arrival I had a long talk with General Birdwood who had just been vaccinated against cholera and was laid up. He is a remarkable man for he sets his troops an example in everything bathing with them living amongst them visiting the trenches and undergoing inoculation against every species of complaint as an exaple for them to follow. I had a long and very interesting talk with him on the whole situation. He seems hopeful for the future and says his men have got the whip hand of the Turks. He then discribed the future plan of campaign in full. His idea is to get

[Page 119]
astride the peninsula at all costs and to reach Kilid Bahr. By this means be thinks he can cut off the Turkish Armies in the south and force them to capitulate. First of all he must get the Hill 971 on his left which is the most commanding position of all. But the difficuties in the way are enormous owing to the nature of the ground. It cannot be done by a regular attack. He therefore proposes to launch the Australians in- dependtly on this task with instructions to crawl round anywhere they like but to reach their objective and there to entrench. At the same time he wants one of the new Divisions to be landed in Anafarta Bay and to push right inland to ocuupy a ridge on which the Turks have three heavy guns and about two thousand infantry. By this combined operation he hopes to cut off the Kilid Bahr Plateau.

The operation is extremely hasadous for the reason that but little is known about the country and the troops will have to act on their own inatiative. These Colonials should certainly be the men for the job. While I was present his Chief of Staff Colonel Skeen came in and General Birdwood said ‘It would be a great idea to launch five houndred of the Australian Light Horse Cavalry in their rear with instructions to raise hell and burn their supplies and depots. It would cause a regular panic amongst the Turks. But the great difficulty is to get their horses ashore and to water them . However we must see if it can be managed’. I asked the general if his plan had been accepted at Headquarters and he replied that it was still under consideration but he thought it was certain t they would agree to his plans. He of course pledged me to secrecy. He agreed with me that it would be an excellent thing if the Greeks could

[Page 120]
be induced to land at the same time at Bulair in which case the success of the operations would be assured. Thus I obtained a very fair inkling of what will happen in the future in this aprt at least. Bettleheim and myself then visited Quinn’s post Pope’s Post and Courtenys. But for discription see elsewhere. We we[nt] round accompanied by Onslow Birdwood's A. D. C. I hear that the I3th Division of the New Army has now arrived and will shortly be landed on the peninsula. I returned to Imbros in the evening.

Saturday July 10th
I was very weary after my long day at Anzac in the great heat but went to G.H.Q in the morning and saw Maxwell and Col Ward. Afterwards I went on board the Triad to see Commodore Keyes. He told me I would be allowed up on a battleship to Constantinople when the right moment arrived. He also said he would try and have Carter made Post Master General at Mudros. I stayed to lunch with Admiral de Roebeck General Godley was present a very agreable man Many interesting things were discussed at lunch chiefly on the subject of Submarines. It seems very doubtful if they have got any after all. At least the Commodore seemed to think so. The great Submarine chase we witnessed as we came in yesterday was due to something having fouled one of the nets. I hear that 18 Monitors with heavy howitzers are expected. Had a very agreable time and drank iced Whiskys and Sodas of which I took too much and also a glass of port which made be very hot. Bathed in the evening.

[Page 121]
Sunday July 11th
I spent the day at Imbros working. I was just on my way down to bathe in the evening when I met General Braithwaite who had ridden over from G.H.Q. to tell me I ought to go to Helles on the following morning as there was going to be a ‘Show’ He said I might be late but they themselves did not know it was coming off before. I went back to camp and made my preperations accordingly.

Monday July I2th
Left by the seven am trawler for Helles. The boat was as usual late and I did not arrive in time to see the first part of the fight. Broooks the Offical Photographer came with me. We lunched with Bettleheim and in the afternoon went out to watch the fight from the Observation Station of the 52nd Division. Brooks was hit and bruised by a shrapnel bullet. For account of fight see elsewhere. Spent the night at Bettleheim’s. Note the long dreary processions of wounded.

Tuesday July I3th
Spent the morning in camp and went out to see the finish of the fight in the afternoon. For account see elsewhere. Very heavy losses again. No one ever seems to know what has happened in these fights. The unavoidable muddle is awful. Spent the night at Bettleheim’s. Heard that Cane Liason Officer has been badly wounded

Wednesday July I4th
Went and saw General Street who gave me a summary of the operations up to date. Found him and all the Staff very weary. He said ‘I hope we | shall have a rest now for a bit’ Casualties above five thousand and results almost nil. Returned to Imbros on the 12

[Page 122]
pm Trawler. On arrival I found that three other Correspondents had arrived. Nevinson for Ptovincial Press, Russell for Reuter’s and a terrible Jew Boy called Mosely for the Central News. They were over at Helles when I got back but returned in the evening exhausted and already sick of the campaign. I found two new monitors had come in the Abercrombie and the Robert. They are strange looking vessels build to withstand torpedo attack and carry two great fourteen inch guns each. Great results are hoped from them bit they are very slow only making 6 knots so I am afraid they will be of little use against the 4 knot Dardanelles current. However they will be able to bombard the enemy’s positions and thus take the place of the battleships. With thes vessels we shall once more regain command of the sea it is hoped. The muddles which take place here are too extraordinary for words. A Brigade of the 29th Div which is to have a rest arrived at Imbros instead of going to Mudros.

Part of the I3th Division of Kitchener's Army under General Shaw has arrived at Helles. By the way General Egerton Commanding the Lowland Division has gone sick or else has been removed and General Shaw was sent up to take the command on the second day of the fight. The three war correspondents had to come out with the Kings Messenger via Athens and brought no stores so I shall have some more people living on me I suppose. The sending of the I3th Division to Helles makes it look as if they intended that Achi Baba should eat up that Division as well as so many others. The appetite of that mountain is insatiable. Nevinson says everyone is depressed in England and they are hpoing for a big victory out here. Poor deluded fools.

[Page 123]
Thursday July I5th
At Imbros. Completed cables of the last fight. I do not know what value these will be as apparently Sir Ian Hamilton acts as his own Correspondent now and sends everything in a long time ahead. Brooks came ashore and we tried the cenimetograph. I hope we shall be able to work it. There have been rumours for some time that there is to be a change in the command and that Smith Dorien is coming out. There are also rumours that Winston is coming this way to have a look round.

Friday July I5th
This morning I rode up to the village of Panaghia with Bean and Ross. A long hot ride over exercribable ground but good water on the way. Not much to see when one gets there but we had a good lunch at a small hotel kept by one George Christie and managed to buy some good light wine from Athens. When I reached camp again I found a note from Brooks to say he was returning to England for a few days. I went on board the Exmouth and saw him and also the Admiral. This is a great nuisance just when I had got the cenimetograph fixed up all right.

Saturday July I7th
Wrote a long article on the Anzac position which I sent in. I went to G.H.Q. Have not been very well for the last few days. The heat and discomfort are intolerable. Received a letter from Carter stating he had been appointed Postmaster at Mudros with the rank of Lieutenant. Part of the 11th Division of the New Army have arrived here. The men came out in the Aquitania which they state was missed in the channel by ten yards by a torpedo. What a cop she would have been.

Sunday July I8th

[Page 124]
[Sunday July I8th]
I was summonsed to G. H. Q to see Colonel Ward. I thought there were limits to human stupidity but now I know there are none. The censorship has now passed beyond all reason. They wont let you give expression to the mildest opinions on any subjects. They apply it to taste style poetry and events of which the enemy are by now fully cognisant and which have already appeared in the press.The long artic e I wrote on Lancashire Landing has been returned withoit a single word being passed. The reason is that they state it makes the people on W beach look as if they were afraid. I wrote the article to please those on W beach and they were tickled to death with it? There are now at least four censors all of whom cut up your stuff. Maxwell starts it then Ward then General Braithwaite and finally Sir Ian Hamilton. All hold differnt views and feel it their duty to take out scraps. Thus only a few dry c crumbs are left for the wretched public.

The articles ressemble chicken out of which a thick nutricious broth has been extracted. A private letter was not allowed to be sent because it was supposed to criticise the Authorities at Malta. Colonel Ward said ‘I shall not have a friend left when the war is over. Already the Greeks on the Island threaten to murder me and I expect the Newspaper Editors will be waiting for me at home. I heard this evening definitely that Winston is coming out. There is now a general activity everywhere in consecquence. Well his blood be on his own head but ifnthere is another big failure whilt he is here it will be the end of him and the existing Staff. I only hope he will use his influence to make them adopt a right and proper course . At any rate Sir Ian will be as potter's clay in his hands. An aviator came over and dropped a few bombs on us.

[Page 125]
July I9th Monday
I remained at Imbros disgusted with the flies the excessive heat and the wickedness of mankind generally and the inexhaustable stupidty of the censorship. I visited one of the New Monitors the Abercromby but I was not allowed to see much iff of her and the officers struck me as being a very dull and uninteresting crowd

July 20 Tuesday
At Imbros with little or nothing to recrod except that more tents are springing up here and I hear an entire Army Cirps under General Stopford is coming. I learnt at Headquarters that the position of our line today is as follows. On right the French. Then Naval Division. Then 42 nd Lancashire Territorial Division. Then the I3th one of the New Kitchener Divisions on extreme left .The 52nd Lowland Territorial are in reserve whilst the shattered 29th Division which is once again only a brigade strong is at Mudros where I understand are also the 10 th Kitchener Division the rest of the 11th two battalions of which are here and two at Helles but I understand they are to return

Wednesday July 21st
I went to see a Major Myburg a friend of Bettleheim's who is in hospital here suffering from nervous breakdown. He commands one of the battalions of the Naval Division. I found him in a state bordering on collapse. He complains bitterly of the manner in which the Division has been led to the slaughter over and over again and placed in impossible positions. He says the s[m]ell in the captured trenches is something to awful for discription and that it is impossible to dig new trenches on

[Page 126]
account of the dead Turks. Always the same old denunciations of the Generals especially of Hunter Weston whom no one has a goodcword to say for. To-day Brooks having left I set to work the conquer the intricaces of the cinemetograph machine and by sitting up late I finally succeeded. Nevinson and myself had to abandon our proposed trip to Helles on account of the weather which was too rough. Aubrey Herbert I came over and spent the night. I suddenly ran across Howard de Walden on the beach. He has been made M.L.O here. He was just the same as ever and came up and dined. To celebrate this reunion we drank a few bottles of Champagne. I have been felling rotten for days from this constant stomach trouble. So have most of the others.

Thursday July 22nd
Nevinson and and Aubrey Herbert went to Anzac this morning having changed our destination from Helles because the Military Authorities seem to think it likely the Turks May make an attack because the 23rd is the anniversay of their Constitution. I am willing to lay 5-1 they do nothing of the sort. However in war one must not take any chances. On arriving the Turks as usual shelled the pier from Gaba Tepe. We first visited Quinn's and Courteny's Posts where I took a number of cenimetograph pictures. Colonel Malone a hard old New Zealand knut and South African Veteran showed us round. On returning I lunched with General Godley and the Staff of the New Zealand Australian Division. Lord Henry Bentinck is there and Colonel Braithwaite, no relation to the General, is the C.S No I. In the afternoon we went out to Walker's Ridge and examined the positions from that side being shown round by General Russell the Brigadier.

[Page 127]
Every precaution had been taken against an attack. It is really a pleasure tospend a few days at Anzac for the atmosphere is so different. It is the one spot where the Army has confidence in its general who is immensely popular with his men. The positions in front occupied by the Turks look enormously strong but they seem to feel they can take them if they are given reinforcements. Nous nous verrons. I dined with General Godley and had a very pleasant time. Afterwards Nevinson and I e went and visited General Birdwood who told us a number of interesting things. I slept outside Aubrey Herbert's Bombproof. There was firing all night and at two am very heavy riflefire which appeared to be an attack but in reality the Turks were only shooting at our men outside the trenches putting up barbed wire.

To my mind the Turks will certainly not make ageneral attack again after their heavy losses and certainly not until after the moon wains. There were so many bullets flying overheaf that I took shelter in Ross's Dug out for the remainder of the night. Had some interesting talks with Aubrey Herbert on the war. He seems to think our next big effort will be a failure. I am also convinced it will unless they launch it at Bulair.There were some shells fierd at the beach at Ilpm which is very unusual but I think the gunners were attracted by the lights of some trawlers landing stores. Dug outs are being made at Anzac for the reception of a new Division. I suppose this will be the 11th

Friday July 28rd
Jihad breakfast with the General and afterwards went out to the extreme left of the line along the beach through a communication trench which

[Page 128]
has benn dug the whole distance. This part of the line causessome anxiety as it is felt that if the Turks attacked in force they might cut it off. However it is self contained for about a week and has the best water supply on the Anzac position. It is held by one battalion of New Zealand infantry and Three houndred Maoris. These are fine fellows to look at but they have not yet been tested in action. They strongly ressemble some of the Colonials. We stayed out at No 3 post all the morning and found it very interesting. On returning I lunched with some of the officers of the Staff and spent the remainder of the day taking cinemetograph pictures of the beach and piers. Aubrey Herbert having returned to Imbros I was able to utilise his dug out during the night but no attack came. At General Godley's Mess I heard some very free expressions of opinion on the conduct of the campaign and Sir Ian Hamilton's dispatch which has just been published came in for some very severe criticism. Never have I known a large army which had quite such a poor opinion of its chiefs. Sedition is rife. If such it can be called.

Saturday July 24th
Stayed at Anzac this morning spending the whole time on the beach trying to get Cinemetograph pictures of bursting shells amongst the bathers. It was exciting work. Over twenty were killed or wounded fifteen by one shrapnel.They started firing again just as Nevinson and I were leaving but fortunately we just managed to get out in an interval safely. Returned to Imbros and found Aubrey Herbert again. After dinner I went round with him to Colonel Hawker’s and met Colonel Wilson

[Page 129]
who commands the Hawk Battalion of the Naval Division and who was my unhappy predecessor in contesting Poplar. Leslie Wilson's denunciations of the Generals beat anything I have ever heard. In fact I think they wish to get rid of him but are afraid to try because he is an M.P with influential friends in the Conservative Party. The tale of muddle mismanagement and useless slaughter is an appaling one. He particularly remarked on the hardships inflicted on the older men the Marines Reserves many of whom are over fifty and who have been dragged out under false pretences to be slaughtered in front of Achi Baba. He told me what had happened in regard to a small trench of absolutely no importance which lay in front of the ground occupied by his battalion. He was ordered to take it and protested vigorously on the ground that he could not hold it after he had taken it.

Time and time again he protested but finally received a definite order a which had to be obeyed. He took it without much trouble and then got bombed out, exactly as he had predicted, losing three good officers and eighty men. Finally he retired with only six survivors. A Marine battalion then took his place and were ordered to take it again suffering the same fate. He declared that none of Hunter Weston's orders were ever intelligable and always had to be changed or modified, or ignored. He could never give a definite objective for an attack but would end up every order with ‘Go as far as you can and then entrench’. He discribed the battle of June 4th as a cold blooded massacre. The Naval Division for instance were ordered to attack a line a thousand yrads wide with about the same number of men in the firing line after a totally inadequate artillery preperation. They advanced and were massacred with machine guns. The Colling-

[Page 130]
[Colling]wood battalion being wiped out. They had never previously been in action and were hurried up into the firing line without experience of trench warfare or any local knowledge of the ground. The He criticised with equaly severity the fate of the wounded many houndreds of whom he declares have perished simply from inadequate treatment. His opinions of the Headquarters Staff were really priceless. It is now definitely confirmed that Hunter Weston has left the Peninsula. His departure is variously ascribed to enteric dysentery or sunstroke but it is certain he will never return having proved himself from the very start to be a perfectly incompetent commander.

I realised that after my first conversations with him. He seemed to me not to have the smallest knowledge of war and to throw away many lives in the most wicked and reckless manner without having any clear idea in his mind of any objective. He was detested by his troops. I never in fact heard anyone say a good word for him. He was known as the Giggling Butcher. He had the habit of going round and seeing the survivors of his abortive assaults on Achi Baba and congratulating them on their achivements in the same words every time. The men who had gone through Hell naturally got sick of this realising how they had been mishandled. Wilson vouched for this story. Hunter Weston went to the end of the Pier at Lancashire Landing to see someone off. Whilst he was there a shell as fired from Asis and hourly occurence of which no one takes much notice after 4 months of this sort of thing. But the General Commanding the Helles Army Corps did not wait for a second one neither did he retire with dignity but dashed off the Pier and made for a dug out at full speed

[Page 131]
amidst the hardly concealed jeers of the onlookers. Well he has gone Thank God after helping to slaughter the equivalent of three as good Divisions as ever wore the British unaform. Nothing can bring back the dead and I do not think anyone will attempt to bring back Hunter Weston. On all sides you hear nothing but criticism of the Headquarters Staff and the incompetency of the other Generals.Sir I is criticised because he never visits the front lines. In fact I do not suppose he is known even by sight to the majority of his troops. He is especially unpopular with the Colonials chiefly on account of his throwing away two of their brigades in the reckless attack on Achi Baba on May 8th.

The Staff on the other hand dislike General Birdwood and are jealous of him and always carefully suppress any refernce to his doings.Oh the jealousies of the Generals. They surpass anything ever known before. I used to think politics a dirty game but the Army is four times as bad in this respect. The dispatches sent home to the unfortunate public contain the most ghastly lies. For instance in his last dispatch Sir Ian puts the Turkish killed at 5150 and estimates the wounded at 15000. As if he has any possible means of knowing. Probably their total losses in these abortive attacks amounted to some eight thousand killed and wounded. I think Aubrey Herbert’s charge against him is the most serious of all namely the wickedness of always leaving thousands of our wounded to perish in front of the lines after these attacks have failed instead of arranging for an armistace for their burial. The Turks have alway proved themselves perfectly willing to have armistaces and have actually asked for one at Helles which was refused by our General Staff.

[Page 132]
Staff. Surely every other consideration should be sacrificed to trying to save the unfortunate wounded who must otherwise perish miserably between the lines. But the Generals are never there to see these things. If They live comfortably at Imbros and have their dinners and their baths and apparently it never interferes with their night's rest the knowledge that houndreds of their fellow men are lying mutilated and unattended only a few yards away from our front lines crying for water suffering the agonies of the damned and knowing that their fate is a long low lingering death from superating wounds or from thirst and stravation. Their fate is awful to contemplate. Men are butchered to make a G.C.B or a K.C.M.G. These cursed letters after their names are apparently all our leaders think about. It is appaling that the destinies of Empires should be entrusted to such small amd petty and inhuman minds.

Sunday July 25th
This day I remainedvat Imbros and visited G.H.Q. where I saw Colonel Ward who explained to the reasons for the late arrival of my last cables in London. As usual it was due to a muddle on the part of the Military Authorites at Malta and in London. I am getting more and more sick of the whole business. But it is hopeless trying to arrange anything with such people. They have not got the smallest business acumen. Colonel Wilson dined with me and again he held for for hours on the muddles and mistakes which have been committed. More troops continue to arrive here. An entire Army Corps is to be concentrated on the island. They are a weedy looking lot and some of them hardly look as if they could carry their kits. Poor Devils. Nothing is sadder

[Page 134]
Grand Fleet for war dismissed at the eleventh hour. Every Admiral and every Captain in the Grand Fleet protested at the change to Winston and at th manner in which it has been carried out but it was no use. Calligan assured me that Winston acted on his own authority and that Jellicoe was appointed without even the Kings’s knowledge. Winston therefore must not be surprised if he receives but little sympathy in his own troubles. Calligan has been worthly avenged. I also learnt a good deal from Calliagn about Beatty’s North Sea Battle. He also told me the two ways in which we are able to tap all the German signals but I will not put this information on paper in case it ever fell into strange hands.

Tuesday July 27th
Remained at Imbros working all day and sending off my Cinemetograph Films. This is an experiment which May land me in hot water but I must take the risk.

Wednesday July 28th
Went over to Helles in the early boat and heard from her Captain how he thinks a submarine was trapped on the previous day. Caught in the net and rammed by a destroyer. It seems fairly certain she was destroyed. However one can never be sure. Saw Bettleheim at Helles. Everything is quiet all along the line. I am sure the Turks will not attack. They are waiting for us. Their game is to lie low and try and stave off our offensive until the weather becomes to bad for further operations. On returning to Imbros I found Loughborough and Coleman had come over to see me. Akso a man called Corbie.

[Page 135]
Thursday July 29th 1915
I spent the entire day at Imbros making preperations for coming events which are certainly casting their shadows before them. The weather is extremely hot. The camps at Imbros are packed with troops who drill and di and do fatigues and whose sole recreation is the joy of bathing in the cool of the evening. You see as many as an entire Division in the water at the same time. This 11th Division of Kitchener's first army does not impress me altogther favourably. Some of the men are all right but the majority are a weedy looking lot thin narrow chested and small.

However it May be one is exigeant over physique after constantly seeing the Colonials hose bronzed independent giants so different to the rank and file of European Armies. A great number of this11lth Division come from Durham and Northumberland and are miners. I am told by their officers that they love digging and are excellent trench makers. This is an excellent point about them and will serve them in good stead when they land in Gallipoli. Some of the officers seem all right but they are not the stuff of which our Regular Army was so proud. Unhappily they now lie beneath the soil in France and Flanders and we can only make the best use possible of the stock which is left.

Friday July 30th
This morning accompanied by Ross and Nevinson I set out for Helles. We caught the 8-30 boat with great difficulty after a most amusing and exciting voyage in a Greek sailing boat. On arriving at Lancashire Landing we left our baggage with Bettleheim and walked over to the river Clyde where we had a talk with Wilson the M.L 0 . and an ex Naval Officer called Cather who are in charge of the landing of troops

[Page 136]
They said we we could come and stop on the River Clyde as that enabled me to have a dark room in which to change my Films on the Cinemetograph. Nevinson and I then returned to Lancashire Landing to lunch. They are now making a breakwater round the Jetty by sinking ships just as they have done at Imbros. The Turks shell this work vigorously from Achi Baba and cause many casualties on the beach but still it goes on all the same. I do not know if it will survive the winter gales. There are some who say the whole of the foreshore is washed by the sea when the wind blows strongly from the south. But I am unable to say if this is true or not. Wilson and Ross sailed round in a boat and took us and our baggage off to the Clyde. We stopped on the way and called on the new Hospital ship the Assaye which has jsut been fitted out. She is an old Troop Ship and can take 390 lying down cases. I am afraid we shall be very short of ships for this next big push when it comes.

I saw a real life woman on baord who is an extraordinary phenomum these days and had two beautiful iced whiskies and sodas. I then went on to V Beach and sailed over the wreck of the poor old Majestic. You can trace her whole length as she lies beneath the water. On arriving at V Beach I took 200 feet of cinemetograph film. That night we dined and slept on board. I went up to the 8th Army Corps Headquarters before diner but most of my friends have left. I sent a signal to Commander Colmore asking him to send down a car to V Beach the following morning. All through the night troops were being sent off from V Beach in Trawlers and Destroyers to Mudros. They are the 13th Division of Kitchener’s First Army which has been ashore for two weeks on our left holding the Trenches. They have had no real fighting but have suffered some 500 casualties. This shows how

[Page 137]
Armies melt away under modern conditions. But they have had some invaluable experience and I suppose they will be employed at some new landing. General Douglas is at present commanding the 8th Corps. He was formerly the Commander of the 42nd Division. I hear however that a General Davis or Davies is coming out from home to assume the command. There is really only one man for the job and that is General de Lisle

Saturday July 31st
The Ford Motor turned up at 8-30 am and we all three motored out to the RnVAC section. I found that both Colemore and Loughborough had left but Commander Weyley sent down the car and at the same time received us in the most friendly manner. We set off on foot of the Krithia Nullah to visit the front trenches in this part of the line calling first at the Divisional Headquarters where I met Captain Marshall again Douglas’s old A.D.C. General Marshall is now temporarly commanding the Division in his absence.

Marshall gave me a guide and we passed on up the Gully stopping for another guide and a permit at the I27th Brigade Headquarters. Here I met General Lawrence a most charming man and also an officer who had known us in the old days at Eastbourne. e then went on and visited the front trenches held by the Manchesters. The country here is very flat and you can see very little. Looking out over the top I had a good view of the Turkish Trenches and also saw a great number of our dead lying amidst the barbed wire where they have been ever since the abortive attack of June 4th which was a ghastly blunder. Everywhere you hear expressions of satisfaction and the departure of Hunetr Weston.

[Page 138]
He was entensely unpopular with all ranks outside his own personal Staff and I am not even sure he was liked by thEm, I took a great number of Cinemetograph pictures which was the chief object of my excursion. We returned to lunch with Wayley who is a very good fellow. We then went back to V Beach and I took some more pictures there. V Beach is now used exclusively for landing troops both English and French whilst Lancashire Landing is reserved for supplies.

Sunday August 1st
The car again came down for us and took us out to Gully Beach. Here Colonel Percival kindly lent us three horses and we road up to the top of the Gully. Here I took some splendid pictures but unfortunately only had a little film left so I shall have to do that part of the position again. The Turks have constructed a new series of trenches in our immediate front since their defeat of June 28th. They look immensely strong and I am afraid we shall loose a vast number of officers and men when we come to take them. I hear we have now far more ammunition on the peninsula than we have ever had before.

The Turks seem to have worked like bees during the last few weeks. They evidently mean to make a desperate resistance and are frightened of their right flank. It is very dangerous going up the Gully as the enemy can snipe down it and also plaster it with shrapnel from time to time. We have erected screens to protect our men going up and down but many are hit. On our way back we saw General de Lisle for a minute but he will not talk as apparently he got into trouble for talking before. The G S have in fact thought it necessary to warn Generals not to talk to War Correspondents. Another petty way of annoying us. We lunched with

[Page 139]
Wayley again and then motored down to W Beach to catch the 4pm Trawler for Imbros. There we found great gloom because a shell had burst right in the signal office at 12 -30 killing six and badly wounding 7others and completely smashing up all the signals. I never saw a worse smash up. Only four inside at the time escaped without injury. The place was a shambles. Just as we got off the beach on the Trawler the Turks started shelling again causing everyone to dash for cover. It seems impossible to knock out these guns behind Achi Baba which are supposed to be concealed in tunnels and only run out to fire.

Monday July 2nd
On arriving back at Imbros I learnt that Phillip de Crespigny had called upon me. He commands one of the small new Monitors No 32. In the afternoon I went down and got on board and found him just the same as ever. We had a great many cocktails I am sorry to say and then went on to the Raglan and had another with Melvil Ward. I was unable to stay to dinner as I had invited Howrd de Walden to dine. The Captain therefore put me ashore in his boat. On arriving back in camp I found a Major Radcliffe who has come out from England to look after all correspondents. This is the blow I have felt has been hanging over us so long and which May mean the curtailment of all our freedom of movement. If this is the case and we are made to go round in a body I shall not stay long but shall return home. After dinner I had a consultation with Nevinson and Ross and we decided to go over and see Sir Ian Hamilton on the following day and lay the whole matter before him so as to find out exactly where we stand. I feel it is necessary to strike before any new rules and regulations are made.

[Page 140]
Tuesday July 3rd
We rode over to G.H.Q this morning Nevinson Ross and myself and went at once to Sir Ian's private quarters. This was the first time I have seen him for six weeks since the row I had when I was accused of criticising the operations. However he seemed to be in a very good mood and received us all in the most friendly manner. Nevinson had already been deputed as Spokesman as being the eldest member of the party. He at o once explained our fears of the curtailment of our freedom and how very awkard it would be if we had to go round togther. I added 'especially as some members of the party are not at all agreable to us' Sir Ian expressed surprise when he heard of the arrival of Major Radcliffe whom he declared had been appointed by the War Office over his head and without his knowledge of sanction.

He went on I will promise you you shall have absolute freedom of movement and that nothing shall be done to curtail the privileges you have enjoyed in the past. It is the last thing in the world I desire. He added that Radcliffe would now t take over the censoring but that he thought it undesirable he should actually live in our camp. He then spoke about the operations which he said would commence in a few days time and that we would be fully informed beforehand so as to make our preperations. He said there will be two centres of interest and you must make your plans accordingly and one of them will be a landing. I asked him if he could give us a hint as to which would be the best one to go to. I To place himself in the position of a war correspondent. He said he could not do so at that minute but might be able to say something later. The conversation then turned on other matters and he said he regretted

[Page 141]
very much there had been no one present to write a great discrptive account of the events of June 4th as Lawrence understood nothing and that he had heard that during the battle he was on the River Clyde packing his luggage and when told of the fight said 'never mind I will find out what happened from someone later’ We then explained that the presence of Mosely in our camp was extremely objectionable to us. He seemed to have heard a certain amount about this gentleman and asked if he had ever been over the other side. We explained he had spent one hour at Anzac in the course of a round trip. He then said 'Well he is doing no use here so I think I shall send him back’. This ended the interview and on leaving we wished him luck. We then went and saw Colonel Ward who agreed it was undesirable that Radcliffe should live in our midst. So we got all our points satisfactory settled. That evening I went on board No 32 and dined with de Crespigny Melvil Ward the Doctor and O'Callaghan . We had a very gay evening and spent most of the time listening to the gramaphone. I stayed on board for the night

Wednesday July 4th
Woke up feeing very rotten having had too much hot drink the night before. We went over to the Ark Royal in the morning and had some excellent iced beer. This is the first time I have been on board this Sea plane ship. She is a remarkable vessel especially constructed for the housing and repair of seaplanes. I was fortunate enough to find a real cenimetograpg operator on board and he came over to number 32 to explain several points about my machine of which I was ignorant. I am afraid therefore that the films I have taken up to date will be of small value. However, some of them May come out

[Page 142]
Later in the afternoon I went ashore and Crespigny 0'Callaghan Monty Parker the doctor and Radcliffe all came and dined with me. Maxwell also came to dinner but we had to have two seperate tables. Radcliffe said he thought he would be able to tell us some definite news on the following night. Events March apace.
Thursday August 5th
At Imbros

[Page 143]
Diary Friday August 6th 1915
On this day it became evident that events were rapidly developing and that the great new move from which so much was expected was about too to commence. These plans had been kept a profound secret but already almost everyone had a fairly clear idea of Sir Ian Hamilton's plans from the prelimianry distribution of the reinforcements at his disposition. It was perfectly clear to me that the plan outlined by General Birdwoood to me when I returned from England would be adopted namely another landing in Anafarta Bay which was destined to sweep inland and endevour to get astide the peninsula whil the Australian Army Corps strongly reinforced for the occasion would endevour to push north and capture the the commanding heights culminating in Koja Chemen which is over nine houndred feet high.

I hoped against hope the General Staff would pronounce against this plan and adopt the only sane and logical course namely to throw the new armies across either at or north of Bulair and thus cut the main line of communication of the whole of the Turkish Army in Gallipoli. I never felt the Anafarta landing could possibly succeed b because it meant putting troops in an impossible country broken up into hilly ground covered with nullahs and dongas and giving the enemy every possible advantage, while at the same time even if it succeeded it would only clear the peninsula as far as Kilid Bahr and offered but few prospects of the fleet being able to get through to Constantinople. To-day Our Charge D'Affaires Major Radcliffe dispatched Lawrence and Moseley to Helles or rather told them to start on the following morning while Nevinson and myself received instructions to be ready to.embark at any
hour after 5pm on the following day August 7th

[Page 144]
It was thus evident that we two were intended to witness the new landing the destination of which was not to be disclosed to us until after we had got on board the Minneapolis which was to convey us to our destination

Saturday August 7th
This day the 11th Corps and two Brigades of the 10th were embarked at Imbros on crusiers trawlers transports and placed in the new Motor Barges to be conveyed to some unknown but easily guessable destination on the bloodstained shores of Gallipoli. It was a fine sight to see the men embark and the majority of them seemed cheery enough delighted to at length embark on the great enterprise afters so much delay and hard preperation. But to me it was a sad and pathetic sight. How few had nany realisation whatsoever of what war really is. How many who were now singing singing light heartidly would be dead before the sun again rose.

How many would eventually survive this awful ordeal before them. How many would ever have enlisted at all had they had the faintest anticipation of the horrors of modern warfare under conditions such as exist in Gallipoli and handled by incompetent generals. Everything seemed to me at this eleventh hour to be against us. The hot weather the enormous packs our men carry the shortage of water, the unknown character of the troops the numbers of the enemy and above all the difficulties of a totally unknown and unexplored ground the only guide to which are hopelessly inaccurate maps which are being constantly changed as fresh discoveries are made. I also placed little reliance on the generals and staffs of these new formations and still less on the effect of the fire of the monitors and crusiers guns. On the previous day Sir Ian

[Page 145]
issued another of his ridiculous proclamations which sound all right when coming from a Napoleon but which are absurd to a degree when trumpeted from the mouth of mediocrity. I watched the troops embarking all the afternoon and at seven o'clock Nevinson and Radcliffe and self after a farewell bathe assembled at the quay to embark on the Minneapolis. For an hour we could not get a boat but at last a freindly N.T.O. sent us off in a tug. It was quite dark when we reached the Minneapolis which toweered out of the water. She is a huge Atlantic Transport liner and had on board seven houndred horses and five batteries of artillery belonging to the 10th and 11th Divisions. I managed to climb up a wooden ladder up her steep sides but we could not find a means of getting our baggage off.

The ship was in total darkness not a light being shown either above or below decks. In the middle of these proceeedings we were mistaken for a lighter and they proceede to lower a gun on the top of Nevinson Radcliffe our baggage and the precious cinemetograph. However this disaster was stopped in time and we eventually got the baggage on board and after a long search in the darkness found the purser who assigned us cabins. Although nominally a cargo boat the Minneapolis is built to carry a certain number of first class passengers and seemed exceedingly comfortable after months in the heat and dust on shore. I found the Chief Steward who produced whiskys and sodas and a beautifully iced bottle of champagne which he said 'had been on the ice since February and was the first one he had sold during the whole of that period. Thus with this refreshment and some sandwiches eaten by the light of a single candle we managed to make ourselves very comfortable

[Page 146]
Major Radcliffe then proceeded to unfold the great plan of campaign which it was hoped would open the gates of Constantinople to us. It was exactly the same as I had anticipated and have already named with the following distribution of troops. The I3th Division had been sent to reinforce Birdwood's Corps at Anzac togther with the 29th Brigade of the 10th division and the 29th Indian Brigade. The 11th Division and the 30th and 31st Brigades of the 10th Division were to land at three selected beaches in Anafarta Bay and endevour to push inland and seize the Anafarta Hills . Meanwhile it was hoped this would weaken or retain the Turkish Armies in front of Achi Baba and the 8th Corps there were to make a series of attacks with the endevour of getting through if possible.

Immediately my worst fears were realised and I felt absolutely certain the whole enterprise was doomed to be a bloody and disastrous failure. The numbers of Turks were estimated at I003/4 0000 [100,000?] in the Peninsula namely 36. 000 in front of Achi Baba. two Divisions at Bulair and one or two Divisions in front of Anzac. What these estimates were based on I cannot say but if the information is as bad as usual they are likely to be falsified within a few hours. During the night the crusiers Endymion and Thesus conveying the covering troops led the way out of Kephalo Bay followed by other vessels in succession. I do not know what time the Minneapolis sailed as I was asleep.

Sunday Saturday August 8th 7th
I was aroused at four thirty am by the sound of heavy firing from the shore and by Nevinson getting up. I stayed in bed a little longer but got on deck shortly after 5am. Dawn was just breaking. Through the

[Page 147]
the gloom our troops were disembarking at several points in the bay while the enemy's guns were busy shelling and our crusiers and Monitors were replying. It was a curious scene for we were only fifteen houndred yards from the shore where heavy fighting was already taking place yet life on the Minneapolis went on just the same as usual. Apparently the Stewards took but the smallest interest in the proceedings for the Chief came up and announced breakfast will be at 6-30 this morning Sir instead of at the usual hour 8-30. When this hour arrived I descended to the Saloon and on my way donw found a steward cleaning the carpets just as usual with a Vacuum cleaner. It was a strange sight but such is the force of habit and discipline on the humble mind. We sat down to a luxurious repast starting with iced Melon and going on with fish eggs and bacon etc. Just in fact the ordinary meal you would eat on a liner crossing the Atlantic.

Outside the guns were blazung and oir men were falling in scores killed and wounded. A gunner Colonel on board one of whose batteries had been landed early from barges called out 'This is a strange way of doing a war. I can sit here eat my breakfast in comfort and at the same time watch by battery coming into action.' All day long we watched the fighting from the Minneapolis as it was quite impossible to get ashore no boat coming to take us off and as no water had been found it was useless to land the remainder of the guns and their horses. The Minneapolis was in fact left severely alone except that some barges came and took off a number of mules which were swung out of the holds and placed in lighters. One had an excellent view of the operations (for account see elsewhere) so I cannot say I found it any great hardship staying on this luxurious

[Page 148]
ious liner having comfortable meals and a clean bed to sleep in. That night we all slept once more on board her,

Monday August 9th Sunday Aug 8th
It became evident this morning that the attack had been hung up. There was little movement along the front and our warn out troops seemed to have no intention of advancing but only the ambition to lie quietly amongst the trees and in the hedges and allow themselves to be sniped by the Turks. We could see crowds of wounded coming back from the firing line showing that once again the casualties had been very heavy. It did not seem as if we would be able to get ashore to-day but about I2 pm Radcliffe who had been off in a pinnace to visit the Headquarters of the 9th Corps which is commanded by General Sir Francis Stopford who was Buller's Chief of Staff at Colenso took us at a moment's notice to A Beach.

Here I sat down and finished my dispatches which Radcliffe took back with him to Imbros when he sailed later in the day. Nevinson and self walked right round the west side of the lake to the Hill of Lala Babab from which we had a good view of the front but apparently there was no movement of any kind. Here we met many members of the staff of the 11th Division which is commanded by Major General Hammersley who is a Dug Out from somewhere. Already it was apperent something was wrong. Nasty rumours began to circulate that the troops could not be induced to advance and that in consecquence the losses amonsgt officers had been unduly heavy. Water is so scare that the unfortunate men are dead beat abd weighed down by their kits can only lie down and think over happier days. It is quite evident the whole affair has been a ghastly failure. God Knows what will happen.

[Page 149]
Monday August 9th
This morning I left early and went out to Lala Baba where I remained all day watching the battlefield from this standpoint. There were disoultry movements of no importance it being obviously impossible to get the infantry to advance. They lay about under the shelter of the trees for the most part too hot and too thirsty to attempt to drive back the Turkish snipers who took full advantage of the immunity they enjoyed creeping about all over the place and playing the devil with our battalions and brigades hopelessly mixed in the broken ground. From time to time there were attempts at a forward movement by small parties of officers and men but these all died away leaving the dead lying out in front as if washed up by a high tide and the survivors lying in little groups behind cover or else trying to creep back in two and threes under the fire of the enemy's sharpshooters.

It was indeed a trajic sight to see Two Divisions held up aand harassed by a few battalions of irregular sharpshooters. About midday a series of fires were started either by accident or design which swept diagonally across our front fanned by a strong wind. In our centre we were on a hill which is now known as burnt hill. Our troops were driven off this by the flames and many of our wounded lying round in the open perished miserably. You c could see them attempting to crawl out of the track of the fire many alas in vain. The warships kept up their useless fire on the Anafarta Ridge behind which did absolutely no good and we could not even silence the two batteries of rtillery with which the Turks annoyed our harassed lines all day. Later in the day Nevinson who had been right out at the

[Page 150]
front rejoined me. His report on the siruation was most distressing. He said that our infantry were demoralised and weary and absolutely refused to advance. The muddle was beyond anything ever previously seen 'Never he said 'since Lombard's Kopje and Nicholson's neck have I seen British infantry behave so badly. This morning the 53rd Division Welsh Territorials were landed and immediately pushed up into the already conjested firing line to add nothing to its strength but merely to deepen the prevailing confusion.

Tuesday August 10th
This morning Nevinson and self went out to Lala Baba but after staying there fro half an hour we decided to go round the Salt Lake to Chocolate Hill where you can obtain a onderful view of the whole battlefield. We selected the south side of the Lake as being the safest but when we were half way round came in for a most unpleasant experience. The enemy either by accident or design got a battery just on W Ridge playing right on us. The first shell went over our heads and the second pitched within five yards covering us with mud. Then several others arrived with a fearful shriek and burst all round us. We had absolutely no cover and I ran into the weeds by the Lake to hide myself hoping to get out of their track. But this availed me little for I sank in slime above my knees and could not move. Thus stuck I had to keep quiet while fourteen shells burst within ten or twenty yards the last two of them being shrapnel. Fortunately by some miracle we all three escaped and after a time the fire ceased. Whereupon we crept out at intervals of one houndred yards and ran for the next three houndred to some slight cover by the roadside. Then we made for the shelter of the lea side of Choc- [olate Hill]

[Page 151]
[Choco]late Hill which we climbed to the trenches on top. From here one had a splendid view of the battlefield spread out before you in the plain beneath. I shall never forget this day for on it the British Army reached the acme of humiliation. You could see the Turks moving about almost as well as you could see oir own men. They held their trenches lightly and threw out large numbers of skirmishers who knew the country well. They crept from point to point whereever they were needed firing at oir lines creeping from bush to bush and from tree to tree. the majority of our men simply lay still and allowed themselves to be slaughtered without maing any effort to advance and drive them back. At attempt was made by a battalion to retake Burnt Hill which had been abandoned the previous day on account of the fires. Some sort of a firing line was formed and this ended in a bayonet charge up the burnt slopes.

The Turks who held a trench on the top evacuated the position and you could see them creeping away down the far side. But when they were half way up the little battery behind W Hill opened on them with two rounds of shrapnel and our men actually ran away like rabbits down the Hill. Small groups at the sides unawares of this movement still held their ground. The astonished Turks surprised at their good fortune crept back in two and threes and reoccupied the trench line and commenced to snipe the fugitives and those who still continued to hold their ground at the sides. Those who were not picked off were also obliged to flee. Two men gallantly helped a wounded comrade away. This was about the only bright spot in the day's work. 0ur dead litter the front. They are lying as if asleep beneath the trees and hedges. Some have been burnt to cinders by the flames,

[Page 152]
others have been dispoiled by theTurks at night who take wa away their rifles food equipment and ammunition to use them on the following day against ourselves. On Chocolate Hill I met two Brigadiers General Hill commanding th 31st Brigade of the 10th Division and General Maxwell commanding the 33rd Brigade of the 11th. Neither knew who was senior and therefore in command or whose troops were really supposed to be holding this section of the line. General Hill who took a sound view of the operations complained bitterly of the muddles of Sir Francis Stopford and the Staff of the 9th Corps. This is ho they muddled up the Brigades of General Mahonfs Division. The 29th was sent to Anszac. The 31st was lent to the 11th Division for the landing for some reason and the 30th alone remained under General Mahon's orders but two battalions of the 11th Division were given him as a kind of sop. So before the troops ever got ashore the germs of confusion were already well planted. All these Brigades belonging to different Divisions were now mixed up in the low country which rendered it impossible to organise any sort of a proper firing line with supports and reserves or to get the men to go forward. In the middle of this muddle to add to the confusion the 53rd Welsh Territorial Division was pushed forward and became involved in the general hotch pot. The officers of the Staffs of these new Divisions seem to be extraordinary ignorant of their work and to have no idea of modern warfare. Artillery was badly wanted and we had a mountain battery with warn outguns pushed forward behind chocolate Hill. I heard a dispute between Generals Maxwell and Hill as to whether these guns could not be removed because General Hill

[Page 153]
complained that they atracted the fire of the Turkish batteries onto his reserves. There were dozens of good positions in which they might have been placed but the artillery officer knew his job so little that he could neither see or suggest a fresh one. Such is the manner in which we conduct war. The Turkish infantry simply dominate these new formations. They walk about as they like from point to point and our men make no effort to pick them off by sending forward skirmishers on the same tactics. Their one idea is to lie low and apparently save their skins and in consecquence they loose far more men than they would by a regular advance.

Throughout the day extraordinary rumours came in announcing g eat successes at Achi Baba and the fall of that position. While up on Chocolate Hill the news came by telophone Achi Baba has fallen offical. This was circulated down the lines and was greeted with cheers by the men. Unfortunately it had no effect in making them advance and hearing this mountain had at last fallen they seem to have come to the conclusion that the main object of the expedition had at length been achieved. Wheras even if Achi Baba has fallen the main task still lies ahead. On our way home we met General Mahon bathing . He seemed to be very disgruntled

[Page 154]
Wednesday August 11th
This morning it became evident that the 9th Corps was in no position to make any further attempt to advance and therefore Nevinson and I decided to return to Imbros to send off cables and to have a wash and a rest of which we were both badly in need. Nevinson however decided to pay one more visit to the front. I caught a trawler which left at two am On returning to our camp I found Marshall Gen Douglas A.D.C. From him I learnt what had happened at Achi Baba. It appeares there were several attempts to advance but that all ended in disaster. The Turks had been strongly reinforced and were ready for us. In fact it is said we anticipated there attack on our lines by four hours.

This May or May not be the truth. In any case our attacks were disastrous and bloody failures. The 42nd Division which advanced against what is known as the vineyard lost seventy five officers and sixteen houndred men. The 29th Division also lost heavily and our total casualties are I am told not under five or six thousand in this quarter alone. The Turks fought with a vigor they have not displayed for a long time and came out in whole battalions to counter attack us. It is now quite evident that the attack has been a total failure all along the line. The Anzac Corps did splendidly and I found some very interesting accounts of the part played by the New Zealanders waiting me from Ross. I also found several letters from home.
Thursday August I2th
All day at Imbros writing dispatches of which I have now got off four. Met Smith the Australian Correspondent who gave me many interesting details of the part played by the Australian troops. Wrote another dispatch.

[Page 155]
Friday August I3th
At Imbros writing dispatches. Nevinson visited G.H.Q and reported great trouble there over the failure of the operations. There are likely to be some important changes in the Corps commands. Lawrence turned up and confirmed the news of the failures of the attacks on Achi Baba. All round the situation is about as black as it could be. The losses are reported to be colossal and the Colonial Troops absolutely fought to a standstill. There is great trouble about our messages as no one seems to know what ought to be allowed through and what ought not. In the afternoon we tried to return to Anafarta but the promised Trawler never turned up.

Saturday August I4th
Left at seven am for Anafarta. Trawler was however grea ly delayed and did not reach there until 11am. We wenr ashore and pitched out tent overlooking the sea on West Beach A. Found the Fleet had been driven out to see by the enemy's shell fire and that the Swiftsure had been hit several times losing six killed and seven wounded. Found the enemy had brought p several fresh guns and had been shelling A Beach with a great 8 inch High Explosive Shell. They drop shells in the gullies behind but up to the present have not got the beach itself although two big ones fell in the water. Otherwise the situation has not changed and our line is no farther foward than it was the evening of the landing. There are now nearly four Divisions ashore here. The whole story is a pitiful muddle. Went up to the Hills on the left in the afternoon and had a good view of the surrounding country. Except I for the shell fire all was quiet. On way back called on Staff of 10th

[Page 156]
Division who expressed themselves very openely on the state of affairs. They complained bitterly of the muddles and of the manner in which their Division had been broken up and its organisation destroyed. Met Granard who reintroduced himself to me and wanted me to send a private letter to Harry Lawson acquainting him with the truth. He told me that he corresponden regularly with the King and could get anything through he liked without censorship.

On leaving 10th Division called on 9th Corps Headquarters and saw the C.O.S General Reid. I had previously known and disliked him in Constantinople. He said Gen Stopford was not very anxious to have any Correspondents with him but had consented to Nevinson and self coming on condition we brought an officer with us. We merely asked that they would give us news from time to time of coming events so that we might be in the right place to see t them. However it was quite easy to see that the atmosphere was not overcharged with friendleness. He promised however to arrange for us to see Stopford on the following day at nine am. This interview never took place for reasons I will explain later. Just as I left The 9th Corps I Caught a glimpse of the General pouring over his Maps evidently trying to discover where his own men and where the enemy where.

Sunday August I5th
At Anafarta. A gale was blowing this morning from the south west. This boasted harbour seems of little value in such a wind and the work of disembarking troops and stores was only being carried on with the utmost difficulty. It does not look to me as if it would be any shelter in
the storms of the autumn and winter. Inhear that the Navy thought they cou d utilise the Salt Lake in the winter. This is a good joke

[Page 157]
because it has no communication with the sae and can only be a couple of feet deep. Nevinson and self went to see Stppford at nine am. Instead we again saw General Reid who made no refer nce to the points we had raised on the previous evening. He seemed more friendly and took us into his Dug Out pointing out the positions held by the different Divisions on the map and then saying that the 10th Division would make an attempt to gain the last knoll held by the enemy on the high ground on the left. This attack would start at 1pm.

A Not a word was said about see Sir Francis Stopford. We decamped highly pleased in this change of attitude but still not knowing the reason. We watched the beach being shelled with 8 inch high explosives for a bit and then returned to our camp where after an early lunch we sauntered up the Hills and got a good view of the fighting. This was on a small scale and took an endless time to develope. There was much firing without result and the Turkish skirmishers again fought well holding up our advance for a long time. I left at 5pm thoroughly weary of the whole thing. The final peak was carried by a bayonet charge of the Munsters at six o’clock. The Turks bolted. I do not think their losses amounted to much. On my way down I heard the startling news that General topford had been relieved of his command. This accounted for Reid’s changed attitude that morning. In my opinion after the ghastly muddle he hade of the operations the prompt action was necessary and inevitable. Inheard that de Lisle was to be appointed in his stead.

Monday August I6th
Nevinson went to 9th Corps Headquarters and saw de Lisle who said

[Page 158]

that His predecessor ‘had broken down under the continual strain’ This was the polite way of putting it. He added 'That now he was busy sorting out the Divisions and making fresh dispositions for another attack. Nevinson Lawrence and self then left at 11am for Anzac. We found Ross and Schulyer on the boat. On arriving I went out to Godley's Headquarters and had a long and interesting talk with him in which he explained his operations. He was loud in his praise of the manner in which the Colonials had fought. I then accompanied by Ross climbed to the highest point held by our troops on the Chunuk Bair Ridge. It was a most interesting journey and very dangerous on account of the enemy's snipers who command the whole valley. At the top we saw the dead lying out in long rows. It was a painful sight.

The front trenches were being held by some of the 13th Division who seemed good troops and who had not been previously engaged. The New Zealand Infantry Brigade who were the first on top were in second line under General Johnston whom I met and had a talk with. From this high ground one obtained a magnificent view of the country for miles around and could see the ground held by the Australians on the extreme left where the line is linked up with posts with the 9th Corps. But in my opinion the position of the army is at present hopeless and we can never hope to break through from these positiosn, more especially now as the Turks know where our attack must come from and will not be caught napping again. We were cleared out of the front trenches at 5pm as the guns had to bombard a Turkish trench fifty yards in front as an effort to storm it was to be made that night. A previous effort early that morning had failed. On my way down I nearly

[Page 159]
got scuppered by a machine gun and had to lie down in the centre of the pathway whilst the bullets zipped overhead. All the way down there was continous sniping. This heavy broken ground provides excellent cover and the Turks seem to be everywhere. I xalled again at Godley's Headquarters and met Aubrey Herbert and Bentinck both of whom were very despondent. The formervtold me horrible tales about the wounded many of whom had to lie out for four days in the broiling sun without water so bad where the arrangements for taking them off. He also told me how awful it was to hear the wounded outside the lines calling for water at night and how they were left to perish miserably.

The whole thing is too horrible for words or details. The Anzac Corps has in fact been fought to a standstill and practically all this splendid Colonial material is gone. On my way back to Anzac Beach I ran across my father's old Secretary Gerald Aylmer whom I had not seen for ten years. In the semi-darkness I stopped to ask him about a turn in the trench and then we recognised one another. I got back at 8 o'clock and managed to get some dinner out of Woods and Butler. I then went round and saw Gen Bird- wood who received me in the most friendly manner and said he was very glad I had called. He then explained to me in detail his plan of the operations what was intended and what was actually achieved. Finally he handed me Gen Godley's full report consisting of twenty seven typewritten fullscap pages and said I could read it and take what notes I liked but that I must be careful how I used it as Gen Hamilton might want it for his report. I stayed with him for an hour and a half talking over the late battle.He was bitterly disappointed over the failure

[Page 160]
of the 9th Corps to make good the positions in there front. He said that without the capture of the W Hills it would have been impossible for him to have remained on the crest of Chunuk Bair. He said his total losses were 375 officers and 10,138 rank and file in the operations on the lfet [left] and over 2000 in the taking and holding of Lone Pine Plateau. At the 10th Division they told me there losses were 165 officers and over 3000 men whilst the 11th Division lost 201 officers and 4300 men. This does not take into account the losses of the 53rd Division which was also in action and the losses at Helles. The total casualties therefore cannot be much under 28,000 an appaling total for the gains which as General Godley expressed it amounted to some 500 acres of bad grazing ground. Or as the Chief of the Staff of the 10th Division put it. ‘There are now three sieges instead of two’. Well we have now got hold of most of the bathing resorts on the coast.

Tuesday August I7th
This morning I was up at 5-30 am although very weary and started transcribing notes f om Gen. Godley’s report. It took me three hours and a half to extract all the ore. Then as I had arranged on the previous evening I went round with Chernside Birdwood’s A.D.C and visited the newly captured Lone Pine Position. The Turks had made this a veritable fortJress and the Australians fought desperately to get it and hold it. Over one thousand corpses were taken from the trenches alone whilst the dead lie thick in the open. Was it worth it. I think not. However it did divert the enemy’s attentoon to this point. S,ells dead maggots debris everywhere. Heard the loss of the Royal Edward and 1000 lives sunk by

[Page 161]
submarine confirmed. Another terrible affair. Took many photographs and cinemetograph pictures. Sailed for Imbros with Nevinson Lawrence and Aubrey Herbert thoroughly warn out.

Wednesday August I8th
At Imbros. Went over to G.H.Q in morning and caught Sir Ian and Gen Braithwaite just as they were starting for Anafarta. Told to come back to-morrow. Saw Maxwell Radcliffe and Col Ward.The War Office are making trouble over the Cinemetograph Films. I am afraid they May try and stop me taking them. One would have thought they had enough troubles f their own to leave me alone. Saw Jack Churchill who seems to think we are in for a winter campaign for certain. He spoke bitterly of Stopford who he said had spoilt the entire plan my his delays. Gen Reid he discribed as a Military Cad who said on being remonstrated with 'Troops cannot advance without the support of their heavy artillery' when he had half the warships waiting for targets in the harbor behind him.

Thursday August 19th
Went to G.H.Q this morning and had very long interviews with Sir Ian and Braithwaite. They both seemed sovered and subdued but were very friendly. They promised to accilerate the dispatch of cables which are to go just as soon as Sir Ian has got off his offical reports. Sir Ian talked a good deal about the operations. He praised the Colonials and although he did not mentoon Stopford it was easy to see he was bitterly disappointed with the 9th Corps. He told me how the Gourkas had actually got on the Chunuk Bair Ridge and had chased the Turks down the further slopes only to be driven off agin by our

[Page 162]
own shell fire. He had just received a report on this p int from Col Allanson who led the final charge. He said that never had plans been so carefully laid and so well carried out and that success was almost within our grasp. I asked him if it would have been possible to have held onto the crest of Chunuk Bair if the enemy still had his guns on W Hill. He said 'I do not think we could have’. Later just as I was leaving he called be back and said ‘In regard to your very pertinent question the enemy actually withdrwe their guns on W Hill for 24 hours after the 11th Division landed. They only returned them there when the advance failed to develop’. I was surprised at this statement and can hardly confirm it from what I saw myself. Both Sir Ian and Hamilton and Braithwaite seemed very friendly towards us. However Generals ofetn are when operations have not worked out as well as was hoped.

They promised at the same time to restore Maxwell to his former position of Chief Censor on our complaining that Delme-Radcliffe was not altogther satisfactory. He has also now left the camp so all the War Office schemes have been brought to nought. Qe are once more free nand unfettered. Once more our will or rather mine has prevailed. Russell has gone I am sorry to say Moseley has gone never to return and now Delme Radcliffe has been cleared out. This makes us just three in the mess except when Russell and Bean, who has been slighlty wounded are over here. Everything now seems fixed up in a satisfactory manner at any rate for the time being. I suppose fresh troubles will come in the future but there is no need to anticipate. We were told to keep ready for further movments which means they are going to have another try at'these positions. They do not stand a Dog's chance now

[Page 162]
August 20th
This day I remained at Imbros working on a long article on the recent fighting at Anzac. I had completed this and then went down to have a bathe when I met Delme-Radeliffe who was on his way to visit us with the information that we ought to go to Suvla Bay next morning. He would not say what was going to happen but only committed himself to the statement that we would be in time. I had therefore to call off my bathe and to make preperations for departure.

August 21st
We left this morning for Suvla but the boat was very late in starting and did not arrive before ten am. However all was quiet. Nevinson and I went to see General Reid who told us a bombardment would start at 3pm and would be followed by a general attack. This gave us plenty of time to get settled into camp and to have lunch before starting at 12 to walk to Chocolate Hill. On arriving there I found the Colonel of the S.W.Bs and learnt for the first time that the 29th Division had been brought up from Helles to take part in the attack. They were in fact being employed like the Old Guard at Waterloo to make a final effort to break through the enemy’s lines. Thi is really using a willing horse beyond reason. The 29th seemed to care but little for the honour which had been conferred on them namely to force a passage for the rest of the army being thoroughly fed up with fighting. However poor devils they had no alternative. For account of attack and battle see elsewhere) This was a very hot day for War Correspondents. Chocolate Hill became the focus of the enemy!s shell fire and you could not lift your head a second above cover without having it bathed in shrapnel

[Page 164]
whilst the infernal bullets whistled all round. I made a sort of a barracde which gave me some protection and enabled me to take Cinemetograph pictures but I have no idea how they will come out on account of the difficult conditions the smoke and thv flames from innumerable fires. The shelling was awful. In the middle of the afternoon Lawrence came to me with the news that Nevinson had been wounded in the head but not seriously by shrapnel. He went and had it dressed and then pluckily returned to watch the fight. I stayed some time with the Naval Maxims which were endevouring without much success to find a target. In fact the whole affair was disgracefully conducted and every possible tactiacl fault committed.

For instance a young Subaltern from the 60 pounders sent to observe arrived on the hill five miuntes before the bombardment was due to start and beggee me to point him out the trenches they were supposed to fire on. This I did to the best of my ability. He said thier .
target had been changed three times in the last hour and no one had any clear idea of what they were supposed to do. Wgen the action started the shell fire was so heavy that the Subaltern made no effort to spot but lay all the afternoon in a dug out to obtain some cover being thoroughly scared. About five thirty I returned to my old position and immediately came in for a terrible shelling. I had to lie low for several minutes at a time finally a shell whistled by my head a burst only six feet away in the parapit behind. The next moment another landed within six inchs of me on the parapit but I had my head down. It blew three sand bags on top of me covering me with smoke and sand. I found myself in total darkness and thought I was buried alive. I called for assistance and after a time a soldier came a dragged me out. The nose of the

[Page 165]
shell fell on my legs yet I did not receive a scratch. Unfortunately when the smoke had cleared away I found my coat camera the glasses for the case of my field glasses and my stick had all disappeared. The shell having landed right amongst them I supposed they had been b blown to smitherens or else over the parapit. It was quite impossible to get out and find them on account of the heavy fire. The loss of my camera is a serious blow as I shall not be able to replace it in a hurry. At eight ofclock we left the battlefield and made our way back across the Salt Lake under a disoultry fire. The fighting lasted all through the night the firing being incessant and unceasing. It seemed as if the Turks were everywhere counter attacking. I did not know exactly what had happened but it seemed a disastrous day all round. Fortunately Nevinson’s wound was slight as he was saved by his helmet otherwise his scull might have been broken. We all reached camp thoroughly warn out and exhausted.

August 22.
The firing had lasted without cessation all through the night but when we awoke this morning it had stopped along the Anafarta front but there was a fight taking place neare Anzac on the other side of the plain. We went and saw General Reid who gave us the bad news that Hill 70 had been abandoned during the night as it was found impossible to hold it. Therfore out net gains after heavy losses amount to nix n except that our Trench line is now joined up with the Australian left. Gen Reid seemed to take rather a pleasure in the result of the operations as they form a sort of vindicationn for the fail re of the 9th Corps in the early days of the landing. He said ‘You see even the famous 29th

[Page 166]
Division have failed and if they did how could new untried troops be expected to succeed. He said that there would certainly be no further movement for some days and that Head Quarters were considering what should be the future of the campaign. In the afternoon we again went out to Chocolate Hill in serach of my belongings. In this we were partly successful as my coat was discovered a long way over the parapit but the firing was too heavy to attempt to bring it in. However some of the Naval Maxim people promised to have a try after dark and to look for my other property. The battlefield presented a ghastly sight being covered with corpses of our men stiff and cold while many wounded unable to reach our lines still moved under any shelter they had been able to find.

The Turks kept up an incessant shrapnel fire on our lines of communication and on the beaches. This shell fire is infernal andb gets on men’s nerves worse than anything. I visited General Marshall who had charge of the 29th Division in this fight. He gave me a resume of what had occured and said the task assigend to him namely to attack the section between Hill 70 and Hill 8 112 was absurd. He therfore changed his orders and treid to get the horns of the horseshoe first. This morning I was shown an order from Headquarters ordering the Naval Authorities to suspend the landing of all men stores animals and transport until further orders. There is enough on shore for four days. Does this mean that the Army is to be reembarked.
I asked General Marshall if he had heard anything about it. He replied know and smiled saying . ‘You can guess what it May mean jsut as well as I can’. We returned to camp under a heavy and most unpleasant shell fire the whole way. Nevinson obatined a lift back in an Ambulance but regretted it afterwards as he

[Page 167]
came in for the worst shelling of the lot. Going home along the beach we came in for some big high explosives and Black Coal Boxes. The worst of it is you never know where these draned things are going to fall as the enemy sweep sections of the shore and camps which renders it quite impossible to take any proper cover. Really life out here is becoming hell. Also there is a great deal of sickness the Surgeons who dressed Nevinson’s head telling him that one thousand cases of dysentry and minor stomach troubles had passed through their hands that day. The weather has become distinctly cooler and there are signs that the summer is rapidly passing. We should not have heavy gales until the middle of September but they will probably come early this year as everything seems to aid the Turks.
 August 23rd                                                                   
Nevinson and Lawrence went off again to Chocolate Hill this morning but I remained in camp as I was very ired and wished to see one or two people. I met Dawny of G.H.Q who had come over in a Destroyer.  He was pale and sad his face reflecting the disasters of the last ten days. He tried to vindicate thenplan of campaign adopted stating they had submitted it to Kitchener who had approved. He said they never hoped to do more that cut off the Turkish Armies in front of Kilid Bahr and Achi Baba and that the plan would have succeeded but for the delays of the 9th Corps. I asked him why they had not chosen some seasoned and tried troops to lead the first rush like the Gourkas or 29th division. He replied General Cox said his Indians were incapable of any fresh offensive and yet they did splendidly at Anzac. How could we know this he added almost with a moan. As for the 29th we felt we could not

[Dawny is probably Guy Dawnay, later with Gen. Allenby and T.E.Lawrence in Cairo etc]

[Page 168]
ask them to do any more. ’Why then’ I replied ’Where they brought up and sacrificed once again in this fresh attack. To this he could only reply 'We had no other troops capable of making an attack and we thought we had a good chance of success having massed twentybfive thousand bayonets for this final attempt. It only proves’ he went on 'that odds of three to one are not sufficient. This statement amazed me and I replied 'Who ever supposed they were after the lessons of this war’ Why you want ten to one and a flank to make sure of any sort of victory when attacking an enemy entrenched up to his neck Dawny replied it so nearly succeeded and victory would have meant a Marquisate for Sir Ian’. This struck me as being a particularly low method of looking at the situation considering the deplorebale state in which the army and the country finds itself at the present time. I pointed out to Dawny that water fundamentally brought about the hold up or rather the lack of it.

He said that every detail had been most carefully worked out and that there was enough ashore to supply each man with a gallon’. I do not know what became of it for it certainly never reached the firing line. I asked him how Sir Ian felt. He replied we are all of coyrse very disappointed. I asked him about the future and he replied ’It is up to the Cabinet to decide what is to become of the expedition. The whole question has been submitted to them. They did not send us out reinforcements in time. We expected them in June not at the end of July.   I asked him 'Why the Bulair landing had not been chosen. He replied '. We learnt that the Turks had five Divisions concentrated there to meet us and we would never even have got ashore. In the offical statement issued to us on the Minneapolis it was clearly stated that there


[Page 169]
were only two divisions at Buliar so I suppose that now their plan has failed they have decided on another to justify their action in the eyes of the Historian. Dawny said they expected this last attack to succeed because they did not think the enemy were stronly entrenched or had more than a division with which to oppose us. I said to him ’Have you had a look at Hill 112 it is absolutely covered with trenches. It is a great pity that G.H.Q dod not sometimes go out and have a look at things for themselves.  Then they would know better what the troops have to face. There is a growing impression everywhere that the expedition is at an end for this year and that we must either withdraw or make preperations to winter in Gallipoli but as we have not got any sort of a base this will be extremely difficult and I am afraid May even lead to a disaster.

On arriving back in camp I found an urgent message from G.H.Q recalling us all to Imbros. Therefore on their return Nevinson Lawrence and self all left. We had to make our way to the beach under the usual infernal shell fire and I got one within ten yards high explosive which fortunately did me no harm except to make me fall over. A kind Providence seems to look after me out here but nevetheless I wish she would’nt run things quite so close as I do get so scared. We had to wait some time for the Teawler and I met Captain Unwin of the River Clyde who has been awarded the V.C I am glad to say. He tells me he has made the Authorities agree to having the landing beach shifted down to where we camp about a thousand yards further off from the enemy’s guns where at least it will be out of sight if not out of range and a certain amount of cover will will also be available.

[Page 170]
While waiting for the Trawler I went on board the Swiftsure and met several old freinds. Got back to Imbrso at six but it was too late to go to G.H.Q.

August 24th
We all three went across this miming. Found they wanted us in order to give a trifle of scrappy offical information about the recent operations which was of absolutely no value to any of us. They had even held up my Anzac dispatch innorder to make me add a paragraph about Sgt Major Wallingford and some machine guns. I was highly indignant and told them so in no uncertain terms. My coat has been returned to me but not the camera or glass case. I m afraid they must have been blown to smitherens. I went on board No 32 and dined with de Crespingny. Feeling very seedy the doctor gave me some bromide and I slept on board

August 25th
Went on board a yacht called the victory and bought a lot of stores and ordered others to be sent from Mythelene. Then returned to camp and had to write a long cable on the last battle. I made it pretty hot and do not know how much will be allowed through. De crespigny Cooper and Monty Parker came to dinner.

April 26th
Had a settlement of accounts in morning and then attacked my immense accumulated private correspondence. Got a signal to come to Headquarters in afternoon. Found they wanted me to take out all references in my last cable to the gallant deeds of the 29th Divisionbecause they said it was a strategical move nd they did not want the Turks to know the Division had been brought round as they might seize the opportunity

[Page 171]
of attacking at Helles. I pointed out that they must know by now that the 20th Division had been brought round on account of the numbers of dead lying about the evacuated positions. They had no answer to this so it is obvious to me that their real reason is they do not wish it known in England that they employed the 29th for this final effort.  It looks to like working a willing horse to death.  However I think it an awful pity to rob the 29th of the credit due to them.  It will only be however for a time. They have succeeded in ruining my dispatch.

I found the whole of G.H.Q evidently reconciled to the, prospcets of a winter campaign. The younger members of the Staff are very disconted with the conduct ofnthe campaign. I had a talk with George Lloyd who evidently takes a very serious view of the situation in the Balkans. He seems to think there is a chance of Bulgaria coming in against us which would mean she would attack Servia to regain what she lost by the Treaty of Bucherest. Maxwell says the news from Russia is too bad to print in the Gallipoli liar.  george Lloyd says the whole staff must go. That Sir Ian has lost all confidence in himself and is simply the tool in the hands of Braithwaite who is thoroughly stupid but ambitious and obstinate. In his opinion where the campaign has broken down has been in the actual direction of operations on the battlefield. In this I quite agree. He was just off to Athens offically and promised to bring me back the latest news as he was to see Chirol. Greece is said to have declared war in any case Venezelos has formed a ministry. But what good is Greece to us without Bulgaria.

[Page 172]
August. 27th to September 1st
During this period I remained at Suvla busy writing and on various jobs but very weary and dispirited. No one seems to know what is going to happen. It is obvious that this army can do no more fighting and unless Bulgaria comes in we shall be stuck here for the winter which is a pleasant outlook in damp trenches many of which will have to be abandoned. There are signs that the weather is already breaking for we have had a series of storms of late and the old sailors tell you how impossible it will be to keep the armies supplied in winter time.  They probably do not know what they are talking about and I believe the work can be carried on even if communication with the shore is broken for certain periods.

There is a general feeling of discontent on all sides and nothing will restore the morale and confidence of the army until we have a change of leadership. G.H.Q have not got a single friend in the army. Never have I heard such outspoken criticisms. We are buyoed up from time to time by rumours, always false, of the active participation of Greece and Bulgaria in the War. Venezelos it is said will reestablish the Balkan League and that Servia and Greece will be willing to make Bulgaria concessions in Macedonia. On the following day you hear that there is a likelehood of Bulgaria coming in against us. It is a strange irony of fate that Bulgaria should now hold all the trump cards in her hands. I gave a dinner to Golonel Hawker Colonel Weston, the new Camp Commandant Jack Churchill de Crespigny and Melvil Ward. It was pronounced a great success. Most nights I go off and dine with Phillip on his Monitor No 32 and he

[Page 173]
does one extremely well. Melvil Inoften see too on the Raglann. This and bathing areour only recreations.

Thursday September 2nd.
This day I left for Suvla Bay accompanied by Brooks the Offical Photographer who has returned from England to take some Cinemetograph Pictures.I have a new Australian Servant called Macnabie to carry my effects, and the machine. On landing at Suvla after a very stormy voyage in a Trawler I found it much quieter that usual and the Turks were shelling A Beach very little. I found my kit still safe but my tent had been takenndown by order of the Camp Commandant Colonel Levinson on the ground that it might attract the enemy’s shell fire. We went out to Chocolate Hill and from there on to the Green Hill getting right into the front trenches and seeing a real fight with the next Turkish Trench. This ought to make an excellent picture.

Our dead still lie out before our lines and I fear many of our wounded must also have perished. The 29th Division lost 2100 odd in their last useless assault on the 21st of August. I hear it was de Lisle who advocated their being brought up as he said 'a regular Division would simply walk over that position. Perhaps they might possibly have done so on the first day. Sir Julian Byng now commands the 9th Corps, de Lisle has gone back to the 29th Division. Marshall has gone to the 52nd. There has in fact been a general reshuffling of all the units. For instance the 13th Division have been brought over from Anzac and the 54th Territorials sent down in theit stead. Many generals have been sent home including Hammersley of the 11th which is now commanded by One                                                                                                        

[Page 174]
brigade of the 10th Division is till down at Anzac and has just had a lot of fighting for Hill 60th. The struggle for this position has been going on for three days. It was taken by us on the 21st of August but apparently we lost it again. I hear our casualties have again been very heavy. On Chocolate Hill I met General Payton who commands the 2nd Mounted Division Yeomanry. He was very agreable and gave me some interesting details of the part played by the Yeomanry in the affair of the 21st. All are agreed it was one of the w rst managed affairs which have been seen on the Peninsula which is saying a great deal It appears that all the other Generals hate de Lisle and refuse to have any dealings with him. The infantry generals resent having a cavalryman placed over their heads. No one knew their orders and some of the Yeomanry Brigades had no idea on what point they were to March. Why on earth they were brought right across the open under a heavy shrapnel fire remains a msytery instead of being massed behind Chocolate Hill under cover of night.

But this is only on a par with everything else. The artillery fire was very poor and I should say the Turks have suffered but little. All our troops are very dispirited and ask ‘’Are we going to be stuck here for the winter?. I am afraid poor devils that they will be whether they like it or not. The Turks spend their whole time digging new trenches. They have now made a great barbed wire entanglement across the front of Hill 70th which it has never had before. This will make it even harder to tackle the next time we make the attempt. The front is very depressing to visit at the present time. We got back to camp late but were fortunate in having a very safe time all day as the enemy hardly shelled at all

[Page 175]
 Friday September 3rd
I went to see General Reid at the 9th Corps Headquarters. I asked him to assign me a fresh site for my camp which he promised to do. He did not seem very cheerful about the prospects for the winter campaign. He said our losses from sickness would be enormous and that all the trenches would have o be rivetted otherwise it would be impossible to stay in them. He seemed to think the prospects for a further advance were out of the question. In the afternoon I went out to Lala Baba to call on the 10th Corps. I found Granard there. His hatred of G.H.Q beats anyone elses. He denounced Hamilton and said he could not be trusted a yard as he would pretend one thing before your face and then try and injure you in every sort of way behind your back.

This has been my experience too. He produced a long letter from Harry Lawson dated August 10th in which he Lawson stated definitely that Hamilton had written to him saying I was unsuitable as a Correspondent to him. This is probably quite true as I have always refused tonwrite to dictation and to lie at anyone request. He then told me that he Granard had written to Hamilton saying ‘’I feel it my duty as privy Councillor to write the truth of all that has occured out here to the King. Perhaps under these circumstances you would prefer that I should not serve under your command’’ Hamilton replied that in wartime Privy Councillors did not count and that all became soldiers and left the matter at this. On the same day he telegraphed over to de Lisle stating that Granard’s letters were to be censored like everyone else’s. This was passed on from Corps Headquarters for Granard to see. He inatiled it and then

[Page 176]
sent it back. Hamilton hates Granard like poison because he knows that nothing can stop his corresponding directly with the King and in telling him the truth. Granard sent in his next letter and received a note back from Ellison the Quartermaster General saying that he himself had sent it off. This shows how G.H.Q love one another. Never in fact was an army in a more deplorable state of moral disintegeration. I then saw General Mahon and told him I was glad to see him back. He then started complaining bitterly of the manner in which he had been treated and how even no his division was broken up one Brigade being kept at Anzac. He said that both Hamilton and Braithwaite ought to go and that only that would restore confidence in the army. This 10th Division lothe and detest G.H.Q.

They were expecting a visit from Sir Ian and his Staff, at four o'clock. Avout this time a few shells came over Lala Baba so all the Staff kepy saying 'Now none of that gang will turn up'. As a matter of fact they did when the shelling had ceased. The meeting was not cordial for they get no change out of old Mahon. Most of his Staff instead of going out to meet the Commander in Chief stayed in their dugouts. They saw Brooks and myself up there and this made them still more angry. The visit was very short and then G.H.Q cleared off to Suvla to dinner to everyone's relief. Mahon said when they had gone 'He told me that in a very few days we should hear some very good news.  I said what will that news be do you think. Mahon replied. I know no more than you but the only good news would be that he has been relieved of his command' I stayed for tea at Headquarters and met Powiscourt Headtfort and Tullarbidine who has just

[Page 177]
arrived with his Brigade of the Scottish Horse. They lost 38 killed and wounded landing on G beach from Shell fire. On single shell killed 113 Mules a few days ago. This makes the prospects for the winter look well. Afterwards Brooks and I took some excellent Cinemetograph Pictures of various scenes. I do hope they will come out well. That evening I dined with two Naval Officers on A Beach and had atalk with Unwin who has got his V.C. I am glad to say. He was furious in his denunciations of the chronic mismanagement all round. His hatred of Hamilton and Braithwaite is only excelled by Granard’s. They are going to shift the beach down to the point where I have my camp as they say they will be invisible to the enemy and less under the fire of his guns. But on returning there I found a big shell had burst right on this point knocking out three men. As usual there are the wildest rumours flying around the latest being that the Fleet is going to make another effort to force the Dardanelles.

Saturday September 4th.
I sailed at 9-30 for Kephalos. The A.P.M came and saw me and said he would assign me a new sight for my camp. Found Nevinson and Lawrence had returned. In the evening went bathing and met Admiral de Roebeck and Roger Keyes looking like nothing human and they certainly did not appear as if they intended to force the Dardanelles or anything else for that matter.    
Sunday September 5th
At Imbros. Worked a bit dined on board the Raglan. No news except that the Germans seem to be doing just what they like with the unfortunate [Russians]

[Page 178]
September 6th
At Imbros. Nevinson who went to G.H.Q yesterday states that Colonel Ward has been relieved of his Post as head of the Intellegence and that Tyrrell whom I knew at Constantinople has been chosen in his stead.  Ward I always found a very agreable man but it is said he was inclined to be lazy and he never knew anything about the Near East. The manner in which these generals eat one another up is astonishing. Ward although stellenboshed has been promoted to the rank of Brigadier and is off home to have the command of a Brigade of Artillery

September 7th
I was to have gone to Anzac to take conemetograph pictures but did not do so as the weather has been so bad. Went for a ride with Hawker and de Crespigny in afternoon. Then had tea with Hawker and met Col. Tyrrell whom I had previously known when Military attache in Constantinople. He has taken Ward's place as Chief of the Intellegence. He opened up the conversation by saying the campaign had been wrongly conducted from the start. There are but few who will dispute this assertion. While we were still at tea Ward came in. He had called to say good bye. I dined on t No 32 with de Crespigny.

September 8th
Murdoch the Australian sailed to day. I gave him an important letter of introduction to Mr Asquith. He promised to get it through. I once again had to postpone my trip to Anzac. It has been blowing a howling gale from the north for the last three days and the weather has suddenly turned much colder. This does not make the future of the campaign

[Page 179]
look any brighter. In the evening I received a signal to say Sir Ian wished to see me on the following day and that our leave to go to Mythelene had been granted.

September 9th
Had to again postpone my trip to Anzac but sent off Brook and my servant Macnabee with the machine. On arriving at G.H.Q. I saw Sir Ian who said the War Office had telegraphed out forbidding anyone but the Official Photographer to take pictures. He said he considered this absurd and told me I might go on taking them. This was extremely nice of him. In fact he went out of his way to be agreable. I am afraid poor man his position is so precarious that he is anxious to seize any means in his power of making friends. I asked him about the future of the campaign but he was very guarded in his reply saying ‘There are events in the air but I do not know if I am right in telling you as mucheven as this’ Personally I do not think he himself knows what the decision of the Cabinet will be. They have sent Dawny home to explain it but a more unfitting choice could hardly have been made. Dawny is ignorant and stupid.

September 10th
I went on board the Victory and collected by goods having arranged for a dinner party this evening. I do not know if my guests will be able to get off their ships as the weather is so bad. For four days it has blown a gale from the north and this harbor at Kephalos is worse than useless under such conditions. Ross tuened up from Anzac looking very ill. He says the conditions of life there are horrible at the present time. All Godley’s Staff are ill. Nevison and Lawrence also

[Page 180]
returned from Suvla Bay but they have nothing to report. All is quiet at the front. Only Maxwell turned up for dinner as the others could not leave their ships.

September 11th
Anotherbhowling gale this morning with very cold weather for this time of year. Was feeling very seedy fever and stomach trouble and had to stay in bed all day. Very depressed and wish to go home. In fact I have writ en applying for a month's leave.  Yesterday I went on board the Triad and saw de Roebeck and Commodore Keyes, I had a talk with them about the submarine exploits but they refuse to allow anything to be published at the present time. I believe there is something in the air. Some new move but could not wheedle it out of them.

Perhaps they are going to make another effort to force the Dardanelles with the Fleet, This is however rather unlikely on the face of it. Then there are steange rumours about the Japanese. Some say they are coming to the Dardanelles and others that they are hastening from VIadivostock and Dalny along the Manchurian railroad to assist Russia on the Polish frontire. What can one believe in these strange times. Nothing is to remarkable to turn out to be the truth.

Sunday September 12th
Still ill in bed and feeling rotten. Weather still bad and the Victory has been unable to sail for Mythelene so we are going to take passage by her to-morrow Monday at seven am. We were told at Headquarters that we could safely go away for a few days.

September 13th
Sailed in Victory at seven am. Weather became beautifully calm and

[Page 181]
passage was delightful. We sailed quite close to the coast of Asia passing Rabbitb Island and Tenedos. Some of out Monitors were behind the island and bombarded the coast of Asia from time to time. The Turks as a reprisial dropped a shell close to Tenedos. We arrived at
Mytelene at seven pm. It is a most beautiful island. There are said to be seventy thousand Greek refugees from Asia minor there. From all accounts there have been horrible doings in Asia ever since war broke out and the Turks have been killing the Armenians and Greeks very freely. We went to stay at the Grande Bretagne Hotel. A vile spot where I could get no sleep being bitten by strange animals all night.

September I4th
At Mytelene. Passed the morning looking round. In afternoon drove out with Lawrebce and Ross to some baths kept by a German where we had a bath. They are thick iron coloyred water flowing from the Hills and very salty but reported to be very good for rhemutasism.

September I5y
At Mytelene. Still feeling ill. Have seen all the latest papers from England containing my cables. They have been made a great show of. It would seem as if our lack of success is beginning to cause some sensation at home. The appaling lists of casualties is all they hear and never of a victory which is what everyone wants. Went for a walk up the hills by the town and had a splendid view of the island. It is extremely beautiful. But the women are all ugly. Went to the Turkish baths in the afternoon. Captain Grant of the Canopus which ship has beennhere since June and the Consul Heskett Smith dined withnus.

[Page 182]
September 16th to 27th.
During these days I remained at Mythene with Malcolm Ross after the others had returned to Kephalos. I was ill most of the time with stomach trouble and did not seem to get any better. There was great enthusiasm amongst the Greek officers for a short time at the rumours that Greece intended to come into the war. Wevw were cheered in the local restaurants and the town was en fete. But this mood changed into something like depression when the officers and men received orders to prepare to depart. Then the recolllection of the former Balkan wars came back to them and they were none to happy. We must face the facts. The Greeks are not a fighting race and would give all they possess to to keep out of the struggle. As a fighting asser there army is of small value.

During the time I was in Mythelene my soul amusement was found in the society of a little lady a Mrs Quincy Adams who was formerly a Miss Whittall of Smyrna. She then married an American Naval Officer. She was both gay and amusing and not having spoken to a lady for three months her society was extremely agreeable. I was obliged to prolong my visit owing to the inability of the Victory to obtain stores for her return voyage to Keplalos but this did not particularly matter as there was little chance of anything happenying on the Peninsular. However on Monday September 26th a small Greek Steamre came into port and we took passage on board her. The following morning we reached Tenedos and after lunching there took the afternoon Trawler for for Kephalos. I found that nothing had happened in my absence save a muting [mutiny?] amongst the servants who had drunk everything left in the camp. The corporal had wisely cleared off before

[Page 183]
my return in order not to face the Music.  I had to sack my Australian Servant Macnabee. In fact we had a thorough reorganisation of the whole camp. Lawrence's Irish servant had also succeeded in drinking himself into hospital

Tuesday September 28th
This morning I went over to G.H.Q. to see Major Delme Radcliffe. On arriving I had a long talk with Colonel Tyrrell about things in general chiefly in refernce to the sending of dispatches and the censorship. He said he had much more important things to attend to than censoring War Correspondents cables and they were only a secondary matter with him. I took exception to this and pointed out we were attached to the army offically and had a right to be properly treated. He then became more reasonable. He then went out of the tent and came back a little later to say'. I had better see the Chief of the Staff Braithwaite.

I went into his tent. There were present himself his idiotic son Colonel Tyrrell and I believe another officer. He asked me to sit down and then said  ‘When I had a talk with you in June last you promised not to critisise the leaders of the army or to break the regulations againb’.  I replied 'That I had consented to certain things and as far as I knew I had kept my agreement.  He then said on May 8th you sent out an uncensored letter by Murdock who was leaving addressed to the Prime Minister. I replied that I had done so and considered I had a right to write to the Prime Minister direct.  He replied. ‘You know you had not. That letter has got Murdoch into serious trouble’.  I replied. ‘How did you find out I had sent the letter’ He

[Page 184]
would give me no answer to this but said it had been seized off him on his arrival at Marseilles’ I then asked if the Prime Minister had ever received it ‘This seemed to take him by surprise and after hesitating for a moment he said. ‘I do not know’ I saw from a few quesyions I put that he had no conception of the contents of the letter and in fact if it had been seized off Murdoch at Marseilles there would have been no time for it to have come back .  He then said ‘As you have again broken the rules of the censorship you will no longer be allowed to stay with the army and must sever your connection with it at once and return home.  I suppose he imagined this would be a knock out blow to me and he was greatly taken back when I jumped up and said 'I am delighted May I return at once I have long been anxious to be relieved of my post and have in fact applied to the N.P.A to be allowed to return’

After a few more words it was agreed that I should leave as soon as possible as soon in fact as I could conveniently get ready. For the first time for days I felt in high spirits.  Colonel Tyrrell expressed his regret.  I said Good Bye to a few officers and then left G.H.Q for ever without a single regret.  Never have I seen such a collextion of mediocre minds chronic muddlers and such an atmosphere of pettey jealousies and intrigue. I arrived back at my camp to communicate the news to the others. All were genuinely upset at my departure. Poor devils. They will have a poor time now that I have gone. At least I have fought for their rights and but for me they would have been completely crushed beneath the iron heel.  Nevinsonnat once expressed his intention of returning with me provided he could obtain the necessary leave.  I have a certain

[Page 185]
feeling that the Staff themsrlves will not survive me long.  Directly the real truth is known at home they are bound to go.

September 29th and 30th.  Busy making preperations for my departure.  Winding up my affairs. Nevinson went to G.H.Q and saw Hamilton who expressed regret at my departure but said he had no alternative as he was merely acting under instructions from the War Office. This I learnt later was untrue and that he acted on his own responsibility.

Friday October 1st.
This day I was busy wishing farewell to various friends and seized the opportunity to go on board the Triad to say Good Bye to Admiral de Robeck and Commodore Keyes. I only saw the former for a minute but I had a long talk with the latter. He was infuriated againstn Hamilton and the Staff geneeally because of the rumours that had been circulating round for some time that the Navy was responsible for shelling the Gourkas off the crest of Chunuk Bair after they had gained that heighth. This the Navy strenously denies. It is possible that a few shells did fall amongst the infantry an incident common to almost every action which cannot be avoided in the confusion of a long drawn out struggle. But Hamilton and the Staff have been endevouring to place the entire responsibility for the dailure on the navy. As a matter of sober fac t it would have been impossible for the Troops to hold on to the crest of Chunuk Bair exhausted as they were from three days continous fighting and having suffered enormous losses. It only needed a weak counter attack to push them off the crest and that is what exactly what happened. The Admiral having heard of what Hamilton was doing determined to nail his

[Page 186]
words knowing what a slippery customer he had to deal with but for some time could only obtain vague andbunsatisfactory evidence. However the occasion arose on the visit of some Russian Officers who were taken all round the various Gallipoli positions. Two Naval officers were attached to them and in their presence Hamilton so far forgot himself as to assert to his visitors that it was only the untimely intervention of the ship’s guns that brought about the disaster. His words were promptly reported to the Admiral who immediately wrote a letter asking for a specific statement on the subject of these allegations or else a denial in toto. The correspondence was shown me by Roger Keyes with de Robeck’s permission. The Admiral's letter was firm and courty and Hamilton's reply a miserable shuffling denial that he had ever used the words complained of and that it was not the truth that the occupation of Chunuk Bair had been brought to naught through the fault of the ships.

Keyes then asked me if I had ever heard the Staff use words to this effect. I at once replied that they had never ceased to rub it in to me that the Navy had shelled the Gourkas off and that this cause alone prevented the retention of Chunuk Bair. I was subsecquently able to produce extracts from Nevinson’s diary and my own showing that Hamilton had himself in an interview made use of these words but that also it was I expressly stated in the offical account of these operations issued to us by the General Staff. All this information I supplied to Keyes in a letter.

Saturday October 2nd.
This day I bade farewell to Imbros forever. I went on board the Cornwallis to say Good Bye to Captain

[Page 187]
Davidson and then took the afternoon trawler for Mudros Bay accompanied by Nevinson who had also obtained leave to return home and as far as Mudros by Malcolm Ross.  On arriving at 5pm we went on board the Arrigon to spend the night and to await a vessel to take us to Malta. I found Captain Fitzmaurice late of the Triumph in charge of the Arrigon and he received me in a most friendly manner. There were few ships going direct to Malta at this time and it seemed more than likely we would have to go to Alexandria and from there tranship to Malta which would have meant endless delays. However on the following morning I Iwarnt that the crusier Bacchante Captain Boyle was sailing direct on the following day and asked for permission to sail in her. This was I granted by Commodore Keyes who had come down in the Triad and both Nevinson and myself repaired on board.

October 3rd
Sailed at 5pm for Malta leaving Mudros Bay for the last time. The Mauretania had just come in with seven thousand troops on board. On hervway when passing the most dangerous part of the route off the network of islands that lie off Crete she came upon some wreckage of a ship that had recently been submarined. A little later two boats were encountered with survivors on board. Her Captain then stopped his ship for twenty minutes to pick them up. He thus jepordised the lives of seven thousand officers and men by presenting his huge v vessel as a sitting motionless target to the enemy’s submarines. When Admiral de Robeck heard of this he was almost speechless and I am told the Captain had to endure a very bad Mauvais quart d’heure.However all well that ends well

[Page 188]
well that ends well and the enemy missed their great chance of destroying an entire Division at the cost of a few houndred pounds. It was with feelings of regret inspite of my desire to return home that I gazed on Mudros Bay and its forest of shipping for the last time. How many trajic events have occured since I first entered its waters in the first days of April of this year. Our journey down the Mediterranean was univentful except for the excitement of dodging the enemy’s submarines which have been very active of late. However by ziz zazing the whole way we got through the danger zone withoit mishap and reached Malta I safely on Wednesday October 6th at seven am

Octoober 7th.
We were fortunate enough to find a large Messagerie /Maririne boat the Lotus sailing the very next day for Marseilles so I after collecting the few belongs I had left in Malta we boarded her on October 7th for Marseiles. I found Francis Maclaren on board also homeward bound and was thus able to pass the time playing bridge. Our voyage was altogther univentful and we reached Marseilles on Saturday afternoon October 10th in time to catch the night express for Paris.

October 10th
Reached Paris at 9am an hour late but with great difficulty managed to catch the 10am boat train for Boulogne. It was indeed pleasant to find oneself once again on English soil after the trials dan ers worries and fatigues of the campaign. Reached London at 9pm and was delighted to find my charming Gina waiting to receive me on the platform. I drove to the Carlton Hotel and managed to smuggle in

[Page 189]
my precious cinemetograph films. Having driven Gina home I met Fenton and sat discussing matters for a great campaign with him long into the early hours of the morning.

October 11th
The first matter ton be arranged was that of the Lecturing Tour. Here Fenton had a proposition namely rhat I should accept a certain sum per lecture and that he should get this offer taken up by a powerful Syndicate who would thus bare all the risk whilst we took the fee out of which he was to receive a commission. We fixed the price at £I00 per lecture a large sum but still warranted by the extreme state of public interest in everything to do with the Dardanelles. The Syndicate consisted of Jack White who manages Sir Joseph Beecham’s affairs and two brothers of the name of Berry who are the Proprietors of the Sunday Times. I saw them today and we had a preliminary discussion. I also saw Fortescue who has returned from Constantinople and who is sailing shortly for America .He told me many interesting things about his stay with the Turks.

October I2th
Very busy, all day seeing people and arranging varoous matters. It seems that he lecturing business is almost fixed up and also the Cinemetograph Films deal if only we can obtain the permission of the War Office to their exhibition.

October I3th
This morning I had my first interview since my return with Harry Lawson. He was friendly but obviously ather annoyed at the abrupt

[Page 190]
manner in which my connection with the army had come to an end.  He showed me a letter from Ian Hmailton full of a conglomeration of most extraordinary lies which he had written in his defence for dismissing me from the aemy.  I pointed out in detail its numerous errors and misstatements.  Ethel Levy and West lunched with me afterbwhich I attended a meeting of the Newspaper Proprietors Association and gave them a full explanation of my reasons for acting as I did.  I think I left them fairly I satisfied.  We talked over the matter of the letter to the Prime Minister. It is extremely difficult to get to the bottom of the business or to find out whether the Prime Minister ever received it or not. Harry Lawson was deputed to wait on Asquith and find out exactly what had happened.

In the afternoon I saw Murdoch who gave me a full account of how he had been stopped at Marseilles and the letter taken off him by an officer backed by a large escort of gendarmes and Troops.  He had no chance of getting rid of it but insisted upon a receipt. It appears the authorites had no idea at the time that it was a private letter addressed to the Prime Minister but thought it a communication addressed to Harry Lawson. Had they known it was to the Prime Minister they would probably have left it severely alone but having set out to accomplish a definite purpose they could not stop half way. Murdoch subsecquently saw the Prime Minister who told him I had a perfect right to communicate with him direct without the intervention of the Military Authorities. On hearing that the War Office had obtained possession of the letter he immediately sent it. At least that is his version of the mysterious affair.  At 11pm I again saw

[Page 191]
I again saw Harry Lawson who meanwhile had seen the Prime Minister. The latter told him he had never seen the letter so the whole affair becomes yet more mysterious and involved. He had however received a similar letter from Hamilton abusing me and full of the same lies contained in the one written to Harry Lawson. I thereupon decided to send Harry Lawson a copy of it which he was to forward on to the Prime Minister.

October I4th.
This was a very busy and trying day for me. In the first place my health gets no better and I am very depressed and unable to get through the work that I should. I have little or no appetite and I am unable to sleep. This morning I had breakfast with Lord Charles Beresford who wishes some information on the real position in Gallipoli as he intends to make a speech in the House. I gave him all the sound advice I could but he seems incapable of grasping the essential points in a coherent form and I am afraid his mind is going. He is not stupid but cannot grasp the essentials from the unessetials.

His ideas are sound enough but when he comes to express them in public he generally makes a fool of himself. He is animated by a positive detestation of Winston and F.E. Smith whom he described as ‘the two greatest bounders he had ever known’ I had to hurry off to me at the Grand Hotel at 11-30 to sign the agreement over the Lecturing Tour. This was duly done to the accompanyment of a bottle of Champagne. They have to give twenty five lectures at £100 pre lecture and then have the option of taking up seventy five more on

[Page 192]
the same terms. This looks like being goof business. At twelve thirty I had an appointment to meed Lord Northcliffe whom I had never met before at the Times Office.  This had been arranged by Murdock who hasv apparently become a great friend of the Napoleon of the Press.  I had heard so many divergent comments on Northcliffe that I was particulary anxious to meet him in the flesh. I found him sitting in his small study smoking a huge cigar. He is just fifty years of age and is not unlike the great Napoleon in build and in the shape of his head. His hair is chestnut but his skin is rather flabby and he looks unhealthy like one who has led a sedentary life. This I believe was the case up yo some years ago but now he is a great golf player a pastime which it is said delights him more than anything else these days.

He received me in the most friendly manner making many favourable comments on my work at the Dardanelles. He examined me at great length as to the true position and I did not hesitate to tell him that in my opinion only one course was open to us namely to remove our forces at Anxac and Suvla Bay. I said I believed this operation could be carried out with but small loss and that if it was thought wise and necessary the Turks might be squared.  He thoroughly agreed and said this was his policy and he intended to press it on the Government for all he was worth namely an immediate withdrawl from the Dardanelles. I told him I thought there might be difficulty in taking the troops off the Cape Helles End. We then discussed the Serbian position.  1 told him the Expedition was abolsutely doomed to failure and that it was fare too late to attempt to save Serbia.  That country would be completely

[Page 193]
overrun long before the Allies could hope to cpncentrate a sufficient force with sufficient transport to strike a side blow against Bulgaria. I told him that all these expeditions in the East were utterly futile and only led to a dangerous dispersion of our forces which was playing into the hands of the Germans who wished to get us deeply involved with their Balkan Allies. He seemed deeply impressed with the arguments I brought forward and said he agreed with them entirely. I stayed to lunch with him Leo Maxse and the Editor Geoffry Robinson. We had many very interesting discussions.

On leaving Northcliffe said ‘Young man there is a great responsibility on your shpulders only you are in a position to bring home to the Government and the country the true sit state of affairs in the Near East’ Maxse then took me off to the House of Commons to try and find Carson. We saw him at three at his house. He was obviously very worried over the whole situation. He has not attended the last three Cabinet Councils his reason being that they begin and end in useless discussions and that no decision is ever arrived at. I found it difficult to get his real view on the situation. He disapproves of all side expeditions and considers the Dardanelles Force ought to be withdrawn but on the other hand he maintains that our honour is pledged to t go to the assistance of the Serbians whether it is too late or not. He wishes to resig but does not like to at this stage. In fact I left him very confused as to what his real views are on anything. One thing is certain. He is animated by just as keen a I hatred as ever of his political opponents and he is by no means com-

[Page 194]
[com]fortable finding himself sitting on the same side with them. In the evening I dined at the Ritz with Freddy Guest who wanted to hear all I had to say with the purpose as I knew well of passing it all on to Winston.  He particularly wished me to lunch with Winston the next day and I said I would although I had promised the date to Lady Paget.

October I5th.
One of the conditions of my agreement with the Sunday Times was that I should write them three articles on the Situation in the Near East. This morning they sent round a representative to interview me. I determined to give them the strongest interview possible stating the true facts to the public. This I did and then went off to lunch with his mother's house. I found his mother his wife Jack wife Lady Goonie and Marsh his Secretary.  Winston was late. On arriving he greeted me in a friendly manner and appears to be much happier than when I last saw him.

After lunch we had a long talk and Freddy Guest who had com e in was also present.  I found Winston to my disgust has learnt but little wisdom from his experiences and had apparently taken but little to heart the lessons I had endevoured to tell him when I was last over here. I found him still full of his absurd ideas on the whole Expedition and still persisting in his statement that the Fleet alone might have forced the Narrows had it but been allowed to make another effort. He told me the Cabinet was still undecided as to what to do whether to wothdraw or to go on. He said 'I myself would be in favour of withdrawal if I could be convinced the expedition really stands no chance of ever succeeding’ I reiterated all the facts once again and told him

[Page 195]
what serious disasters might follow if we kept the troops in these impossible and exposed positions during the winter.  We also discussed the Salonika Expedition and I repeated stronger than ever what I had told Lord Northcliffe just previously and what I have repeated to everyone in authority since I have been back.  He then put the following concrete question to me.  If you were suddenly appointed Commander in Chief what force would you regard as a minimum to have any hope of taking Constantinople? I told him there were so many factors which I must be taken into consideration notably the attitude of the Greeks but supposing even Greece and Roumania declared in our favour I should I require the existing force on the peninsula one houndred thousand men landed in Asia Minor and Five houndred thousand constantjly kept up to full steength in Macedonia and Thrace.  These figures seemed to stagger him.  

I left this interview with a deep impression on my mind namely that Winston knows nothing of modern warfare that he jumps at the most absurdly erroneous conclusions and that he suffers from extraordinary illusions. In fact I now regard him as a grave danger to the country He told me that Ian Hamilton and His Chief of Staff had both been recalled. This is at least a step in the right direction. It saves me agitating any further on this score. I was determined to go on making exposures of their deceitfulness and incompetency until matters had reached a crisis. In fact the news has now been announced in the papers that Sir Ian has been recalled in order to make a report and that Sir Charles Munro has been sent out to report to the Cabinet on the whole situation

[Page 196]
There is no question that the country is getting more and more agitated at the present time and disatisfied with the Government. Everybody knows that something is wrong, and it does not seem clear to anybody what the proper remedy is, and one is met everywhere with the stock reply "Well if you turn the present lot out, who would you put in their place?’’ After my long talk with Winston I became more determined than ever to make a complete disloosure of the whole situation in the near East to risk the censorship because I felt absolutely certain in my own mind that the Government would take no stepwhatsoever against you. Therefore this afternoon Berry sent a man around from the "Sunday Times" to interview me. I gave him the strongest possible statements and then wrote to Berry that he could only go in on conditions that it was not first submitted to the censor. To his he consented. Having finished this I cleared off down to the country with Fenton.

Saturday October l6th
At Temple. Played golf all day with Kerr, Seymore and Fenton.

Sunday October 17th
This morning the interview appeared in the "Sunday Times" in full. It caused a tremendous sensation. The first person to ring me up was Lord Northcliffe to ask permission to reproduce part of it in The Times" and "Daily Mail". To this I consented. Kerr Seymore thinks that both the Editor and myself will be locked up, but I think otherwise. We returned to London in time for dinner and dined with Joe Coyne, who had also been down to Temple at Ciro. Then we went on to a party given by Gina at her house. This was a very great success and it did not break up

[Page 197]
break up until nearly 4 a.m.

Monday October 18th to Thursday October 21st.
A great number of the papers quote my remarks in the "Sunday Times" and Murdoch, rang me up to say he had cabled it in full to Australia. For the next four days Fenton and I were kept extremely busy fixing up the lecturing tour and also various other matters. It is now arranged that I shall lecture under the management of the Berrys in England, and that they should also fix up the Australian Tour. Ever since my return I have been very ill and cannot get over the stomach trouble I contracted in GallipoliI

Friday October 22nd
It was not until this morning that Fenton and myself were able to leave for Temple, thoroughly worn out, exhausted and in a bad humour generally. Kerr Seymore also came down, and it poured with rain all day9 which, made matters worse.

Saturday October 23rd
At Temple. I get no better in my prospects for the lecturing look very bad.

Sunday October 24th
Gina and Teddy Gerrid came down and attempted to play golf, but the weather was extremely bad. They stayed the night and we played cards, I winning £100 at chemin de fer off Teddy, but I need hardly add I never got a sixpence.

Monday October 25th
We all returned to London this morning, and I went round at once to see Bruce Porter to consult him about my state as I get no better. Unfortunately I found he had gone to Italy on war work, and therefore had to be content with his partner, who pronounced me to be in a bad way, and totally unfit to give a lecture. He prescribed a diet and other remedies and said he would try and keep me

[Page 198]
alive until Wednesday evening the day fixed for my opening at the Queen’s Hall.

Tuesday October 26th
I stayed in bed all day, feeling something awful. The Doctor thinks I am suffering from some liver trouble and made me go through a Turkish bath, to try and get better.

Wednesday October 27th
To day being the day of the lecture, of course I felt worse than ever, and in fact could hardly stand up. The Doctor came aroundin the afternoon and spent some time with me and then announced it was utterly impossible for me to lecture that evening. I got into communication with Fenton, who said it would be impossible to call it off, as every seat in the hall was sold and they had turned away thousands. At 6 p.m. feeling that only desperate remedies would avail I told Simpson the Doctor, to go to the devil and got up and dressed.

I had been allowed nothing to eat for two days and naturally was feeling very weak, so I walked around to the Carlton Grill Room, and ordered a boiled sole Marie Lohr then came in to have some dinner before the evening performance and I told her of my sad state, and how I had to speak that evening. She said the only thing for you to do is to drink half a bottle of champagne, which willprobably carry you through the evening, but make you worse tomorrow, which after all wont matter. So I followed her advice, drank the half bottle, and then she said "Now have anold brandy, and you willprobably feel all right". I certainly felt a bit better, but I could not get my head clear and had absolutely no ideas in it. I then struggled back to my flat, dressed and drove to the Queen’s Hall. I found an immense crowd trying to get in and being turned away, but everything seemed

[Page 199]
to be in a kind of haze, and I think only my sub-conscious mind was working. I found the Berrys, White and Fenton in a terrible state of anxiety, and I told them frankly that I would. probably break down in the middle of the show. Fenton then gave me a glass of port for my throat, which was also very bad, and had another huge tumbler placed on the platform. I was then half pushed on to the stage, really not knowing what exactly was happening. I remember seeing an immense seaof faces, for the place holds three or four thousand, but I could not recognise any individuals.

Fortunately for me I knew my subject absolutely, and my memory did not fail me, so I got through all right for the first hour and a half and then my voice suddenly went and I became so tired that I didn’t think I would ever finish. Then I remembered Fenton’s tumbler of port, and I drank this right off, which put new life into me, and I was subsequently told that I finished in great style, in fact much better than I had started. In fact I spoke for 2 hours and 20 minutes, and the promoters were tremendously pleased, but I can't say I was myself, as I knew I could have done much better. However we had the finest audience and took more money than has ever been taken in the history of theQueen’s Hall.  Afterwards I went around to the Berkeley Hotel and had supper with Princess Hatzfeldt, who had got up a large party for me, but I was too ill to stay more than a few minutes. Thus ended this horrible ordeal and I would not go through it again in that state for a thousand pounds.

Thursday October 28th
I was no better today, and had to stay in bed.

Friday October 29th
I had to stay inLondon as I had promised to dine with Lord Charles Beresford to give him the information he required on the

[Page 200]
Dardanelles for the great debate which is to take place on Monday next. He had alarge party and the old man was extremely amusing on the subject of the Government and on Sir Ian Hamilton, whom he cordially detests. He said "I’ve known that rotter for years. How the devil can you expect a man to be a leader of men, when he spent half his life sitting in ahot bath writing odes to elderly females." In fact there is no limit to which Beresford wont go in denouncing Hamilton. The latter returned last week with Braithewait his Chief ofStaff, and met with a very cold reception from the public. In fact nobody takes any notice of him, and he is being given the cold shoulder all around. Nevertheless he goes about in public and in private maintaining that he could have got through to Constantinople had they sent him a few more troops, but of course this is all damn nonsense. On the morning of his arrival, he had a long interview at the War office with Kitchener.

On leaving he said "Am I to consider myself a disgraced man" and Kitchener replied "No, we recognise the difficulty you were under and you can hold your head as high as you ever held it". No one knows whether this was meant for irony or not, but of course Kitchener was responsible for Hamilton’s appointment, and for keeping him in command so long, and that therefore he must bare a large burden of the responsibility for the failure of the Expedition. General Joffre has been over this week and also met Hamilton at luncheon at theFrench Embassy. Hamilton had previously announced that it would be impossible to remove a single man from the Peninsular without incurring terrible disasters. This had beencommunicated to Joffre. On meeting Joffre Hamilton at once broke into the most fulsome compliments on theFrench General, who suddenly cut him short by saying "How many men could you spare from

[Page 201]
Gallipoli at once for Salonica. Hamilton thought for a moment and then replied "Oh, one Division, say 20,000." Joffre then answered "But General, you have already announced that not a man could be taken off without incurring a grave disaster".  He then turned his back on Hamilton. As a matter of fact, Joffre’s visit is in connection with the Salonica Expedition. I denounced this both in the "Sunday Times" and in my lecture at the Queen’s Hall asbeing utterly useless, because it had been undertaken too late, and that the Serbians would be driven out of the country before we could ever strike, with a sufficient force to render them any practical assistance. This has caused a fierce fight in the Press and there are grave internal disensions in the Cabinet. Carson has atlength resigned, after refusing to take part inthe last three or four Cabinet Councils. It is understood that he will make a statement after the Prime Minister’s on Monday. After dinner I went down by train to Temple but there was such a dense fog that I arrived two hours late, and did not get in until 2 a.m. I was no sooner in bed than I was seized with horrible sickness, and was sick all through the night, so that I am now more than ever convinced that there is something radically wrong with me.

Saturday October 30th
Kerr Seymore and Fenton came down but it poured all day.

Sunday October 31st
Another terrible day. We motored over to Redding and lunched with Harry Rodgers. He was just the same as ever, and has rejoined some regiment which seems to have done him good. He told me he was having great trouble with Loughbourgh, who is in Egypt and who will continue to spend unlimited sums of money. He is hoping that his marriage with the Australian girl will put matters

[Page 202]
right.  Personally I do not believe the wedding will ever take place, because her parents think Loughbourgh has money which he certainly wont have until Harry’s death, and Loughbourgh on the other hand thinks she will have money, but as a matter of fact she has only got a very little.

[The "Australian girl" was Sheila Chisholm, who married Lord Loughborough]
Monday November 1st.
Motored up to London and attended the House of Commons to listen to the Prime Minister’s statement. The House was absolutely packed, and there was a very great deal of excitement The Prime Minister has been ill for the last ten days and the habit hehas whenever he is faced with awkward questions he is unable to answer. He hasbeen bitterly attacked by the Conservative Press and even his own party seem disatisfied withhim, but he has weathered so many storms that he will probably pull through this one as well. The "Morning Post" even went so far as to: accuse him of drinking too much.

This is rather unkind. It is well known that he does drink, but it does not do him the least bite of harm and I don’t think he could live and get through the work he does if he departed from his old habits. In fact what did him more good in the eyes of the country than anything, was his bold statement that he wasn’t going to change his habits for this or any other war, when the King and Lord Kitchener came out with the foolish announcement that they were only going to drink water until the Germans were defeated. This abstinence has certainly not improved Kitchener’s mind or his strategy, and most of the Cabinet declare he has gone to pieces. As for the King, it did not matter much one way or the other what he did, but the sole tangible result of his great resolution is his falling off his horse at the Great Review in Prance. Asquith as usual made an excellent Parliamentary speech, which quite bluffed his own side and the wretched gang, who now call them-

[Page 203]
[them]selves the Conservative Party. His speech contained more lies about the war to the square inch than any statement I have ever heard, but such is the ignorance and apathy of the Ho use at the present time that the majority of the falsehoods passed as the gospel truth withthe rank and file. I bitterly regretted not being in the House to pull his statement to pieces. He was followed by Carson, who got up and delivered the most scathing and most terrible denunciation of his late colleagues imaginable. He knew little of the facts of the war, and might have made his speech much stronger, which was extremely crude and ill-delivered, but every word breathed hatred, fanaticism, and fury. He did not hesitate to expose Cabinet secrets, and declared that he had resigned becuase the Cabinet could never make up its mind to anything.

Such a scene has never been witnessed in the House ofCommons before, and England is the only country in which such domestic quarrels could be ezposed in the middle of a life anddeath struggle, like the present. During his speech the whole Cabinet sat with bowed heads like a lot of criminals, being condemned to death. But I suppose that nothing will follow and that it willall end in mere words. I dined at the Ritz with the Agha Kahn, the Duchess of Sutherland and Mrs Astor. I had a very interesting talk with the Agha Kahn on the situation in the East. I do not think he fears there will be any general Mohamodan uprising in India, but he says the situation requires very careful handling. Afterwards we went on to see the wonderful film "The Birth of a Nation" at the Scala Theatre.

Tuesday November 2nd
I am worse than ever and simply do not know what to do.

Wednesday November 3rd
Played golf this morning with Fenton. On returning

[Page 204]
dressed for lunch I was horrified to see that my face and chest and arms had turned a bright orange colour, and that I looked more like a chinaman than a white man. I lucnhed with Fenton and my sister and both noticed my strange colour, and it was decided that we must consult a specialist that very afternoon. At 2.30 I went to the Colonial Office to see Bonar Law who had askd me to call. He told me that he had received a communication from the Australian Government informing him that I was going out there to lecture on the Dardanelles Expedition, and they were anxious to know what attitude I was going to take up, as they wereafraid I might do a great deal of harm if I criticised affairs too severely.

I replied that I was not going out for at least two or three months, and that there would be vast changes in events before then, and that in any case I should do my best to put the best construction on a bad case.  Bonar Law then said ‘’Perhaps I can arrange to settle your quarrels with the War Office, so as to enable you to go to the Western Front again, instead of your going to Australia. I said that at the present time I was too ill to take the field and that in any case I had arranged to give 25 lectures in England and I therefore suggested that the whole matter should stand over until I knew for certain when I was going to Australia.

I then then had a very interesting conversation on the whole situation with Bonar Law, who was very frank. I warned him that there was only one course, namely to withdraw the troops without undue delay.  Otherwise he and the Cabinet would be incurring the gravest responsibility. I told him that itwas utterly impossible to ever move from our present positions, no matter what reinforcements were sent, and that the whole situation was definitely lost beyond hope of retrieving it, now that Bulgaria had come into the war.

[Page 205]
I pointed out to him that if the troops were kept in their present exposed position during the winter months that they would lose the entire equivalent of the force in sickness alone, also that they ran the risk of being pushed out of their positions at certain exposed points, because the heavy rains would wash away the trenches which would affect the Turks less than ourselves, because theirs are everywhere situated above ours. I also told him that now communications were opened up between Austria, through Belgrade and Nish to Sofia, that the Germans could send down big guns and keep the Turks supplied with ammunition and shell us out of the awful beaches. Bonar Law replied that he thoroughly agreed with my point of view and that he himself had long advocated the withdrawal, but that the Cabinet were still undecided and could not make up their minds, and that Lord Kitchener now on his way out, would sendin a report on which they would come to a decision.

I then told him that unless they came to a decision before it was too late, that I would come out with a statement to the country, and that Lord Northcliffe was prepared to do the same. That we would risk the consequences and would not stand any more shillyshallying, and thus lose thousands more lives during the winter months, and at the same time very likely suffer a grave disaster. I then went around with Fenton and saw Doctor Vernon Jones who pronounced that I was suffering from a severe attack of jaundice and enteritis and must go into a nursing home at once. This is a serious blow as it means the postponement of my lecturing tour, but he gave a certificate saying that I could not go onwith it, so there is an end to the matter. I struggled into Doctor Shields Home at 17 Park Lane this afternoon and wasat once put to bed. I met ray old friend Sir Alfred Fripp, who also has an interest in this home.

[Page 206]
Thursday November 4th to Friday November 19th
The whole of this period I spent in bed at 17 Park unable to do any work and bored to death, my only amusement being to read books. It had been arranged that I should start lecturing again on Monday November 22nd, and I determined to get well by this date. I was allowed to see visitors, but that was my sole respite. This home is the most extraordinary one of its kind ever started. Doctor Shields is an Australian, and one of the greatest surgeons of the day. In the height of the boom in the late eighties in Australia, there ws a man called Harold Fink known as "Shilling the Pound" Fink. He made a huge fortune, and then lost it all again, in the collapse, and went smash, paying one shilling in the pound. As a matter of fact he got away with most of the stuff, and left his widow extremely wealthy.

They had one son, who was consumptive, but Shields managed to keep him alive for several years. The widow to show her gratitude founded this home, which is known as the Harold Fink Private Hospital, and Shields has the complete control of it. Before the war it was extremly fashionable and very expensive. Ladies wishing to get away from their husbands and see other friends used to go there for a rest cure, and another frequent occupant was old Lady Limerick, when she was suffering from one of her periodical attacks of D.Ts. The place had in fact rather a bad reputation, for it was said that dances, theatrical entertainments used to be held in it, and that you could be cheerful and thoroughly amused right up to the moment of your death Since the war however, it has been turned into a military hospital for officers„ and the skill of Shields and Friff has raised its reputation high, so that it is the most eagerly sought after of all the private hospitals. There are 25 regular nurses, and allthe rest of the work

[Page 207]
is carried on by lady volunteers. For instance they look after the kitchen and you May have a Duchesses daughter come and sweep your room before breakfast. The atmosphere is indeed strange, and these assistant nurses, or volunteers, are aninfernal nuisance, because they invariably bring you the wrong diet, and give you somebody elses medicine Some of them are extremely beautiful and they certainly help to pass the time, with their idle prattle on all kinds of subjects. Amongst others there were Eleanor Glyn’s twodaughters.
Nothing of note accurred during my stay until the announcement of the retirement of Winston Churchill from the Cabinet on Saturday November 13th. I had long forseen that such a course was inevitable, as the country has lost all confidence in him over the mistakes made by the navy in the early part of the war, his foolish uterances in public speeches, and above all the great Dardanelles fiasco. Now had Winston just left for the front quietly he would have at least earned the respect of the public and a good deal of sympathy. But this is not in his nature, and he chose instead to make a dramatic exit by delivering a farewell addres in the House on Monday November 15th defending his actions, and severely criticising both Lord Fisher and Lord Kitchener.

On reading his speech on the following morning I found it a tissue of lies, half true and absurdities about the Dardanelles. Now I was determined to expose the next person who got up publicly and lied about Gallipoli. I had intended to write a reply to the Prime Minister’s speech, but my illness prevented me from doing any work at the time. But now feeling better I determined to haulWinston over the coals. I worked for the next two days and on Thursday November 18th sent in my letter to "The Times". On this day it was announcedmthat Winston had left for the front, amidst a chorus of acclamation on his patriotism, from the press.

Saturday November 20th

[Page 208]
Left Nursing Home and returned to my flat.

Sunday November 21st
Spent the day in London. Gina lunched and dined with me.

Monday November 22nd
Arrived in Leeds at 1.30 and lectured in the evening. A Godforsaken hole and a still more God-forsaken audience.

Tuesday November 23rd
At Birmingham. A fair audience, but local manager said he had not been given proper time to advertise

Wednesday November 24th
Left Birmingham at 8 a.m. Arrived London at 10 a.m. Lectured at Queen’s Hall in the afternoon. We had afairly good audience. Today my letter on Winston in four columns appeared in the "Times", and it made a great sensation, being reproduced in nearly all the other papers. Dined with Fenton and went to the Palace.

Thursday November 26th
Was to have lectured at Nottingham, but cancelled lecture and stayed in London.

Friday November 27th
Went to Manchester, an awful place, with thick fog and heavy rain, which kept people away. Ormrod, my chairman made a fool of himself and was finally counted out and hooted off the platform for speaking too long.

Saturday November 27th
Arrived Liverpool at 12 p.m. Saw the New Adelphi Hotel for the first time where I met my Uncle George, whom I had not seen for many years. He is once more back in the Navy, and commands a squadron of trawlers, but I don’t think he ever goes to sea himself. Lectured in the afternoon and caught 5.25 trainto London.

[Page 209]
Sunday November 29th

All day in London.  Gina lunched with me. We dined at Ciro’s and there I met F. E. Smith and Max Aitken The former was furious with me on account of theletter I had written about Winston. He accused me of every conceivable evil, motive in doing so, but I shut him up and told him he couldn’t speak to me like that, which ended him and he became very sulky. Caught train at 11 p.m. for Aberdeen.

Monday November 29th
Arrived Aberdeen 11 a.m. lectured at 8 p.m. Good audience.

Tuesday November 30th
Visited Military hospital where I met Colonel Johnstone who commanded the 11th Australian Infantry, who were disembarked from the "London" at the first landing. Also a very big raw boned Australian soldier, who wanted to know why, having come from the extreme South from "down under" that he should now be in the most northerly hospital and the coldest in the British Isles. I told him that the military authorities had probably made a mistake and imagined that Australia was near the North Pole instead of the South. Visited the submarines and went all over them, after ards taking the naval officers to lunch. Caught 3.30 trainto Dundee, arrived 5-30, and lectured in the evening to fair audience.

There is no getting away from the fact that lecturing in England and Scotland has been ruined by the Belloc and Fred James and others. They all tell the same tale. These people have nothing to say but will insist upon saying it, which naturally makes the audience suspicious of everyone who comes afterwards. Dundee has been especially hard hit because Belloc arrived an hour late having got drunk in Edinburgh and Fred James came on the platform in a worse state than usual, and in the middle of his graphic description of the sinking of the "Scharnorst" at the Falkland Island battle, he himself fell off the platform and sunk slowly amongst the stalls, from which position all the efforts of salvage parties

[Page 210]
failed to raise him.

Wednesday December 1st
Arrived Glasgow 2 p.m. lectured 8 p.m. to a very fine audience.
Thursday December 2nd
Arrived Edinburgh 11.20. Stayed at the Caledonian Hotel. Lectured at 8 p.m. and just caught the 9.30 train to Glasgow. Transferred to the 11.55 for Larne, and crossed the Irish Channel to Belfast.
Friday December 3rd
Arrived Belfast 5 a.m. Went to stay with the Chichesters at Ormiston. Lectured in a new building the Presbyterian Assembly rooms at 8 o’clock. A very fine hall and a fair audience.
Saturday December 4th
Spent day in Belfast. Found the position in Ireland highly unsatisfactory, the majority of the people longing for the war to end so that they can continue their old internal struggle over home rule. Recruiting is poor both in Ulster and in the Nationalist districts. Chichester tells me that the farmers are making so much money that they will not join the army. Left at 6 p.m. and crossed to England.

Sunday December 5th
Arrived in London at 10 a.m. Got through a good deal of work. Gina dined with me.
Lectured at Tunbridge Wells afternoon and evening. The place was in total darkness and it is utterly impossible to get about at night The reason for this absurd state of affairs is that some time ago a Zeppelin dropped a bomb by mistake (for not even a German would waste a bomb on Tunbridge Wells), which exploded in a garden, frightened on old lady’s tame canary, so that it has lost its voice and' can no longer sing.

[Page 211]
Thursday December 7th
Arrived at Eastbourne in the morning and lectured afternoon and evening at Devonshire Park. Stayed at the Grand and met Irene Vanburgh who is actingat the Devonshire Park theatre. She told me she had had a very poor audience and that my show would kill hers that day. I suggested that we should pool the proceeds. Left Eastbourne at 9.30 arrived at London at 11.12. Went to the Savoy Hotel to try and find Fenton, and found him at a smallprivateparty being given to Polare, who is returning to France. Although I was not dressed they insisted upon my staying and we had a very amusing evening, supper and some excellent singing afterwards. In addition to Polare, Teddy Gerard and the lady who has made such a success at the Ambassador were there. At a very late hour went to the Paddington Hotel and caught the 7.30 a.m. train for Torquay. Arrived there 2.15 a.m. Lectured at 3 p.m Caught the 4.25 train to London, arrived 8.45 and went out to supper with West and to a party.

Thursday December 9th
Went down to Southsea and lectured in the evening to a large and appreciative audience which would have beenbetter, but for the awful weather, for it simply poured the whole evening.
Friday December 10th
Left Southsea at 7 a.m. and arrived in Bath at 11.30. Lectured at 3 o'clock. At 5.30 left for Bristol and lectured there at 8 p.m. Both places good audiences.
Saturday December 11th
Arrived at Cheltenham at 11 a.m. Lectured in the afternoon to a very fine audience. Dined with Agg Gardener the member, in the evening at which he produced the most wonderful collection of old wine, which he always carries about with him, and lectured again in the evening to another good audience. At 11 30 pa hired a motor car and motored

[Page 212]
30 miles to Swindon in order that I might catch a train for London in the morning. I went sound asleep and did not wake up until I reached the hotel, a filthy little place at 1.30. I threw stones at the barmaid’s window until she came down and let me in in a very bad temper.

Sunday December 12 th
Left Swindon at 10.10 a.m. Arrived London at noon. Gina lunched and dined with me.
Monday December 13th
Went to Brighton with Gina, George, my brother, and Fenton. We all lunched at the Royal York Hotel with Harry Preston who gave us one of the finest repasts I have ever known. He is indeed a strange littel man. Lectured at the Town Hall afternoon and evening. Marshall Hall presided in the evening. Caught the 10 p.m. train to London.

Tuesday December 14th
Went to St Leonards to lecture in the afternoon. This is assuredly the most benighted seaside resort in the world. Lunched withpoor old Gilly Farquhar. Returned to Lodon and went with Fenton to see More at the Ambassadors.
Wednesday December 15th
Made the most extraordinary mistake and missed my train to Bournemouth by driving to Paddington instead of to Waterloo. However caught another and only arrived 20 minutes late for my lecture. Lectured again in the evening. Stayed the night at Bournville.
Thursday December l6th
Returned to London and spent a very busy day, as it hasnow been decided that I shall sail for Australia on the 23rd. Gina lunched with me.
FridayBDecember 17th
Busy day in London. Don’t know how I shall ever get off in time.

[Page 213]
Saturday December 18th
Saw Bonar Law at 2.30 and told him I was going to Australia. The situation having entirely changed there is no further opposition but he said he would communicate with the Dominion Government. Wrote a final article for the ’’Sunday Times" on the whole situation. It is now I understand definitely decided that the Dardanelles force is to "be withdrawn. But Bonar Law would not tell if for certain. In the evening l dined with B.C. and took him to the Palace, which he enjoyed very much. I then went on to Ciro’s and then on to Faunthorpe's apartments, as I had not seen him since my last visit to the Western Front.

Sunday December 19th
Very busy all day withpreparations. Lunched at StrattonStreet, with B.C. Basil Gotto came up from the country to see me, so also did Fenton, and we all lunched together at Stratton Street, the afternoon the papers announced that Suvla Bay and Anzac had been evacuated with practically no loss. The news caused a partial sensation but the public had long been prepared for such a step. Gina and Fenton dined with me at Giro!s.

Monday December 20th
Had a very busy day. In the morning I saw Lord Northcliffe and his brother Rothermere, and had along talk with them. Northcliffe has promised to give me letters to a great number of people in America and Australia. At 1 o’clock we had a final meeting and luncheon at the Carlton Hotel between Nevin Tait, Murdoch, Fenton and myself, and the correspondent of the New York "Times", Marshall.  At 4 p.m. J. W. Taylor and Fenton met at my flat to make up their terrible quarrel and I succeeded in arranging this with great difficulty. At 8 o’clock dined at Princes with Harry Preston and aparty of men. My dinner was sadly interfered with by having to

[Page 214]
give interviews to the representatives of the Australian press in London, We all went on to the National Sporting Club to see the fight between Jimmy Wild [Wilde] known as "The Terror", and Sid Smith the flyweight champion. Wild is a great marvel of the age, and is quite unknown outside England. He weighs 6 stone 8 pounds and has long thin arms and legs, is 30 years of age and has ten children. He comes into the ring with long hair over his forehead, which makes him look like a boy of l6 and with a very weary bored expression on his face. All the other fighters, flyweights and featherweights are terrified of him. He never gives away less than 10 lbs, and very often 16 or 20. On this occasion he was giving Sid Smith, who is a very fine fighter about 16 lbs.

To see him fight is a revelation. Wild never lifts his legs or feet off the ground, but seems to slither along and when he gets going heis the greatest marvel the ring has ever seen. All experts are agreed on this. His speed is terrific he dodges like streak lightning and his hitting power tremendous. He sailed into Sid Smith with the most fearful long swinging blows delivered with such bewildering speed that he was at a loss to know what to do with them. The fight lasted eight rounds during which time the unfortunate Smith was knocked down at various periods 27 times before giving in.

Wild then left the ring without having turned a hair. He has fought 200 fights, and his first 36 were won by clean knockouts. He has never been beaten, and only once has had a decision given against him, and that was when he fought Tancy Lee the featherweight champion last year. Wild was in no condition to take the ring as he was suffering from a bad attack of influenza. Until I had seen him I could never believe that such a strange freak of nature existed in the world. Fenton had a farewell party at his house which we all went to after the fight. It was great fun

[Page 215]
and we kept it up until very late. Gina, Teddy Gerard, Phylis Monkman, and many others were there. I drove back to Maida Vale and I was so weary that instead, of returning to ray flat, I slept on the sofa in the drawing room all night, and only just woke up in time to keep a number of important appointments.

Tuesday December 21st
It was today, not Sunday, that the withdrawal from Anzac and Suvla Bay was announced. It was also this morning that I saw Northcliffe and Rothermere and also Harry Lawson, who was very anxious for me to go to the Western Front for him on my return from Australia. I went down and saw Sir George Reid, who promised to send me lett ers to various people in Australia, and I lucnhed with him and General Walker, the Commander of the First Australian Division at Anzac at the Senior. We had an interesting discussion on the whole situation. I was rushed all day, because I did not see how I could get off by tomorrow, but on going around to Cook’s at 4.30 I found that the sailing of the "Baltic" had been postponed. Went around in the afternoon and saw E.R. to say Good bye. Fenton and myself dined at Stratton Street and had a long discussion with B.C. about the desirability of publishing the three documents.

Wednesday December 22nd
I went out to Coombe this morning with Murdoch and Northcliffe and played golf, I had a great match with N who beat me on the last hole. He promised to publish my memorandum to the Cabinet and suggested that it should be sent in by B.C. I saw him later in the day about it and he raised innumerable objections, but finally consented. In the evening I dined with Fenton at Ciros and to my amazement, who should be sitting there with his wife but Winston. This is rather soon to make a return from Elba and I cannot see what has induced him to come back at this stage. He glared at me

[Page 216]
across the room, but I pretended not to see him, and as I left before he did we avoided a meeting, which could only have been unpleasant for both. I then went around to settle up matters with B.C. and afterwards went to the Palace Theatre to pick up Gina

Thursday December 23rd
With the utmost difficulty I managed to pack up and reach Euston at noon accompanied by Gina, Fenton, my brother George who has not yet recovered fromhis wounds receive at Neuve Chapelle and Nevin Tait, who had all come to see me off. Candler, Berin’s manager came as far as Liverpool. Embarked at 5 p.m. on the SS "Baltic". She only carried 58 First Class passengers. We sailed at 6 p.m. but anchored in the Mersey until 8 pm.

Friday December 24th
We took the NorthCoast of Ireland route, as this is supposed to be safer against submarine attack.
Saturday December 25th to
Friday December 31st
At sea in the "Baltic". A very calm passage. She is as steady as a rock, but there is noone of any interest on board.

[Page 217]
[Editor’s note: Carbon copy of a report written by Ashmead Bartlett at Gallipoli, which appears to be addressed to the Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith. However it is not the version which was ultimately sent to Mr Asquith. See pages 237 and 245 and Ashmead Bartlett’s diary, pages 178 and 193]

[Handwritten notes]
pencil notes on margin are "my Uncle Burdett-Coutt’s"
[G?] Robertson 6/4/16
Original Copy will be sent, as per letter E A B

Review Of The Situation In Gallipoli.

It is not necessary to dwell on the initial error of attempting to force the Dardanelles with the Fleet alone, as that is now universally recognised.  All our subsequent difficulties and the position in which the Allied Armies now stand are due to this cause.  The Turks were given ample warning of our intentions and it was easy for them to judge that we had no intention of abandoning the campaign without making a great effort on land.  It should have been obvious that the same brains which had shown so much skill in the defence of the Straits by sea would display just as much energy and determination in preparing the land defences.
But it cannot be maintained that our preparations for the land campaign were based on any such supposition or even on a reasonable estimate of the enemy’s numbers or of the skill which the Germans would show in handling the Turkish armies in Gallipoli,. In spite of the lessons of March 18th we still persisted in underestimating our opponents and his powers of resistance. It does not seem to have been recognised after March 18th that the whole character of the campaign had fundamentally changed, namely, that the army was no longer an auxiliary of the Fleet but must take upon its shoulders the entire burden of clearing the Gallipoli Peninsula. After March 18th the Fleet had in fact become the

[Page 218]
auxiliary of the Amy.  But there seems still to have remained the idea that only a small force was necessary to carry the Turkish positions on the European side up to the Narrows and then it would be a comparatively simple matter to clear the Straits of mines and allow the Fleet through to demonstrate off Constantinople. The immensity of the task ahead of the Allies was certainly not realised when the army landed on April 25th and even to this day there seems to be a general reluctance to face the true facts of the situation.

Also, apparently, there was a very natural disinclination to turn what was originally intended as a minor operation of war into a major one which would involve hundreds of thousands of men at the East of Europe at a moment when both armies in the West were evidently preparing for a decisive trial of strength. Yet, as a matter of fact, it should have been obvious that the attack on Gallipoli had already become a major operation of war directly we showed our hand by the disastrous Fleet action of March 18th. It was obvious that the Germans would leave no stone unturned to render the defences of the peninsula impregnable. It would seem also as if our information as to the enemy’s numbers and the disposition of his troops have been sadly at fault from the start. Thus, having failed to take Constantinople by a coup de

[Page 219]
main on March 18th, we proceeded to try another forlorn hope on April 25th« Our armies were far too small to attempt any such ambitious programme.  The force which originally landed on the Gallipoli Peninsula at Anzac and Seddul Bahr was of about the right strength to have accompanied the Fleet in the first instance for the purpose of effecting a surprise.  Had it "been at hand on March 18th we would now in all reasonable probability be in possession of Constantinople, But as an army which was ab out to undertake an independent operation in which it would only receive a very limited assistance from the Navy, the campaign was doomed to failure from the starts

There is no object in concealing the fact that the original landing very nearly ended in a disastrous failure and the situation was only saved both at Gaba Tepe and Seddul Bahr by the superb heroism of our troops led by the most devoted and self-sacrifing officers.  Yet is is now generally recognised that the Turks actually holding the beaches were extremely few in numbers. Fortunately, the enemy’s reserves were slow in coming up; otherwise we would probably have been driven into the sea. This seems to have been due to the optimism of Liman von Sanders,
[note in margin] he had put Lindan
who did not believe we could possibly carry the beaches in the face of such obstacles.  One cannot blame him for this belief, because the more they are examined the more incredible does the feat become. But the fact remains that nearly fifty per cent of our best troops were

[Page 220]
put out of action in the first day’s fighting and, with the limited numbers at Sir Ian Hamilton’s disposal, there were no reserves with which to follow up the initial success in an endeavour to take the Achi Baba position before the enemy, surprised by our landing, had the chance of bringing up fresh troops and consolidation his positions on the slopes of that mountain.  All we could do was to hold grimly on to the positions we had won and dig ourselves in across the Peninsula and await the arrival of reinforcements.

The False Optimism

Why were the Military Authorities confident they could carry the Achi Baba position and push on to the Narrows with such a small force after the lessons of Flanders, which have proved the immense power enjoyed by the defence in well fortified positions and the vast superiority in numbers necessary for an offensive if it is to be pushed home with any hope of success? I think the answer is to be found in the faith placed in the fire of ships’ guns of large calibre on field works and their demoralising effect on the enemy’s infantry. Otherwise, the positions chosen for the disembarcation are extremely difficult of explanation.  By landing at the Southern extremity of the Peninsula the army was at once brought up against a series of positions of extreme natural strength, all of which would have to be taken by assault before Kilid Bahr on the European side of the Narrows, which was apparently the

[Page 221]
original objective of the army, could be reached. The whole movement would in fact consist of a series of costly frontal attacks on entrenchments.  Whereas had an army been able to get astride the Peninsula at Bulair or Gaba Tepe and present an entrenched front both North and South, it is difficult to see how any food or ammunition could have reached the Turks, with our submarines active in the Dardanelles. At best, they could only have fed with extreme difficulty and in all probability they would have been starved into submission. This, of course, was strategically the big plan to undertake.  But I am not attempting to criticise the Military Authorities for not adopting it.  To carry through successfully it would have required a far larger force than was then available and with the small force originally landed it might easily have ended in disaster.

On April 25th the army was still regarded as the auxiliary of the navy, namely, to March parallel with it up the Peninsula, making good the positions as they were won.  A compromise was adopted, that is to say, the Australians were landed at Anzac to make a diversion on the Turkish flank whilst the 29th Division was to seize the southern end of the Peninsula and work its way gradually up to the Narrows.  It was decided that all the advantages which might be derived from the more ambitious programme must yield in importance to the immense moral and material support which this force would de

[Page 222]
[de]rive from having "both its flanks protected, by the Fleet which could thus bring a cross-fire to bear and rake the enemy’s positions.  Whether this decision was right or wrong, I am not prepared to argue.  One thing is certain that the expectations formed of the Fleet’s guns dismally failed to be realised and once more we have missed our objective.

The Effect Of The Ships.  Guns.
Nothing has been more disappointing that the Effect of these high- velocity, low-trajectory shells, both twelve and six inch# on the enemy’s trenches and field works.  The Turks have proved themselves to be past-masters in digging themselves in.  Time and time again our troops have been held up in their attacks by suddenly finding themselves up against deep trenches, the existence of which had not previously been suspected, hidden as they are amidst the shrub and bracken.  It is often impossible to locate them by aeroplane reconnaissance. For the enemy will cart away all the earth which is usually thrown up in the form of a parapet so as to leave merely a deep, narrow, drain flush with the ground and below the level of the thick shrub.  Unless the position of a trench is accurately known, it is impossible to do it any material damage by shell fire and even if these drains are located, direct shell fire from the

[Page 223]
ships do them practically no harm except by a lucky chance. For a high-explosive shell of this sort must have something to burst against and if there is no parapet, these shells merely burst in front, making huge holes in the ground whilst the fragments fly right over harmlessly.  All the enemy’s infantry have to do is to lie low whilst the bombardment lasts and when it ceases or passes further on, which is generally the signal that our infantry is about to advance, they are ready to meet them with a deadly rifle and machine-gun fire.  

The maps of the Peninsula are so inaccurate and it is so difficult to fire accurately from a moving platform like a ship, that the gunners dare not fire really close ahead of our infantry for fear of hitting them.  Even the tremendous shell fire which was concentrated on the trenches above the beaches on April 25th on positions which would be seen from the foretops had but very little effect.  Therefore, it is easy to understand that the effect is even less on the enemy’s positions inland. These trenches can only be adequately dealt with by howitzers on shore and by field guns.  But the latter must have high-explosive shell and not shrapnel, which is useless against barbed- wire and deep trenches. When I left Gallipoli, there was not a single round of high-explosive shell for the field guns.  Our two big sixty-pounder howitzers were, however, doing good work.

[Page 224]
The Enemy’s Guns
The Turks and Germans have used their machine guns with great skill, such as we are accustomed to in France. Very often our attacks have been held up at critical moments by these concealed weapons. They are also extremely skilful in the use of their artillery. At first, they seemed to be either short of guns or of ammunition and fired very sparingly, but of late they have been much more free, frequently shelling the beaches and trenches and ships approaching too close to the shore.

During the big fight of May 6th to 8th, when we made our last effort to carry Krithia and Achi Baba by assault, they reserved their artillery fire for critical moments when our attacks were being pressed home and on at least three occasions drove the French in hopeless flight out of positions they had successfully taken by assault. They are continually shifting the position of their field guns so as not to draw the fire of the ships’ guns on their artillery positions and especially the fire of the big howitzers. Their favourite time is to open up just before sunset when it is rather late for an aeroplane reconnaissance.
The Position Of The Australians At Anzac.
I have frequently described this position in previous

[Page 225]
dispatches and will not do so again. The Australians are now entrenched impregnably and all the Turks in Europe will not shift them. Von Sanders made a final effort on May 18th-19th, with disastrous results, as we a have afterwards buried over three thousand of their dead.
[note in margin] you had April actually it was May This action, the most successful of the war up to date, has had excellent effect on the colonials who, being a highly intelligent and superior lot of men, had become somewhat discouraged by the failure to achieve any definite success and extremely bored with sitting day after day in trenches. This position May be described as being fairly comfortable and almost self-contained. That is to say, there is no need to keep battleships perpetually off the coast.

On the other hand, a ship or two must be available near at hand to deal with any new batteries the enemy May attempt to place in position to enfilade the beach. I should say it is too much to hope that the enemy will make any further attempt to assault the Anzac position. He is now entrenched up to his neck right round the Australian lines and, unless he is obliged to withdraw the majority of his troops, I do not see it is any more possible for the Australians to drive him back than it is for the Turks to drive the Australians into the sea. Thus, at Anzac you have a perfect stale-mate. There would be no object in sending reinforcements there as the position will not hold another man,

[Page 226]
being over-crowded as it is, and it could only be extended at very great sacrifice of life. The value of Anzac to us is that it retains a large Turkish force, it is a perpetual menace to their flank in their operations farther south against Seddul Bahr and it undoubtedly complicates the question of supply, for the prisoners taken at Achi Baba complain that the Anzac troops steal their supplies on the way down the Peninsula. Anzac is held by four Australian and one New Zealand Brigade, with about eighteen guns, all there is room for. These Brigades have suffered very heavily, but new drafts have been sent up from Egypt, chiefly from the dismounted Australian Horse who carry the same rifle, but not the same equipment, as the infantry. I believe, therefore, the Australian' Corps is very nearly up to strength again. The material of the new drafts is excellent and it has been decided it is better to complete their training in the tranches rather than in Egypt.

The Position Of Our Army At Seddul Bahr.
Very erroneous reports have appeared in the Press from time to time on the position of the Allied Armies at the southern end of the Gallipoli Peninsula. "We have made good progress", "The Army is advancing into the interior". "Maidos has been occupied". These statements and many others have been allowed by the Censor at home to appear in the papers, thus hopelessly

[Page 227]
misleading the public and rendering the subsequent disappointment all the more keen. It is surely one of the first duties of a Censor to stop these ridiculous and ludicrous lies, as it is for him to suppress the truth when he considers it might be harmful. As a matter of sober fact, the Allies are only a few hundred yards farther onward then they were three days after the landing. A few of the enemy’s advanced trenches have been taken, but his main line in front of Krithia and on the lower slopes of Achi Baba remains intact and is daily being strengthened by new works and more wire. Yet, these are the positions some of our leaders were confident they could occupy on the very night of the landing, so hopelessly was the situation misjudged.

The failure of the great assault on May 8th led to a change in tactics. The lessons of Flanders should have shown the hopelessness of the attempt before it was undertaken. I fancy, however, the Generals felt something desperate must be undertaken to retrieve the position.  Trench warfare is at present the order of the day and on our extreme left we have made some sensible progress, although very slow, towards turning the enemy’s right wing and enveloping Krithia. In the centre, however, we have been held up and up to the time of my departure had gained very little ground. Trench warfare is the only sound course to adopt but at the present rate of progression it will be months before we get Achi Baba. There seems to be an idea that the taking of this position will open

[Page 228]
the country up to the Narrows and that taking the Narrows will open the gate for the Fleet to pass through to Constantinople. Yet, there is little justification for either of these beliefs. There are two other great positions behind Achi Baba before we can reach Kelid Bahr and, although I have no certain information, there is every reason to believe the enemy is fortifying these to meet future eventualities. Therefore, unless his resistance suddenly collapses, an eventuality on which we have no right to speculate, each of these positions will have to be taken yard by yard, trench by trench.

Also, taking the Narrows will no longer open the road for the Fleet to pass through to Constantinople, because the Turks have been mining the Channel (right) the way up to Gallipoli. They have been erecting new batteries on shore and placing fresh torpdeo tubes in position. Therefore, let no one suppose that once the Narrows is taken, the longer reach of narrow water beyond can be tackled with impunity. At the present moment we have not got a military position at all at the southern end of Gallipoli. I do not think we could be driven out of it, but we are not comfortable as every yard of the plain which we hold is exposed to the fire of the enemy's batteries and all the beaches can be swept by his heavy guns. Every movement we make is visible to him on the higher ground and his guns can be moved from position to position in

[Page 229]
perfect concealment. He, therefore, is constantly effecting some new surprise by shelling beaches, ships and camps from totally unexpected positions. The fire of field guns does but little harm but the moral effect on troops, who are thus constantly exposed to shell fire and on the qui vive, is bad. Regiments are brought out of the trenches into rest camps, but what are these camps? It merely means moving them back to the shade of some trees closer to the coast, where at any hour they May be smothered with shrapnel or blown up by high explosive shells.

The enemy has got two big guns in position behind the slope of Achi Baba and with these they started a systematic bombardment of W  Beach or Lancashire Beach, as it is now known. In two days they killed one hundred horses and several men! These high explosive shells naturally get on the nerves of the working parties. Also a tremendous amount of digging had to be undertaken and the horses placed on roads cut in the cliffs, where they are fairly safe. We are much in the same position as an army besieging a fortress which is held by a more powerful garrison than the besieging force and which constantly makes sorties. In fact, as we are situated at present, the Turks have it in their power to annoy us in a hundred different ways, whilst our chances of retaliation are small. It is still considered necessary to keep battleships protecting the flanks, even

[Page 230]
after the arrival of submarines. This led to the loss of the "Goliath", Triumph", and "Majestic". As long as it is necessary to keep ships on the flanks to keep down the enemy’s shell-fire from the Asiatic and European shores, it cannot be maintained that the Allied Army is either self-contained or comfortable.

The Troops In Southern Gallipoli.
Our Army in Southern Gallipoli at present consists of the following units. The remains of the splendid 29th Division, now reduced to below the strength of one brigade. This Division bore the brunt of the fighting during the landing and in holding the positions then won. The losses have never yet been made good as only an allowance of drafts representing a loss of ten per cent were available, whereas the real losses of the Division amounted to nearly seventy per cent; the remains of the Naval Division, originally eleven thousand strong, which has also had very heavy losses. This Division has fought extremely well considering its heterogeneous and amateur elements. Cox's Indian Brigade of two battalions, as the two Punjabi battalions were sent back to Egypt. The Gurkha and Sikh battalions have done extremely well. Then there is the Lancashire Territorial Division. Its losses have been slight up to date. The men in all three brigades are considered good but the officers in the East Lancashire Brigade have done badly. This Brigade has now

[Page 231]
been broken up and its units distributed amongst the remnants of the 29th Division.  These were all the forces we had in Southern Gallipoli when I left the front. The Lowland Division of Territorials was due to arrive. The French force had been brought up to the strength of two Divisions or twenty-four Battalions. Of these troops, the Division which first landed has lost very heavily. The troops are bad and liable to sudden panics. They seem incapable of consolidating and holding a position after it has been won. The worst offenders are the Senegalese Infantry, who are all right in attack as long as their European officers are with them but who are useless without them. The 175th Regiment of the line is somewhat immature.

The Foreign Legion are perhaps the best, followed by the Colonial Infantry. But the heart of the French is not in the job. They never fight the same off their own soil and in this expedition they feel they have nothing to gain for themselves and are merely pulling chestnuts out of the fire for others. The tension which existed between the higher commands has been relieved by the departure of General D'Amade. That General seems to have gone off his head very early in the proceedings. General Gouraud apparently enjoys the confidence of the army. Thus, it will be obvious that our forces in Southern Gallipoli, as at present constituted, are not in a position to resume the offensive against Achi Baba on an ambitious scale, The arrival of the Lowland Division will relieve the

[Page 232]
pressure on the old troops, but no General dares undertake serious operations with these troops until they have become accustomed to their surroundings and have been tested in action. All that can be expected at the present time is a continuation of this slow out-flanking movement on our left wing behind Krithia and the same slow advance in the centre.

What Gan Be Done In The Future?
I have attempted this short review of the existing situation in order to make it perfectly clear what courses are open to us in the future. It is surely much better to face the true facts and to take a new survey of our position than to go on deceiving ourselves that we are on the verge of achieving a decisive success which is only a dream. We have definitely failed in our original objective, namely, the forcing of the Straits and the rapid capture of Constantinople. The present Force in its present positions will never carry out that ambitious programme.
We attempted the possible too late, when it had unfortunately become an impossibility. Therefore, how can we get out of our present difficulties without loss of prestige? For the time being, the Fleet as an active factor in the operations must be eliminated altogether. Quite apart from the obstacles which are insurmountable right up to Gallipoli, the presence of submarines

[Page 233]
has rendered its position off the coast intolerable. We have already lost three capital ships and have little or nothing to show for it. If we are to eventually achieve our original objective, the task can only be accomplished by the army. The lighter vessels of the Fleet must still be utilised for bombarding the enemy’s guns and keeping down the Asiatic batteries. Also, the Fleet must safeguard the seaway from Malta and the landing of supplies. But if we are to achieve our original objective, namely, the taking of Constantinople by opening up the Narrows, the task can only be accomplished by the army.

But not the army such as we have now. We want at least another five divisions. We cannot say we are in a position to clear the Dardanelles, to allow the Fleet to pass, until we have driven all the Turkish armies out of the Gallipoli Peninsula, north of the lines of Bulair into Thrace, where they can do us no more harm. Or else, we must bottle them up in Gallipoli by getting astride the Peninsula and cutting off their supplies. Such a movement with an entirely new army landed at Bulair or Enos would probably lead to decisive results, especially if a few more submarines of the latest type were sent to the fleet to stop traffic from Asia to Europe. Once we get astride the Peninsula and present a strong defensive front towards the North and South, I believe the Turks would be obliged to abandon their position in front of Anzac and along Achi Baba inside of a week. Even now the

[Page 234]
prisoners who come in declare they often go without food for two days. I am simply stating the position in Gallipoli and what is required to carry through the enterprise without having any knowledge of the troops and munitions available at home for the purpose. It is for the Military Authorities to consider whether the prize is worth the price, and, if it is worth the price, and if the means are available to carry it through; whether in fact we can spare enough men and enough guns and ammunition from the Western theatre of war and from home defence to carry the near Eastern expedition through to its logical conclusion. If they are not available and this programme is considered too ambitious, why then, we should consider an alternative policy and concentrate all our efforts on its fulfilment. If we cannot carry out the whole programme, we ought to concentrate all our efforts on taking up a real defensive position where we will be quite comfortable and where the army will be altogether independent of the fleet for long periods if necessary. The Australians at Anzac are fairly comfortable where they are but, in the south, we are not. We should, therefore, assuming no separate army for a diversion at Enos or Bulair is available, endeavour to take Achi Baba and thus present a fine defensive front to the enemy which would give us a zone absolutely clear from artillery fire for troops and munitions. But even for this operation we require more men than are at present available even after the arrival of the Lowland

[Page 235]
Division. The position is complicated by the fact that there is no more room for even the Lowland Division on the small stretch which we hold. However, this can be overcome by keeping the reserve divisions on the islands, like Imbros, Tenedos or Lemnos, where they can be taken to Gallipoli in a few hours on tugs, trawlers and destroyer without much fear of submarines. The whole point is, you must be able to relieve the troops in the front line as often as possible in the arduous work of sapping against the enemy’s trenches or after they have lost heavily in an assault. It is asking too much to expect the same men to go forward day after day as they have been asked to do up to the present.

To sum up our position at the present time in Gallipoli is this. We have two jumping-off points for a further offensive, the one at Anzac secure and the other at the southern extremity - insecure, exposed and uncomfortable. Along neither of these positions can we develop a front for the useful deployment of more troops. If the necessary men and guns can be spared, the only sound course will be to make a great diversion elsewhere and get astride the Peninsula, thus entirely cutting off the Turkish armies in front of these positions or else forcing them to withdraw so many men that we shall

[Page 236]
be able to resume the offensive with fair prospects of success. If this course is decided on it will probably be found wider to abandon any further frontal attacks on Achi Baba and merely to hold the ground we have won, as the Achi Baba position would then fall automatically. But if men cannot be spared for the larger movement, why then, enough reinforcements should be sent to enable us to take the Achi Baba position step by step, even if it takes a very long time to accomplish. The task of landing another great army has become immesurably more difficult now that submarines have reached Eastern waters and, if it is attempted, we must be prepared to face heavy losses in ships. Of course, the intervention of Bulgaria would obviate this difficulty and we should have Gallipoli in a very few days. Even a well-timed diversion would probably lead to the break-up of the Turkish armies on our front.

As things stand at present, I do not see the smallest chance of our being able to clear the Peninsula, advancing from our positions at Anzac and Seddul Bahr. I think we are merely living in a fool’s paradise. We May gain ground from time to time by sapping, but the campaign will drag on indefinitely and we shall certainly never realise our hopes of achieving a rapid success in the East which will have a decisive effect on the campaign in the West.

[Page 237]
[Editor’s note: It is not known when, if at all, this version was seen by Mr Asquith]
[Handwritten notes]
This was prepared at request of Mr Asquith who thought the "Review" [was 20pp?] too long for submission to the Cabinet
GR 6/4/16
Summary of Long Memorandum to Cabinet
E. Ashmead Bartlett 

Memorandum On The Situation In Gallipoli.
The Fleet
For the time being, the Fleet can play no active part in the reduction of the Straits. In fact, our ships now never attempt to go beyond Tott’s Battery. The enemy’s mine field is intact, the damage to the forts at the Narrows has been made good, and the existence of concealed torpedo tubes on shore is perhaps the most serious obstacle of all. In addition, the presence of the enemy’s submarines has greatly complicated the difficulties. The lighter vessels can, however, assist in keeping down the fire of the enemy’s batteries and from time to time battleships will have to be employed for this purpose, especially in searching the ground behind the Kum-Kale Yeni-Shehr Ridge on the Asiatic shore.

It is a fundamental error to assume any longer that, if we are able to occupy the southern extremity of the peninsula so as to embrace Kilid Bahr and the European shore of the Harrows, we have opened the gate to Constantinople for the Fleet. The enemy has been engaged for two months in forfifying the longer reach of waters stretching from the Narrows to the entrance of the Sea of Marmora by placing heavy guns in field works on both shores, in preparing new mine fields and torpedo tubes; and, in addition, he is reported to be prepared to sink ships to guard the passage a scheme, however,

[Page 238]
of doubtful utility, Therefore, even with the Kilid Bahr plateau in our possession, we shall have to tackle the longer reach of waters beyond. Therefore, any operation limited in their objective to the seizure of the Kilid Bahr Plateau can lead to no decisive results. They will merely carry us a certain distance forward and enable us to make a fresh survey of the further task ahead. At the present time our operations both from the Southern Gallipoli and from the Anzac positions are being directed towards the obtainment of this limited objective, which will not open the gate to Constantinople.

Anzac Position.
Neither is there even a reasonable prospect of their succeeding.  The Australians at Anzac hold the most extraordinary position in which an army has ever found itself, clinging as they are to the face of the cliffs. Roughly the position consists of two semi-circles of hills, the outer higher than the inner. They are extremely well entrenched and cannot be driven from their position by artillery fire or legitimate attacks, as was shown in the utter failure of the Turks on May 18th and 19th. But a successful use of gas might render their position precarious. The Turks are entrenched up to their necks all round them. Towards the north they are on higher ground, but towards the south on lower, and in one place they hold ground which cuts right into our outer line and enables them to snipe right down Shrapnel Valley. The Australians cannot advance as any attempt at a general attack would

[Page 239]
probably only lead to much the same slaughter as the Turks suffered when making their last effort to which I have referred. The position is held by five Brigades and will not hold another man, being already overcrowded. We cannot develop a wide front along the low ground towards the south as long as the enemy holds the small promontory of Gaba Tepe, which has been transformed into a regular fortress and which has defied all our efforts in spite of the terrific fire to which it has been subjected by the Fleet. The position at Anzac is, therefore, a complete stale-mate.

Position At Seddul Bahr.
Here we occupy the plain at the foot of the Achi Baba position and cannot get on.  All our lines are exposed to full view and to the enemy’s artillery fire. He has made the Krithia-Achi-Baba-Kereves-Dere position a regular fortress which can only be taken trench by trench. Our assaults have repeatedly failed. The position is thoroughly uncomfortable. Our trenches are, however, very strong and I do not think we could be driven off the peninsula by legitimate attacks. But once again the employment of gas might render our lines untenable, and the wind almost invariably blows off the shore. Again, it is an error to suppose that the possession of Achi Baba would open the road to Kilid Bahr. The enemy, according to all information, has been busy making a net-work of trenches on the two lines of hills behind, and all these positions will have to be slowly snapped against and then stormed. This will involve

[Page 240]
heavy loss and great delay.  On the ground we hold there is only room for the employment of a limited number of troops, but the reserve divisions can be kept in the neighbouring islands. In time, given sufficient reinforcements and a large supply of Field Howitzers, we might slowly work our way forward and occupy the Kilid Bahr Plateau. But again I would repeat, this means a vast operation of war, endless delays, and then only the attainment of a limited objective.

The New Objective.
Therefore it would seem we must abandon our early objective and seek for another which should lead to decisive results. We should eliminate any idea of active assistance from the Fleet, except submarines, and regard the situation purely from the military standpoint. The whole of the Gallipoli peninsula has, in fact, been transformed into an immense fortress. We are supposed to be besieging it, but, instead of cutting the enemy1s communications and consequently stopping his supplies, we are endeavouring to force a way forward through the entire length of his successive lines of works. This must be wrong, judged from almost any military standpoint. Therefore, there is only one alternative plan, namely to concentrate all our efforts to get astride the peninsula either at, or rather north of, Bulair.  I cannot speak from personal knowledge of the character of the landings available, as I have never been so far north; but all such information is in possession

[Page 241]
of the naval and military authorities. There will be no need for us actually to storm the lines of Bulair if they are considered too strong. We can establish fortified line across the peninsula north of them. For this purpose a force of five Divisions should ensure success, provided at least two of these Divisions are troops which can be absolutely depended upon without a preliminary trial, which has so often proved necessary with our new formations.  As far as I know, the landing can he covered and assisted most materially by the guns of the Fleet right across to the Straits.

This force May seem very large but it must be borne in mind that the exact numbers of the enemy are not accurately known in Thrace, and we must he prepared to meet any formations he might send against us from the north, in addition to those who are now in the Gallipoli Peninsula. These are, I believe, estimated to amount to anything from seventy thousand to one hundred thousand. Personally, I am inclined towards the lower figure, after the heavy losses he has suffered. This fresh landing north of Bulair will force the enemy to conform to our plan of campaign, more especially if it can be carried out as a surprise. The Turks are now entrenched in fixed positions opposite Anzac and at Achi Baba.  You cannot move troops thus entrenched rapidly.  All his guns are in fixed positions and would take days to move north to meet the new menace. I would not advocate using the troops now at Seddul Bahr and Anzac for this new movement, but it might be

[Page 242]
desirable to take off three of the Australian Brigades, and place new formations in their trenches.  These Australians, who have been brought up to strength, are now experienced and extremely good in enterprises which require dash and initiative. The troops at Seddul Bahr should be left.  The 29th. Division and Naval Division have had a very rough time, and probably the East Lancashire Division have lost heavily by now. The Lowland Division, might, however, be spared to form one of the five.

If our estimate of the enemy’s numbers is correct he cannot possibly have enough men available successfully to oppose a landing on a broad front. He must, therefore, weaken his forces in front of Anzac and draw men from Achi Baba. But he dare not weaken his lines very considerably in the face of the troops we are keeping on these positions. At both points we must be prepared to take the offensive the moment he shows signs of withdrawing. Once firmly established and entrenched across the neck of the peninsula, the campaign is at an end. The Turkish Armies in Gallipoli could not hold out for ten days. They have no reserve of supplies on the peninsula. Everything is brought by sea from Constantinople, or comes across the lines of Bulair from Thrace. Already the task of feeding their troops is difficult enough. The presence of a few more of our submarines in the Sea of Marmora would render the task impossible, once we are astride the neck. Torpedoes and stores

[Page 243]
and oil could be supplied to the submarines by land, and they would no longer have to run the dangerous passage of the Straits. The demoralising effect on the Turkish Armies in Southern Gallipoli of a new force landed right in their rear across their lines of communication should not be forgotten. It would also be desirable to allow the French, if they can spare the available troops, to make a fresh landing at Kum Kale and occupy the Kum Kale-Yeni Shehr Ridge.  This would have the effect of diverting the enemy’s attention, forcing him to keep his troops on the Asiatic coast, and would also prevent him harassing the beaches on Southern Gallipoli by erecting new batteries, which he is constantly trying to do. Only a small force is required for this purpose and the French Staff have always favoured its re-occupation.

Quite apart from the broader aspect of its effect on the war as a whole, there seems to me to be two local reasons why it is highly desirable to make some decisive move in Gallipoli. The one, the ever constant fear that the enemy May resort to the use of gas, in which case we might easily be driven into the sea; secondly is the fear of an outbreak of cholera amongst the Turkish troops which might spread to our own. In November 1912, they lost nineteen thousand men in ten days along the lines of Chataldja. This outbreak was brought by the troops coming from Asia Minor.

[Page 244]
In conclusion, once you get astride the peninsula the campaign is won. You have only then to clear the minefield and get your Fleet through to Constantinople.  The real obstacle to success is the presence of submarines, an we must be prepared to lose some ships.

[Page 245]
[Editor’s note: This letter addressed to the British Prime Minister was given to Keith Murdoch in Gallipoli to take to England. He was intercepted at Marseilles by British authorities and obliged to hand it over. A copy was finally delivered by Ashmead Bartlett when he was in England in October although Asquith May have seen the original]
[Handwritten note] 
This is the carbon copy of the original letter sent
September 8th 1915.
Dear Mr Asquith
I hope you will excuse the liberty I am taking in writing to you but I have the chance of sending this letter through by hand and I consider it absolutely necessary that you should know the true state of affairs out here. Our last great effort to achieve some definite success against the Turks was the most ghastly and costly fiasco in our history since the Battle of Bannockburn.  Personally I never thought the scheme decided on by Headquarters ever had the slightest chance of succeeding and all efforts now to make out that it only just failed owing to the failure of the 9th Corps to seize the Anafarta Hills bare no relation to the real truth.  

The operations did for a time make headway in an absolutely impossible country more than any general had a right to expect owing to the superlative gallantry of the Colonial Troops and the self-sacrificing manner in which they threw away their lives against positions which should never have been attacked.  The main idea was to cut off the southern portion of the Turkish Army by getting astride of the Peninsula from Suvla Bay.  Therefore the whole weight of the attack should have been concentrated on this objective, instead of which the main attack with the best troops was delivered against the side of the Turkish position which is a series of impossible mountains and valleys covered with dense scrub.  The Staff seem to have carefully serached for the most difficult points and then threw away thousands of lives in trying to take them by frontal attacks.  A few Gourkas obtained a lodgement on Chunuk Bair but were immediately driven off by the Turkish counter attacks and the main objective Koja Chemen Tepe was never approached.  The 9th Corps, miserably mishandled, having failed to take the Anafarta Hills is now accused of

[Page 246]
being alone responsible for the ultimate failure of the operation. The failure of the 9th Corps was due not so much to the employment of new and untried troops as to bad staff work.  The generals had but a vague idea of the nature of the ground in their front and no adequate steps were taken to keep the troops supplied with water. In consecquence many of these unfortunate volunteers went three days in very hot weather on one bottle of water and were yet expected to advance carrying heavy loads and to storm strong positions. The Turks having been given ample time to bring up strong reinforcements to Anafarta, where they entrenched themselves in up to their necks, were again assaulted in a direct frontal attack on August 21st.  The movement never had the slightest chance of succeeding and led to another bloody fiasco in which the unfortunate 29th Division who were brought up especially from Helles, and the 2nd Mounted Division (Yeomanry) were the chief suffers. As the result of all this fighting our casualties since August 6th now total nearly fifty thousand killed wounded and missing.

The army is in fact in a deplorable condition. Its morale as a fighting force has suffered greatly and the officers and men are thoroughly dispirited.  The muddles and mismanagement beat anything that has ever occured in our Military History.  The fundamental evil at the present moment is the absolute lack of confidence in all ranks in the Headquarters Staff. The confidence of the army will never be restored until a really strong man is placed at to its head. It would amaze you to hear the talk that goes on amongst the Junior commanders of Divisions and Brigades. Except for the fact that the traditions of discipline still hold the force togther you would imagine that the units were in an open state of mutiny against Headquarters. The Commander in Chief and his Staff are openly spoken of, and in fact only

[Page 247]
mentioned at all with derision.  One hates to write of such things but in the interests of the country at the present crisis I feel they ought to be made known to you. The lack of a real Chief at the head of the army destroys its discipline and efficiency all through and gives full rein to the jealousies and recriminations which ever prevail amongst the Divisional Leaders. At the present time the army is incapable of a further offensive.  The splendid Colonial Corps has been almost wiped out. Once again the 29th Division has suffered enormous losses and the new formations have lost their bravest and best officers and men. Neither do I think even with enormous reinforcements, that any fresh offensive from our present positions has the smallest chance of success.  Our only real justification for throwing away fresh lives and fresh treaure in this unfortunate enterprise is the prospect of the certain cooperation of Bulgaria. With her assaistance we should undoubtly pull through. But as I know nothing of the attitude of Bulgaria or Greece or Italy I am only writing to give you a true picture of the state of the army and the problems with which we are faced in the future if we are left to fight the Turks alone.

Already the weather shows signs of breaking and by the end of this month we cannot rely on any continous spell of calm for the landing of large bodies of troops at some other point on the coast.  In fact the season will soon be too late for a fresh offensive if another is contemplated.  We have therefore to prepare against the coming of the winter or to withdraw the army altogether.  I am assuming it is considered desirable to avoid the latter contingency at all costs for political reasons owing to the confession of final failure it would entail and the moral effect it might have in India and Egypt. I am convinced the troops could be withdrawn under cover of the warships without much loss far less in fact than we suffer in any ordinary attack.  I assume also

[Page 248]
that the future of the campaign out here must he largely dependant on the measure of success that attends our fresh offensive, in conjunction with the French, in the West. It is no use pretending that our prospects for the winter are bright.  The Navy seems to think it will be able to keep the army supplied in spells of calm weather provided a sufficient reserve of food munitions and ammunition is concentrated while the weather holds ate the various beaches. The outlook for the unfortunate troops is deplorable. We do not hold a single commanding position on the Peninsula and at all three points Helles, Anzac and Suvla Bay we are everywhere commanded by the enemy’s guns. This means that throughout the winter all the beaches and lines of communication to the front trenches will be under constant shell fire. Suvla Bay is especially exposed.

The Turks are firing a fair amount of ammunition but it is obvious they are feeling the shortage or else are carefully husbanding their supply otherwise they could shell us off the Peninsula at some points altogther.  But it must be remembered that as soon as they are absolutely certain our offensive has shot its bolt, and that we are settling down in our positions for the winter, they will be free to concentrate their artillery at certain points and also to bring up big guns from the forts and therefore we must expect a far more severe artillery fire on the beaches during the winter months than we are exposed to at present. A great many of the trenches which we hold at present will have to be abandoned altogther during the winter as they will be underwater. This will mean concentrating the army at certain points on dry ground and preparing a series of defensive works which will insure us against sudden surprise attacks. We could thus hold our positions with fewere men and rest some of the Divisions from time to time in the neighbouring Islands

[Page 249]
We ought to be able to hold Helles without much trouble but even if we commence our preparations in time we shall be faced with enormous difficulties at Anzac and Suvla Bay.  Our troops will have to face the greatest hardships from cold wet trenches and constant artillery fire. I believe that at the present time the sick rate for the army is roughly 1000 per day.  During the winter it is bound to rise to an even higher figure. I know one general, whose judgement is usually sound who considers we shall lose during the winter in sickness alone the equivalent of the present strength of the army.  This May be an exageration but in any case our loss is bound to be very heavy.  The whole army dreads beyond all else the prospect of wintering on this dreary and inhospitable coast.  Amongst other troubles the autumn rains will once more bring to view houndredd of our dead who now lie under a light covering of soil.

But I suppose we must stay here as long as there is the smallest prospect of the Balkan Alliance being revived and throwing in its lot with us even if they do not make a move until next Spring.  I have laid before you some of the difficulties with which we are faced in order that they May be boldly met before it is too late.  No one seems to know out here what we are going to do in the future and I am so afraid we shall drag on in a state of uncertainty until the season is too far advanced for us to make proper preperations to face the coming winter in a certain measure of comfort and security.  At the present time some of our positions gained by the Colonial Corps high up on the spurs of the hills on which the Turks are perched cannot be considered secure. A sudden counter attack vigorously delivered would jepordise the safety of our line and might lead to a serious disaster. There will have to be a general reshuffling of the whole line and some of our advanced posts will have to be abandoned during the winter months.

[Page 250]
I have only dealt with our own troubles and difficulties. The enemy of course has his. But to maintain as I saw stated in an offical report that his losses in the recent fighting were far heavier than ours is a childish falsehood which deceives no one out here. He was acting almost the whole time on the defensive and probably lost about one third of our grand total. You May think I am too pessimistic but my views are shared by the large majority of the army. The confidence of the troops can only be restored by an immediate change in the supreme command.

 Even if sufficent drafts are sent out to make good our losses we shall never succeed operating from our present positions. A fresh landing on a grand scale north of Buliar would probably insure success but the season is late and I suppose the troops are not available.  If we are to stay here for the winter let orders be given for the army to start its preperations without delay. If possible have the Colonial troops taken off the Peninsula altogther because they are miserably depressed since the last failure and with their active minds, and positions they occupy in civil life, a dreay winter in the trenches will have a deplorable effect on what is left of this once magnificent body of men, the finest any Empire has ever produced.  If we are obliged to keep this army locked up in Gallipoli this winter large reserves will be necessary to make good its losses in sickness. The cost of this campaign in the east must be out of all proportion to the results we are likely to obtain now, in time, to have a decisive effect on the general theatre of war.  Our great asset against the Germans was always considered to be our superior financial strength. In Gallipoli we are dissipating a large portion of our fortune and have not yet gained a single acre of ground of any strategical value.  Unless we can pull through with the aid of the Balkan League in the near future this futile expenditure May ruin our prospects

[Page 251]
of bringing the war to a successful conclusion by gradually wearing down Germany’s colossal military power. I have taken the liberty of writing very fully because I have no means of knowing how far the real truth of the situation is known in England and how much the Military Authorities disclose.  I thought therefore that perhaps the opinions of an independent observer might be of value to you at the present juncture.  I am of course breaking the censorship regulations by sending this letter through but I have not the slightest hesitation in doing so as I feel it is absolutely essential for you to know the truth. I have been requested over and over again by officers of all ranks to go home and personally disclose the truth but it is difficult for me to leave until the beginning of October.

Hoping you will therefore excuse the liberty I have taken.
Believe me
Yours very truly
E. Ashmead Bartlet
The Rt. Hon. H.S.Asquith
10 Downing Street.

[Edited by Peter Mayo for the State Library of New South Wales]